Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects privilege escalation events associated with Azure Arc agent processes. It monitors for specific Windows Security Event IDs (4672, 4673, 4674, 4688) where the involved process or its parent is an Azure Arc agent process (himds.exe, azcmagent.exe, gc_worker.exe, gc_service.exe) and the SubjectUserName is not a standard system account. This helps identify potential attempts to elevate privileges using or targeting the Azure Arc agent.
Detects the creation of a GitHub repository named `tpcp-docs`. This specific repository name is utilized as a fallback exfiltration channel by the TeamPCP threat actor. During the Trivy supply chain attack, the malware abused stolen GitHub tokens to create this public repository on the victim's account to host stolen data as release assets when the primary exfiltration method failed.
Detects mass device wipe, retire, or delete operations performed via Microsoft Intune, inspired by the Stryker/Handala attack. This rule combines five detection signals: static velocity threshold, bulk destructive actions from a single operator, first-time operator detection, UEBA anomaly correlation, and ML anomaly detection. Operations are categorized into Tier 1 (critical, zero baseline activity like wipe/retire) and Tier 2 (high, legitimate IT ops activity like device delete, subject to velocity and ML thresholds). Severity escalates based on the number of overlapping signals.
Detects a 'git push --force' event in GitHub audit logs. A force push overwrites the remote repository's history with the local history, which is a potentially destructive action.
This technique was notably used in the supply chain attack against the 'aquasecurity/trivy-action' repository, where attackers force-pushed malicious versions to existing version tags.
This technique was notably used in the supply chain attack against the 'aquasecurity/trivy-action' repository, where attackers force-pushed malicious versions to existing version tags.
This rule detects when two different MSI installations, both related to known VPN clients (Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Ivanti, GlobalProtect), occur on the same device within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attempt to establish redundant access, bypass security controls, or an unusual administrative activity.
This rule detects several types of suspicious activities related to Microsoft Graph API calls, specifically targeting device management actions. It identifies: 1. Actions from an IP address not previously seen for a given caller identity. 2. Actions performed by a service principal that has not been observed before. 3. High-risk actions (e.g., device wipe, retire, remote lock, reset passcode) or device configuration changes occurring outside of business hours or on weekends. 4. Bulk device targeting, where a single caller identity performs actions on a large number of devices within a short time frame. These detections aim to identify potential compromise of accounts or malicious administrative actions.
Detects the creation of a new computer account (Event ID 4741) where the creating user is a known service account used by FortiGate appliances. Attackers who compromise FortiGate devices can steal embedded LDAP credentials and use them to join rogue workstations to the domain, leveraging the `mS-DS-MachineAccountQuota` attribute.
Detects Zimbra SOAP API requests attempting to enable IMAP access by setting zimbraPrefImapEnabled. This is a known persistence technique used by threat actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently enable mail protocols, bypassing the web UI to maintain access using stolen app-specific passwords.
Detects modifications to Azure AD federation settings or domain authentication methods. Such changes can be indicative of a Golden SAML attack, where an attacker establishes a new federation trust to forge SAML tokens and gain unauthorized access.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a new device is registered after a user browse or click on a Microsoft device login page. This could indicate an adversary attempting to register a new device to bypass multi-factor authentication or establish persistence.
Detects when a new federation identity provider (SAML or OpenID Connect) is created or updated in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). This could indicate an attempt to establish new trust relationships for federated access.
This rule detects the launch of Amazon EC2 instances with GPU-enabled or very large instance types. Adversaries may launch such instances for resource-intensive tasks like cryptocurrency mining or other compute-heavy operations, which can lead to unexpected cloud costs and resource hijacking.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate user or service principal names (SPN/UPN) in Active Directory by adding non-ASCII or zero-width characters. Such modifications can be used by adversaries for obfuscation, to bypass detection mechanisms, or to create stealthy persistence. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 4738 (User Account Changed) and 5136 (Directory Service Object Modified) where the 'servicePrincipalName' or 'userPrincipalName' attributes contain characters outside the standard ASCII range or zero-width characters like U+200B, U+200C, U+200D.
AWS SES Email Enumeration Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects enumeration of AWS SES email identities and sending quotas. This activity can indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance before launching phishing or Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks. The rule identifies multiple distinct SES operations related to identity and quota checks performed by a single user within a two-hour window.
AWS Region Enablement Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects when a commonly abused or dormant/opt-in AWS region is enabled in an account. Adversaries may enable unused AWS regions to evade detection, deploy resources for malicious activities like cryptocurrency mining, or to establish persistence outside of actively monitored regions.
Detects when a successful AWS Console Login is immediately followed by discovery actions from the same user and IP address. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance after gaining initial access, as seen in recent AWS phishing campaigns.
Detects a FortiGate configuration file download occurring within 10 minutes of a successful administrative login from the same user and source IP address. This rapid sequence of events can indicate an attacker who has gained administrative access and is proceeding to exfiltrate sensitive configuration data, which may contain credentials for other systems.
This rule detects changes to a user account's User Account Control (UAC) settings, specifically when the 'NewUacValue' is set to '0x2080'. This value corresponds to the 'ACCOUNTDISABLE' flag, indicating that a user account has been disabled. Monitoring such changes can help identify potential malicious activity where an attacker might disable legitimate user accounts to disrupt operations or hinder incident response.
This rule detects the installation of suspicious extensions on Azure Virtual Machines. These extensions, such as CustomScriptExtension, RunCommandHandler, DSCExtension, AADLoginForWindows, and NetworkWatcherAgent, can be abused by attackers for various purposes including remote code execution, configuration manipulation, unauthorized account access, or network reconnaissance. Monitoring their installation can help identify potential compromise or malicious activity within an Azure environment.
Detects when a repository's branch protection, specifically the 'allow force pushes' enforcement level, is updated or disabled. This rule explicitly excludes events originating from automation scripts to reduce false positives.
Detects a single Azure identity accessing three or more distinct Azure resource types within a short time window. This behavior can indicate an attacker attempting to enumerate or pivot through an environment after compromising an identity.
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