Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Device Logons from Unknown IP Addresses.
This query identifies device logons from IP addresses not associated with any machine in Defender ATP.
This query identifies device logons from IP addresses not associated with any machine in Defender ATP.
'This hunting query identifies Accounts that are new or inactive and have accessed or used GitHub that may be a sign of compromise.'
Looks for a new device registration in Entra ID preceded by medium or high-risk sign-in session for the same user within maximum 6h timeframe.
This rule detects user logins from multiple distinct states or countries within a one-hour window, leveraging GeoIP enrichment. It specifically looks for successful login events where a user logs in from at least two different states or at least one country, indicating potential 'impossible travel' or suspicious access patterns.
Find all alert evidence for a single endpoint. This is handy for exporting to a third-party SIEM.
This rule detects successful user logins where the user's termination date is in the past, indicating a login from a terminated employee. This could signify unauthorized access or a failure in account deprovisioning processes. The rule requires a context data source that provides user termination dates, such as Azure AD Context or Workday.
This rule detects a sequence of multiple failed login attempts (more than 4) followed by a successful login for the same user on the same hostname within a 15-minute window. It specifically targets Windows login events (event IDs 4625 for failure and 4624 for success) and correlates them with user and asset entity data, focusing on users in the 'Domain Admins' group and assets that are 'Domain Controllers'. This pattern is indicative of a brute-force attack or password guessing attempt that eventually succeeded.
This rule detects suspicious activity following a successful login to the Azure AD PowerShell application. Specifically, it looks for a user performing multiple administrative actions within a short timeframe after logging in. These actions include adding or updating applications, adding delegated permission grants, or managing certificates and secrets for applications. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Entra ID environment after initial access.
This rule detects a pattern of multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login for the same user on the same hostname within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force attack or password guessing attempt that eventually succeeded.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicating the creation of a user account, a successful login by that user, and the subsequent deletion of the same user account within a 4-hour timeframe. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary creating temporary accounts for malicious activities, using them, and then removing them to cover their tracks or evade detection. The rule specifically targets Windows login events (event code 4624).
Detect multiple user logins from multiple states or countries using Chronicle GeoIP enrichment.
Allowed Logins from Terminated Employees
Detect Multiple Failed Login Attempts followed by Successful Login
Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests.
Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.
One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus.
This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment.
This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.
One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus.
This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment.
This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
Detect Multiple Failed Login Attempts followed by Successful Login
This analytic detects the activation of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user activates a PIM role assignment, indicated by the "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)" operation. Monitoring this activity is crucial as PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and unauthorized activation could indicate an adversary attempting to gain privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the Azure environment.
The analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.
The following analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new country. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen users and their login locations. This activity is significant because logins from new countries can indicate potential unauthorized access or compromised accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the AWS environment.
This analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. It specifically looks for EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and a source address of 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account. This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.
This analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell cmdlets. This detection leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify successful logins where the appDisplayName is "Microsoft Azure PowerShell." This activity is significant because it is uncommon for regular, non-administrative users to authenticate using PowerShell, and it may indicate enumeration and discovery techniques by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to perform extensive reconnaissance, potentially leading to privilege escalation or further exploitation within the Azure environment.
The following analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Google Cloud Platform (GCP) for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It uses Google Workspace login event data to detect instances where MFA is not utilized. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to GCP resources, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.
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