Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
This rule monitors for network connections, firewall traffic, and Entra ID authentication events involving known malicious IP addresses (the 'Wall of Shame'). The rule specifically flags interactions occurring over common VPN ports, suggesting potential unauthorized access or persistence attempts via VPN services.
Detects successful remote logons to network devices (routers, VPNs, NAS) using the 'admin' account. This pattern is indicative of credential spraying or brute-force attacks targeting weak default credentials on externally facing management interfaces, often associated with botnets or threat actors performing reconnaissance and initial access operations.
Detects anomalous SSH authentication patterns characterized by a high volume of failed logon attempts (>= 10) originating from a specific IP address within a short timeframe (30 minutes), followed by a successful authentication to the same target device. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force or password guessing attack against an exposed SSH service.
Detects anomalous SSH authentication patterns characterized by a high volume of failed logon attempts (>= 10) originating from a specific IP address within a short timeframe (30 minutes), followed by a successful authentication to the same target device. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force or password guessing attack against an exposed SSH service.
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
Detects instances where a single proxy service API key or account is used from an abnormally high number of distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and unauthorized sharing or exploitation of proxy credentials by third-party actors.
This rule identifies successful user sign-in events specifically targeted at Microsoft's management portals (myaccount.microsoft.com and mysignins.microsoft.com). It aggregates these events by user, tracking the frequency, timeframe, and originating IP addresses for successful access. This monitoring is useful for detecting abnormal access to identity settings, which could indicate credential abuse or unauthorized account management.
Detects suspicious Entra ID device registration and Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance occurring shortly after an OAuth Device Code sign-in. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-style post-compromise persistence, where an attacker leverages a stolen device code to register a rogue device and establish a persistent session.
Detects outbound email replies concerning invoices or payments sent by a user shortly after performing a device-code authentication flow, indicative of an ARTSender proxy attack where the attacker hijacks an existing email conversation to conduct Business Email Compromise (BEC).
Detects anomalous device-code authentication attempts from multiple distinct users originating from known ARToken PhaaS platform egress IP addresses within a 3-day window. This behavior is indicative of a bulk token-capture operation, where an attacker leverages an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing framework to harvest credentials and session tokens from multiple users.
This rule detects a user account performing its first-ever GitHub OAuth or repository access within a short timeframe (30 minutes) after authenticating to a designated low-trust OpenAI community forum. This pattern is designed to identify potential adversary activity where a compromised or newly created account is used to pivot from a low-trust environment to corporate repository access.
This rule detects a user account performing its first-ever GitHub OAuth or repository access within a short timeframe (30 minutes) after authenticating to a designated low-trust OpenAI community forum. This pattern is designed to identify potential adversary activity where a compromised or newly created account is used to pivot from a low-trust environment to corporate repository access.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
This rule detects potential OAuth token theft resulting from device code phishing (e.g., N0va phishkit). It monitors for a successful OAuth device-code authentication followed within 5 minutes by a secondary successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, different browser client, or different user agent, which is a common indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt.
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