Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Looks for multiple users that had their admin role removed by a single user within a certain period.
'This query look for Service Principal accounts that are no longer used where a user has added or updated credentials for them before logging in with the Service Principal.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
' This query will detect logins from guest account which was recently deleted.
For any successful logins from deleted identities should be investigated further if any existing user accounts have been altered or linked to such identity prior deletion'
For any successful logins from deleted identities should be investigated further if any existing user accounts have been altered or linked to such identity prior deletion'
'This query looks for diagnostic settings that are removed from a resource.
This could indicate an attacker or malicious internal trying to evade detection before malicious act is performed.
If the diagnostic settings are being deleted as part of a parent resource deletion, the event is ignores.'
This could indicate an attacker or malicious internal trying to evade detection before malicious act is performed.
If the diagnostic settings are being deleted as part of a parent resource deletion, the event is ignores.'
'Indicates when an anomalous number of resources are created in Azure via AzureActivity log. Resource creation could indicate malicious or spurious use of your Azure Resource allocation.'
'It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user.
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
'Identifies any Azure VM Run Command operations and links these operations with
MDE host logging. Linking these two data sources provides hunting opportunities.
Logging from AzureActivity provides the IP address and UPN of the account that
invoked the command. Joining this with logging from MDE provides insights into
what cmdlets were loaded by the command.'
MDE host logging. Linking these two data sources provides hunting opportunities.
Logging from AzureActivity provides the IP address and UPN of the account that
invoked the command. Joining this with logging from MDE provides insights into
what cmdlets were loaded by the command.'
'This querys look for users accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently, who then have a MFA method added or updated before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
'This hunting query identifies updates to the RequiredResourceAccess property of an OAuth application.
This property specifies resources that an application requires access to and the set of OAuth permission scopes and application roles that it needs under each of those resources.
This pre-configuration of required resource access drives the consent experience. The resourceAccess property of the requiredResourceAccess type is a collection of ResourceAccess.
A threat actor might update this property before granting permissions to an application.
'
This property specifies resources that an application requires access to and the set of OAuth permission scopes and application roles that it needs under each of those resources.
This pre-configuration of required resource access drives the consent experience. The resourceAccess property of the requiredResourceAccess type is a collection of ResourceAccess.
A threat actor might update this property before granting permissions to an application.
'
'Detects successful signins using single factor authentication where the device, location, and ASN are abnormal.
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
'This query determines rare activity by a high-value account on a system or service. If any account with rare activity is found, the query retrieves related activity from that account on the same day and summarizes the information.'
'Looks for new device registrations following a risky user account sign-in. By default the
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
'PIM provides a key mechanism for assigning privileges to accounts, this query detects changes to PIM role settings.
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Goal: Find machines in the last N days where the SystemGuardSecurityLevel value NOW is less than it was BEFORE.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
'Detects anomalous IP address usage by user accounts and then checks to see if a suspicious Teams action is performed.
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
Query calculates IP usage Delta for each user account and selects accounts where a delta >= 90% is observed between the most and least used IP.
To further reduce results the query performs a prevalence check on the lowest used IP's country, only keeping IP's where the country is unusual for the tenant (dynamic ranges).
Please note, if the initial logic of prevalence to find suspicious logon activity is noisy then consider adding filtering based on Location.
Finally the user accounts activity within Teams logs is checked for suspicious commands (modifying user privileges or admin actions) during the period the suspicious IP was active.'
'Identifies when the Azure Run Command operation is executed by a UserPrincipalName and IP Address that has resulted in a recent user entity behaviour alert.'
'Often times after the initial compromise the attackers create inbox rules to delete emails that contain certain keywords.
This is done so as to limit ability to warn compromised users that they've been compromised. Below is a sample query that tries to detect this.
Reference: https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/7kyp0a/recent_phishing_attempts_my_experience_and_what/'
This is done so as to limit ability to warn compromised users that they've been compromised. Below is a sample query that tries to detect this.
Reference: https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/7kyp0a/recent_phishing_attempts_my_experience_and_what/'
'This query could identify critical user management operations like user registration(Microsoft Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication & self-service password reset (SSPR)) authentication by admin account followed by attempts to stop System Restore activity. Stopping system restore prevents from recovering data by going back to a restore point. The operations could be an indication of attackers trying to maintain persistence, move laterally with attempts to stop system restore point that could point to a potential ransomware attack.'
'This script identifies rare domain accounts accessing cloud resources by examining logs. You can lower the domainLimit value to see domains with fewer access attempts. For example, set domainLimit = 2 to see domains with 2 or fewer access attempts.'
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