Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'This query looks at the last 14 days for "Consent to application" operation by a user/app which could potentially mean unauthorized access. Additional context is added from AuditLogs based on CorrleationId from the same account that performed the action.'
'This hunting query identifies Zoom room systems with high CPU alerts that may be a sign of device compromise.'
'Identifies if an AV scan fails in Azure App Services.'
This query uses the public MDE GitHub repo as a source to estimate the time that an agent build remains supported
based on the time it was uploaded. Please note that the timestamps used in this query are meant to estimate the
support period and will likely not represent the actual expiration of the package which will be based on the build.
If you would like an estimate of support, uncomment the extend statement to get an idea of what is \ is not
supported and an idea of how long support will remain for current agents.
This query currently only supports GA builds, not preview builds.
based on the time it was uploaded. Please note that the timestamps used in this query are meant to estimate the
support period and will likely not represent the actual expiration of the package which will be based on the build.
If you would like an estimate of support, uncomment the extend statement to get an idea of what is \ is not
supported and an idea of how long support will remain for current agents.
This query currently only supports GA builds, not preview builds.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
'This query looks for errors that may indicate that an attacker is attempting to exploit a vulnerability in the service.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
This query provides the commonality of operating systems seen in the inventory
This rule detects rare audio devices used in Zoom meetings by analyzing Zoom logs. It specifically looks for speaker devices that are not commonly observed (e.g., not iPhone, FaceTime, AirPods, or MacBook built-in devices). The intent is to identify unusual device usage that could be indicative of Remote Employment Fraud (REF), where actors might use atypical setups. The rule uses a 'rare' command to find the top 50 least frequent speaker devices after filtering out common ones.
This query searches for not onboarded devices with a specific prefix
This rule detects the successful installation of the Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent by looking for specific Event ID 1033 from the MsiInstaller provider, where the message content includes 'AteraAgent'. This activity has been associated with threat actors, specifically Conti operators, using the Atera agent for command and control.
This rule detects rare input devices (microphones) used during Zoom meetings. It specifically looks for microphone devices that are not commonly observed, while excluding typical devices like iPhones, FaceTimes, AirPods, and MacBooks. The primary goal is to identify unusual device usage that could be indicative of Remote Employment Fraud (REF), where actors might use non-standard equipment. This is a hunting query designed to flag anomalies for further investigation.
Software Inventory by OS
Detects remote RPC calls made by SharpHound, a BloodHound data collector, to enumerate remote connections and local group memberships. This specific rule targets the MS-SRVS protocol (Server Service Remote Protocol) interface UUID 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 and operation number 12, which is associated with session enumeration.
Detects corrupted packets sent to the MSMQ service, which could indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2023-21554, a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Message Queuing (MSMQ). The rule specifically looks for EventID 2027 with a Level of 2 (Error) from the 'MSMQ' provider in the Windows Application event log.
This rule detects attempts to extract the ntds.dit file, which contains Active Directory credential information, using `wmic` in conjunction with `vssadmin.exe` or `ntdsutil.exe`. It also identifies the creation of `.dit` files in temporary directories and specific ESENT application event logs associated with NTDS database activity. This activity is indicative of credential dumping, a common post-exploitation technique.
This rule detects the installation of Microsoft Installer (MSI) packages directly from a web source. It specifically looks for MsiInstaller events (EventID 1040 or 1042) in the Windows Application event log where the installation data contains a web protocol indicator (e.g., '://'). This behavior can be indicative of an attacker using msiexec.exe to download and execute malicious MSI files from a remote server, potentially bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Conti operators
Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR
Detects attempts to execute remote commands, within a Pod's container using e.g. the "kubectl exec" command.
Detects enumeration of Kubernetes secrets.
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