Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `UpdateSAMLProvider` event, analyzing fields such as `sAMLProviderArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity` details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.
The following analytic identifies instances where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is disabled for a user within the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to MFA settings. Disabling MFA removes a critical security layer, making accounts more vulnerable to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attacker attempting to maintain persistence or an insider threat, significantly increasing the risk of unauthorized access. Immediate investigation is required to validate the reason for disabling MFA, potentially re-enable it, and assess any other suspicious activities related to the affected account.
This analytic identifies the assignment of the 'Application Administrator' role to an Azure AD user. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.
This analytic identifies potential privilege escalation activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment by correlating multiple analytics from the "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" analytic story within a specified time frame. This is significant for a SOC as it helps identify coordinated attempts to gain elevated privileges, which could indicate a serious security threat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, leading to potential data breaches and further compromise of the network.
The following analytic detects `UpdateTrail` events within AWS CloudTrail logs, aiming to identify attempts by attackers to evade detection by altering logging configurations. By updating CloudTrail settings with incorrect parameters, such as changing multi-regional logging to a single region, attackers can impair the logging of their activities across other regions. This behavior is crucial for Security Operations Centers (SOCs) to identify, as it indicates an adversary's intent to operate undetected within a compromised AWS environment. The impact of such evasion tactics is significant, potentially allowing malicious activities to proceed without being logged, thereby hindering incident response and forensic investigations.
The following analytic identifies IAM users attempting to update or modify AWS Lambda code via the AWS CLI. It leverages CloudTrail logs to detect successful `UpdateFunctionCode` events initiated by IAM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gain persistence, further access, or plant backdoors within your AWS environment. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could upload and execute malicious code automatically when the Lambda function is triggered, potentially compromising the integrity and security of your AWS infrastructure.
The following analytic detects when a single service principal in Azure AD creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute span. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation initiated by service principals. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attacker using a compromised or malicious service principal to rapidly establish multiple service principals, potentially staging an attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could facilitate network infiltration or expansion, allowing the attacker to gain unauthorized access and persist within the environment.
The analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen regions. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs to identify events where resources are started or created, and cross-references these with a baseline of known regions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources from unfamiliar locations. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized resource creation, potential data exfiltration, or further compromise of cloud infrastructure.
This analytic identifies when a new owner is assigned to an application registration within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. This activity is significant because assigning a new owner to an application registration can grant significant control over the application's configuration, permissions, and behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could modify the application's settings, permissions, and behavior, leading to unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, or the introduction of malicious behavior within the application's operations.
The following analytic identifies the addition of a new federated domain in an Office 365 environment. This behavior is detected by analyzing Office 365 management activity logs, specifically filtering for Workload=Exchange and Operation="Add-FederatedDomain". The addition of a new federated domain is significant as it may indicate unauthorized changes or potential compromises. If confirmed malicious, attackers could establish a backdoor, bypass security measures, or exfiltrate data, leading to data breaches and unauthorized access to sensitive information. Immediate investigation is required to review the details of the added domain and any concurrent suspicious activities.
This analytic identifies instances where tenant-wide admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to the "Consent to application." operation within the AzureActiveDirectory workload, and filters for `ConsentType = "AllPrincipals"`. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to organizational data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the "Add service principal" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.
This analytic identifies when built-in Microsoft 365 security detections for suspicious email behaviors are triggered. These alerts often indicate that an attacker may have compromised a mailbox within the environment, leading to activities such as suspicious email sending patterns, user restrictions from sending email, suspicious email forwarding activity, or email sending limits being exceeded. Monitoring these alerts is crucial for responding to potential account compromises and malicious email activities.
The analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
The following analytic detects the creation of a DaemonSet in a Kubernetes cluster. This behavior is identified by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation event of a DaemonSet. DaemonSets ensure a specific pod runs on every node, making them a potential vector for persistent access. This activity is significant for a SOC as it could indicate an attempt to maintain persistent access to the Kubernetes infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to persistent attacks, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
This analytic identifies when a user with sufficient access to Exchange Online alters the mail flow/transport rule configuration of the organization. Transport rules are a set of rules that can be used by attackers to modify or delete emails based on specific conditions. This activity could indicate an attacker hiding or exfiltrating data by manipulating email flow.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single service principal creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in the Office 365 Azure Active Directory environment. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised or malicious service principal attempting to expand control or access within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
This rule detects the creation of new mail flow rules in Office 365 that are configured to redirect or copy emails to unauthorized or external addresses. It specifically looks for the "New-TransportRule" operation in Office 365 Management Activity logs, combined with parameters such as "BlindCopyTo", "CopyTo", or "RedirectMessageTo". Such activity can indicate potential data exfiltration, unauthorized access to sensitive information, or an attacker attempting to intercept email communications, which could lead to data breaches or information leakage.
The following analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the "Update authorization policy" operation, specifically changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats by allowing users to grant consent to potentially malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.
The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen cities. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs and compares the geographic location of the source IP address against a baseline of known locations. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or misuse of cloud resources from an unexpected location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized resource creation, potential data exfiltration, or further compromise of cloud infrastructure.
This analytic identifies when specific Office 365 advanced security settings related to anti-phishing, safe links, safe attachments, or malware protection are altered within the Office 365 tenant. An attacker disabling these settings could reduce their risk of detection, potentially leading to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, account compromise, or other malicious activities without leaving a detailed audit trail.
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