Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,666 detections
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'This hunting query will alert on any Impossible travel activity in correlation with mailbox permission tampering followed by account being added to a PIM managed privileged group.
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
'This query helps detect new Microsoft Entra ID sign in from a new location correlating with Office Activity data highlighting cases where user mails are being forwarded and shows if it is being forwarded to external domains as well.'
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
This query creates a list of IP addresses with the number of failed login attempts to Entra ID
above a set threshold ( default of 5 ). It then looks for any successful Palo Alto VPN logins from any of these IPs within the same timeframe.
above a set threshold ( default of 5 ). It then looks for any successful Palo Alto VPN logins from any of these IPs within the same timeframe.
'This content is utilized to identify instances of successful login by risky users, who have been observed engaging in potentially suspicious network activity on non-Microsoft network devices.'
'This content is employed to correlate with Microsoft Defender XDR phishing-related alerts. It focuses on instances where a user successfully connects to a phishing URL from a non-Microsoft network device and subsequently makes successful sign-in attempts from the phishing IP address.'
'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (default of 5) of failed logon attempts to Microsoft Entra ID.
Uses that list to identify any successful remote logons to hosts from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Uses that list to identify any successful remote logons to hosts from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
'This query look for Service Principal accounts that are no longer used where a user has added or updated credentials for them before logging in with the Service Principal.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
' This query will detect logins from guest account which was recently deleted.
For any successful logins from deleted identities should be investigated further if any existing user accounts have been altered or linked to such identity prior deletion'
For any successful logins from deleted identities should be investigated further if any existing user accounts have been altered or linked to such identity prior deletion'
RDP Nesting
KQL
'Query detects potential lateral movement within a network by identifying when an RDP connection (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) is made to an initial system, followed by a subsequent RDP connection from that system to another, using the same account within a 60-minute window.
To reduce false positives, it excludes scenarios where the same account has made 5 or more connections to the same set of computers in the previous 7 days. This approach focuses on highlighting unusual RDP behaviour that suggests lateral movement, which is often associated with attacker tactics during a network breach.'
To reduce false positives, it excludes scenarios where the same account has made 5 or more connections to the same set of computers in the previous 7 days. This approach focuses on highlighting unusual RDP behaviour that suggests lateral movement, which is often associated with attacker tactics during a network breach.'
'It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user.
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
Looks for a new MFA method added to an account that was preceded by medium or high risk sign-in session for the same user within maximum 6h timeframe
'This querys look for users accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently, who then have a MFA method added or updated before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
'Detects successful signins using single factor authentication where the device, location, and ASN are abnormal.
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
'This query detects all authentication attempts of non administrator accounts that their RID is ending in *-500.
Ref: https://stealthbits.com/blog/rid-hijacking-when-guests-become-admins/'
Ref: https://stealthbits.com/blog/rid-hijacking-when-guests-become-admins/'
'This query determines rare activity by a high-value account on a system or service. If any account with rare activity is found, the query retrieves related activity from that account on the same day and summarizes the information.'
'This query looks at correlating different reconnaissance alerts with interactive logon logs to help analysts investigate initial possible compromise activity'
'Looks for new device registrations following a risky user account sign-in. By default the
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
This query shows authentication methods being added and devices registered around the time of a high risk sign in which could indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised account. The threshold can be changed to a wider timeframe if needed.
'Correlate IPs blocked by a Cisco firewall appliance with successful Microsoft Entra ID signins.
Because the IP was blocked by the firewall, that same IP logging on successfully to Entra ID is potentially suspect and could indicate credential compromise for the user account.'
Because the IP was blocked by the firewall, that same IP logging on successfully to Entra ID is potentially suspect and could indicate credential compromise for the user account.'
'This hunting query will try to identify the user account used to perform a file upload to blob storage.
This query can be used to match all file upload events, or filtering can be applied on filename to search for a specific upload.'
This query can be used to match all file upload events, or filtering can be applied on filename to search for a specific upload.'
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