Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins (ResultType 0) originating from specific Autonomous System Numbers (197540, 216154) where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required or not recorded, and where Conditional Access policies either did not apply or succeeded without enforcing MFA.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins (ResultType 0) originating from specific Autonomous System Numbers (197540, 216154) where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required or not recorded, and where Conditional Access policies either did not apply or succeeded without enforcing MFA.
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
Detects the addition of a 'msDS-KeyCredentialLink' attribute to an Active Directory object (Event 5136), which is indicative of the Shadow Credentials attack vector, followed by a successful PKINIT authentication (Event 4768) for that account. This combination suggests that an adversary has successfully established persistent access using a forged or unauthorized device credential and is now utilizing it for authentication.
This rule monitors Azure AD Sign-in logs to identify 'impossible travel' scenarios, where a user authenticates successfully from two geographically distant locations within a time window (1 hour) that would require travel speeds exceeding a plausible threshold. This behavior is a common indicator of credential compromise or session token replay attacks.
Detects multiple successful GitLab authentication events from a specific source IP that contain parameters indicating an attempt to skip or bypass two-factor authentication, consistent with known GitLab 2FA bypass vulnerabilities.
Detects multiple successful GitLab authentication events from a specific source IP that contain parameters indicating an attempt to skip or bypass two-factor authentication, consistent with known GitLab 2FA bypass vulnerabilities.
Detects potential session replay or cookie theft attacks against Google Workspace accounts. The rule identifies anomalous session activity where a single session ID is associated with multiple country codes within a short timeframe (less than 60 minutes), suggesting that a stolen session token is being used by an adversary in a different location than the legitimate user.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
This rule detects activity associated with known indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to European political targeting campaigns. It monitors network, email, and authentication logs for connections to specific malicious domains (including .onion addresses) and IP addresses. The rule spans multiple data sources, including device network events, Entra ID sign-in logs, cloud application events, and email communications.
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-ins where the user agent identifies as a Python requests library version (2.33.1 or 2.34.2) that has not been observed for that specific user account in the preceding 14 days. This behavior is indicative of anomalous automated or scripted access.
This rule monitors for the creation or presence of a specific backdoor account (username 'p2pwn' and password 'p2password') on Dahua devices. This account is known to be injected by threat actors exploiting CVE-2024-39943 as part of Operation CameraSwarm to maintain persistent unauthorized access.
Detects successful Kerberos PKINIT authentication (Event 4768, PreAuthType 16) issued by on-premises certificate authorities. This activity is a potential indicator of Shadow Credentials or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) abuse where attackers use forged or stolen certificates to authenticate as domain users or machines.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior shortly after a successful MFA-authenticated session in Microsoft 365. This rule flags scenarios where a subsequent session for the same user occurs within a short window (30 minutes) from a different IP, ASN, User-Agent, or device identifier, potentially indicating the replay of a stolen session cookie obtained via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing.
This rule monitors for network connections, firewall traffic, and Entra ID authentication events involving known malicious IP addresses (the 'Wall of Shame'). The rule specifically flags interactions occurring over common VPN ports, suggesting potential unauthorized access or persistence attempts via VPN services.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) utilizing Schannel (TLS client certificate) or PKU2U (peer authentication) logon processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using forged or stolen certificates to authenticate against a system, potentially bypassing Kerberos-based authentication monitoring.
This rule monitors for successful sign-ins to sensitive cloud resources (such as Microsoft Authentication Broker, Office 365 Exchange Online, or Graph API) that originate from IP addresses not observed in the user's recent history (14-day baseline) or from known datacenter/hosting network ranges. The rule also filters for common scripted User-Agent strings (e.g., Python requests, curl) or empty User-Agent strings to increase the likelihood of detecting programmatic or malicious automated access rather than standard browser-based user activity.
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