Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,733 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
909
387
164
127
68
Contributors
479
417
201
177
61
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
1,733
Platforms
822
436
329
274
206
Products / Services
498
378
118
96
79
MITRE Techniques
433
327
225
196
196
CVEs
12
12
10
10
6
IDS Classtypes
1
1
IDS Protocols
2
Detects when a user starts or interacts with the ABAP debugger on an SAP production system, which is a sensitive action that could indicate unauthorized debugging or privilege manipulation.
Detects when an SAP process opens an FTP session to a host that is not on the approved server list.
The following analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications
that are covered by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Event.
This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate
data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
that are covered by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer.
It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Event.
This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate
data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects established git actors (seen >7 days ago) originating from a newly observed source IP address (first seen within 24 hours) that perform a high volume of git operations (>=15) across multiple distinct repositories (>=10). This behavior often indicates compromised developer credentials being used to enumerate and clone source code repositories.
Detects agentic AI jailbreak attempts that try to establish persistent control over M365 Copilot through rule injection, universal triggers, response automation, system overrides, and persona establishment techniques. The detection analyzes the PromptText field for keywords like "from now on," "always respond," "ignore previous," "new rule," "override," and role-playing commands (e.g., "act as," "you are now") that attempt to inject persistent instructions. The search computes risk by counting distinct jailbreak indicators per user session, flagging coordinated manipulation attempts.
Another small hunting idea using CallActivityEvents Table. The query extracts the Top-Level Domain (TLD) from the person performing the action in a Microsoft Teams call and enriches it with an external country list. In this example, I exclude .CH to quickly surface activity where the originator is using a domain associated with another country. A different hunting angle to spot unexpected external participants, unusual call activity, or simply identify interactions that deserve a closer look. Of course, a foreign TLD is not malicious by itself — it is just another piece of context for the hunter. 🔎
This rule detects when an SAP user generates audit records exceeding a configured hourly threshold (200 for high severity or 4000 for medium severity events) on their system. This behavior may indicate automated scanning, mass data extraction, or anomalous user activity within SAP environments.
Detects when an SAP audit message ID appears in security audit logs but is absent from the defined monitoring configuration table, which could indicate attempts to bypass or disable monitoring controls.
Detects when a user performs a bulk data download (large volume of data) shortly after accessing restricted or sensitive SAP objects such as sensitive tables, ABAP programs, or transactions.
This rule detects when a user starts an ABAP program that is on a list of deprecated or unsafe programs within an SAP environment using SAP Security Audit logs.
Detects when a user invokes a function module on the deprecated or unsafe module list within SAP environments based on SAP security audit logs.
Detects dynamic ABAP programming events (Insert, Generate, Delete) in SAP environments, excluding pre-defined authorized transactions.
The SAP FTP server allowlist was empty or populated with wildcard entries
This rule detects when a user executes a sensitive or restricted transaction code in an SAP system, as identified by SAP security audit logs (AU3/AU4 messages). It tracks non-excluded users performing these transactions and aggregates them over a 75-minute window.
An ABAP program invoked a remote function call (RFC) using a destination resolved at runtime, which may indicate lateral movement or unauthorized internal communication within an SAP environment.
Detects the execution of the SAP Transport Organizer transaction (SE09), which is critical for managing development objects and transport requests. Execution by unauthorized users may indicate unauthorized system modification or bypassing of change management controls.
Detects potentially highly relevant antivirus events in the application log based on known virus signature names and malware keywords.
Detects bursts of five or more distinct Cisco AI Defense event IDs, or three or more occurrences of the same event ID, matching prompt injection, code detection, PII, or PCI guardrails for the same application and connection within ten minutes.
Allowed PII/PCI prompt events are handled by Cisco AI Defense Allowed Sensitive Prompt.
These patterns can indicate iterative prompt-injection probing or repeated attempts to use an AI application to access restricted data or capabilities.
Allowed PII/PCI prompt events are handled by Cisco AI Defense Allowed Sensitive Prompt.
These patterns can indicate iterative prompt-injection probing or repeated attempts to use an AI application to access restricted data or capabilities.
The following analytic detects instances where Azure AD has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to a risky or potentially malicious application.
This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on user consent actions and system-driven blocks.
Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization.
If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that Azure's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation to understand the context and take preventive measures.
This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on user consent actions and system-driven blocks.
Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization.
If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that Azure's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation to understand the context and take preventive measures.
Detects M365 Copilot jailbreak attempts through prompt injection techniques including rule manipulation, system bypass commands, and AI impersonation requests that attempt to circumvent built-in safety controls. The detection searches exported eDiscovery prompt logs for jailbreak keywords like "pretend you are," "act as," "rules=," "ignore," "bypass," and "override" in the Subject_Title field, assigning severity scores based on the manipulation type (score of 4 for amoral impersonation or explicit rule injection, score of 3 for entity roleplay or bypass commands). Prompts with a jailbreak score of 2 or higher are flagged, prioritizing the most severe attempts to override AI safety mechanisms through direct instruction injection or unauthorized persona adoption.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs an unusual device-code authentication (potentially indicative of device code phishing) followed shortly by an OAuth application consent or permission grant event. It flags potential compromise if the sign-in is new for the user or occurs in a short timeframe, with optional indicators associated with the 'maillive.sbs' phishing infrastructure.
Page 3 of 83