Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects `StopLogging` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It identifies when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on successful attempts. This activity is significant because adversaries may stop logging to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to perform further activities without being logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations, and potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
The analytic identifies suspicious file-sharing activity on Google Drive, where internal users share documents with more than 50 external recipients. It leverages GSuite Drive logs, focusing on changes in user access and filtering for emails outside the organization's domain. This activity is significant as it may indicate compromised accounts or intentional data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data leaks, and potential compliance violations.
The following analytic identifies when an IP allow list is disabled in GitHub Enterprise. The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for actions related to disabling IP allow lists at the organization or enterprise level. This behavior is concerning because IP allow lists are a critical security control that restricts access to GitHub Enterprise resources to only trusted IP addresses. When disabled, it could indicate an attacker attempting to bypass access controls to gain unauthorized access from untrusted networks. The impact includes potential exposure of sensitive code repositories and GitHub Enterprise resources to access from any IP address. SOC teams should investigate such events, especially if they were not pre-approved changes, as they may indicate compromise of admin credentials or malicious insider activity.
The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
Detects the use of the 'Get-ADComputer' cmdlet with specific parameters or LDAP filters to identify systems configured for unconstrained delegation. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to find targets for Kerberos-based attacks like credential theft.
This rule detects login activity by Azure AD administrators to Microsoft cloud applications that are not part of a predefined list of common first-party applications. The rule specifically looks for successful logins where the application ID is not in the 'first_party_ms_cloud_apps' list and the user ID is present in the 'entra_id_admin_watchlist'. This helps identify potentially unusual or unauthorized access by administrators to less common or custom applications, which could indicate compromise or policy violation.
This rule detects when an Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) conditional access policy has been modified. It specifically looks for 'USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT' events within Office 365, targeting the 'AzureActiveDirectory' application, where the 'extendedAuditEventCategory' is 'Policy' and the 'product_event_type' is 'Update policy.'. This indicates a change to a conditional access policy, which could be a legitimate administrative action or a malicious attempt to alter security controls.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative role within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It specifically looks for events where the event type is 'USER_CHANGE_PERMISSIONS', the product event type is 'Add member to role', and the product name is 'Azure AD Directory Audit'. The rule is configured to trigger when a user is assigned to a role with the TemplateId '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10', which corresponds to the Global Administrator role in Azure AD. This activity is sensitive and warrants validation due to the high privileges associated with administrative roles.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or deletion of client secrets within an Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) application. While client secrets have legitimate uses, their manipulation can be a method for adversaries to establish persistence by gaining unauthorized access to an application's functionalities and data.
This rule detects successful login activity by administrative users to Microsoft Office 365 applications that are not part of a predefined list of common, first-party Microsoft cloud applications. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or unusual access to less common applications within the O365 ecosystem by privileged accounts. The rule specifically targets 'USER_LOGIN' events from 'Office 365' where the login is allowed and the application ID is not in the 'first_party_ms_cloud_apps' list. It also filters for users present in an 'msazure_admin_watchlist'.
This rule detects when a user is added to a role in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) outside of a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) process. While adding users to roles is a normal administrative action, performing it outside of PIM can indicate a potential security risk, as PIM provides just-in-time access and approval workflows for privileged roles. This rule specifically looks for "Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)" events, which are often triggered via PowerShell API calls.
This rule detects successful login activities to the Azure AD PowerShell application within Office 365. While legitimate administrative tasks often involve using Azure AD PowerShell, adversaries can also abuse this access to gather user information or perform other malicious actions. The rule specifically looks for successful user logins to the application identified by the product object ID '1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894'. It also includes commented-out filters for ADFS Sync Accounts, which are typically legitimate and run every 30 minutes.
Detects when a new user is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) and subsequently assigned administrative or other specified roles within a 90-minute window. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or suspicious account setup activities.
This rule detects when a client secret is added to an application within Azure AD. While this action can be legitimate for application configuration and integration, it can also be abused by adversaries to establish persistence within the environment. By adding a secret, an attacker can maintain access to the application and potentially associated resources, even if their initial access method is remediated. The rule specifically looks for 'Update application' events related to 'Certificates and secrets management' in Azure AD Directory Audit logs.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a new user account is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and then, shortly after, that same user is assigned an administrative-level role. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating a new account and immediately granting it high-level access.
This rule detects when the Unified Audit Log (UAL) is disabled in Office 365. This is identified by monitoring for the 'Set-AdminAuditLogConfig' product event type where the 'UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled' field is set to 'False'. Disabling the UAL can indicate an adversary attempting to impair defenses and avoid detection by preventing their actions from being logged.
This rule detects when the Unified Audit Log is enabled in Office 365. This event is triggered when the 'Set-AdminAuditLogConfig' cmdlet is used to set 'UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled' to 'True'. While enabling logging is generally a positive security action, this rule is designed to alert if logging was previously disabled and is now being re-enabled, which could indicate an adversary attempting to cover their tracks after a period of operating without logging, or to restore logging after intentionally disabling it.
This rule detects when a Google Cloud identity experiences a low severity Security Command Center alert followed by a medium severity Security Command Center alert within a 24-hour period. This escalation in alert severity for the same identity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain further access or escalate privileges after an initial compromise or suspicious activity.
Detect users who are newly created and then immediately assigned administrator level roles
Adding users to roles is expected but if it occurs outside of PIM, validation should occur
Secrets added to applications have legitimate purposes, but can also be a method of persistence. This alert will trigger on creation, modification or delete of a client secret
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