Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'Identifies an interrupted sign-in session from a country the user has not sign-in before in the last 7 days, where the password was correct. Although the session is interrupted by other controls such as multi factor authentication or conditional access policies, the user credentials should be reset due to logs indicating a correct password was observed during sign-in.'
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'Detects when a privileged user account successfully authenticates from to another Microsoft Entra ID Tenant.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
'This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation.
This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'
This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'
This query shows attempts to request Kerberos service ticket using the AS service, to monitor Kerberos AS authentications.
'Detects when a privileged user account successfully authenticates from a location, device or ASN that another admin has not logged in from in the last 7 days.
Privileged accounts are a key target for threat actors, monitoring for logins from these accounts that deviate from normal activity can help identify compromised accounts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Privileged accounts are a key target for threat actors, monitoring for logins from these accounts that deviate from normal activity can help identify compromised accounts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Looks for users who had a risky sign in (based on Entra ID Identity Protection risk score) and then performed and ElevateAccess action. ElevateAccess operations can be used by Global Admins to obtain permissions over Azure resources.
// Detect Active Directory service accounts that are not active because their last logon was more than 14 days ago
// Replace XXX on line 4 with the naming convention start of your Active Directory service accounts
// Replace XXX on line 4 with the naming convention start of your Active Directory service accounts
'Query over SigninLogs summarizes login attempts per hour on weekdays. Kusto anomaly detection finds login spikes. Calculates percentage change between anomalous period and average logins. Determines success and failure rate for logins for 1 hour period.'
'Identifies accounts that are added to a privileged group and then quickly removed, which could be a sign of compromise.'
'Identifies whenever a user account has the setting "Password Never Expires" in the user account properties selected.
This is indicated in Security event 4738 in the EventData item labeled UserAccountControl with an included value of %%2089.
%%2089 resolves to "Don't Expire Password - Enabled".'
This is indicated in Security event 4738 in the EventData item labeled UserAccountControl with an included value of %%2089.
%%2089 resolves to "Don't Expire Password - Enabled".'
'Finds attempts to list users or groups using the built-in Windows 'net' tool '
'This query detects authentication attempt from a fake computer account(username ends with $).
Computer accounts are normally not authenticating via interactive logon or remote desktop neither they are unlocking the systems.
Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-6-hiding-in-plain-sights.html'
Computer accounts are normally not authenticating via interactive logon or remote desktop neither they are unlocking the systems.
Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-6-hiding-in-plain-sights.html'
'Identifies IPs with failed attempts to sign in to one or more disabled accounts signed in successfully to another account.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
' Identifies measureable increase in successful sign-ins from user accounts.
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
'The alert shows users that join a Zoom meeting from a time zone other than the one the meeting was created in.
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
'This query identifies when a new trust monitor event is detected.'
'Identifies when failed logon attempts are 20 or higher during a 10 minute period (2 failed logons per minute minimum) from valid account.'
'This hunting query identifies users joining a meeting from a time zone that a user has not been observed from in the last 30 days.'
'This detection uses Security events from the "AD FS Auditing" provider to detect suspicious object identifiers (OIDs) as part EventID 501 and specifically part of the Enhanced Key Usage attributes.
This query checks to see if you have any new OIDs in the last hour that have not been seen in the previous day. New OIDs should be validated and OIDs that are very long, as indicated
by the OID_Length field, could also be an indicator of malicious activity.
In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
'
This query checks to see if you have any new OIDs in the last hour that have not been seen in the previous day. New OIDs should be validated and OIDs that are very long, as indicated
by the OID_Length field, could also be an indicator of malicious activity.
In order to use this query you need to enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS Server.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/magicweb-nobeliums-post-compromise-trick-to-authenticate-as-anyone/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging
'
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