Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous non-interactive sign-ins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements from a geographical location not previously seen in the user's historical sign-in baseline. This pattern is indicative of attackers using stolen OAuth access or refresh tokens to maintain persistence and bypass standard authentication controls.
Detects anomalous activity associated with OAuth 2.0 device code phishing campaigns. The rule identifies accounts showing frequent device code authentication attempts, including successful logins from potentially unmanaged or unrecognized devices, which is consistent with the behavior of phishing kits targeting OAuth device grant flows.
Detects anomalous activity associated with OAuth 2.0 device code phishing campaigns. The rule identifies accounts showing frequent device code authentication attempts, including successful logins from potentially unmanaged or unrecognized devices, which is consistent with the behavior of phishing kits targeting OAuth device grant flows.
Detects anomalous activity associated with OAuth 2.0 device code phishing campaigns. The rule identifies accounts showing frequent device code authentication attempts, including successful logins from potentially unmanaged or unrecognized devices, which is consistent with the behavior of phishing kits targeting OAuth device grant flows.
Detects potential N0va-style phishing or token-exchange abuse where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately by an access token usage from a different IP address or device. This sequence indicates an adversary has captured the resulting token/session and is attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects potential N0va-style phishing or token-exchange abuse where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately by an access token usage from a different IP address or device. This sequence indicates an adversary has captured the resulting token/session and is attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects potential post-authentication persistent actions (e.g., OAuth app grants, MFA changes, mailbox rule updates) performed shortly after a successful Google Workspace login, specifically flagging actions originating from IP addresses different from the login session to identify session hijacking or token replay (AiTM) activity. Includes suppression for known corporate IP ranges, trusted OAuth application consents, and recurring user behavior.
Detects anomalous cloud authentication events occurring within a 3-hour window after suspected unauthorized access to sensitive configuration or credential files on a Vite development server. The rule flags sign-ins with high risk, anomalous location, or missing device compliance information, excluding trusted corporate locations and devices, serving as an indicator of potential post-exfiltration account takeover.
Detects anomalous cloud authentication events occurring within a 3-hour window after suspected unauthorized access to sensitive configuration or credential files on a Vite development server. The rule flags sign-ins with high risk, anomalous location, or missing device compliance information, excluding trusted corporate locations and devices, serving as an indicator of potential post-exfiltration account takeover.
Detects anomalous cloud authentication events occurring within a 3-hour window after suspected unauthorized access to sensitive configuration or credential files on a Vite development server. The rule flags sign-ins with high risk, anomalous location, or missing device compliance information, excluding trusted corporate locations and devices, serving as an indicator of potential post-exfiltration account takeover.
Detects successful authentication attempts to a LiteLLM proxy instance using the hardcoded default master key 'sk-1234'. This activity indicates potential exploitation of misconfigured instances where default credentials remain unchanged.
Detects successful authentication events in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that utilize the 'device code' OAuth flow. This flow is often used by command-line utilities and headless applications to authenticate users on devices without a web browser, but it is also frequently abused by attackers to perform phishing and session hijacking.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a sign-in from an unmanaged or mobile device while interacting with applications often associated with MFA or SSO prompts (indicative of a social engineering lure), followed by an administrative update to register a new authentication method within 30 minutes. This pattern is characteristic of attackers establishing persistent access to an account by adding their own MFA device.
Detects any successful login event for a user in an Azure AD environment. The rule acts as a coarse proxy for potential device-code grant-type authentication, pending the availability of more granular protocol and grant-type fields in the environment's telemetry.
Detects user authentication events that exhibit patterns consistent with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns, specifically those leveraging passkey or SSO-themed lures and device-code authentication flows.
Detects a sequence of user activities—authentication, MFA registration, Graph API reconnaissance, and data exfiltration—originating from a rotating set of distinct source IP addresses for the same user within a 24-hour period. This behavior is indicative of coordinated infrastructure rotation tactics used by threat actors in cloud intrusions.
Detects evidence of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack where a user sign-in results in specific error codes (50074: MFA required; 50140: Keep-me-signed-in interrupted), followed by rapid enumeration of key M365 applications (OfficeHome, My Apps, My SignIns) using the same session/user-agent, signifying post-authentication reconnaissance via stolen tokens.
Detects anomalous usage of the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant flow (Device Code Flow). This flow is frequently abused by attackers to bypass MFA by tricking users into authenticating an attacker-controlled device or session, potentially leading to token theft or unauthorized access to sensitive enterprise applications.
This rule monitors Azure AD Sign-in logs to identify 'impossible travel' scenarios, where a user authenticates successfully from two geographically distant locations within a time window (1 hour) that would require travel speeds exceeding a plausible threshold. This behavior is a common indicator of credential compromise or session token replay attacks.
This rule identifies successful OAuth 2.0 device code authentication attempts originating from both an IP address and country not previously seen for that specific user, using a 90-day baseline that requires at least 5 prior non-device-code sign-ins to be established (reducing noise from sparse-history/new accounts). It excludes known legitimate device-code applications (e.g., Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and sign-ins from devices already marked compliant/managed. This tightened logic reduces false positives from routine travel or home/office network changes while still catching device code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into entering a device code on a malicious site to obtain an access token.
Detects a sequence of multiple VPN authentication failures from a single IP address followed by a successful authentication within a 10-minute window, which is indicative of a successful credential brute force attack.
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