Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic identifies AWS console login events by users from a new city within the last hour. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares them against a lookup file of previously seen user locations. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate unauthorized access or credential compromise, especially if the login originates from an unusual location. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, data exfiltration, or further exploitation within the cloud environment.
The analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
This analytic detects a single source computer authenticating to 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute timespan using Windows Event ID 4624 (successful logon). This behavior is identified by analyzing Windows Event Logs for LogonType 3 (network logon) events and counting unique target computers. Such activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or network share enumeration by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to multiple systems, potentially compromising sensitive data and escalating privileges within the network.
The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event for an AWS IAM user account without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where MFA was not used during login. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the AWS environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration, resource manipulation, or further privilege escalation.
This analytic detects and analyzes PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) usage in Windows environments. It tracks both connection attempts (EventID 4648) and successful logons (EventID 4624) associated with PSWA, providing a comprehensive view of access patterns. The analytic identifies PSWA's operational status, host servers, processes, and connection metrics. It highlights unique target accounts, domains accessed, and verifies logon types. This information is crucial for detecting potential misuse, such as lateral movement, brute force attempts, or unusual access patterns. By offering insights into PSWA activity, it enables security teams to quickly assess and investigate potential security incidents involving this powerful administrative tool.
The analytic detects an AWS account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 5-minute window. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs, specifically monitoring `ConsoleLogin` events and counting distinct source IPs. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials, potentially from a phishing attack, being used concurrently by an adversary and a legitimate user. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the AWS environment.
The analytic detects a user authenticating with special privileges on 30 or more remote endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Event ID 4672 from Windows Security logs to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain extensive control over the network, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the environment. Security teams should adjust detection thresholds based on their specific environment.
The following analytic identifies successful single-factor authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. It detects this activity by analyzing Okta logs for successful authentication events where "Okta Verify" is not used. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the environment.
The analytic identifies an unusual number of remote authentication attempts from a single source by leveraging Windows Event ID 4624, which logs successful account logons. It uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to detect deviations from normal behavior. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to move laterally within the network, escalate privileges, or gather information for further attacks.
This rule detects successful login activity by administrative users to Microsoft Office 365 applications that are not part of a predefined list of common, first-party Microsoft cloud applications. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or unusual access to less common applications within the O365 ecosystem by privileged accounts. The rule specifically targets 'USER_LOGIN' events from 'Office 365' where the login is allowed and the application ID is not in the 'first_party_ms_cloud_apps' list. It also filters for users present in an 'msazure_admin_watchlist'.
This rule detects persistent login activity to the Azure AD PowerShell application. Specifically, it looks for successful user logins to the application identified by the product object ID '1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894' (which corresponds to Azure AD PowerShell) by the same user ID over a 24-hour period. The rule is designed to flag continuous access to this administrative tool, which is not considered a security best practice and warrants further investigation.
This rule detects successful login activities to the Azure AD PowerShell application within Office 365. While legitimate administrative tasks often involve using Azure AD PowerShell, adversaries can also abuse this access to gather user information or perform other malicious actions. The rule specifically looks for successful user logins to the application identified by the product object ID '1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894'. It also includes commented-out filters for ADFS Sync Accounts, which are typically legitimate and run every 30 minutes.
This rule detects successful Office 365 login activity to applications that are not part of a predefined list of common, first-party Microsoft Cloud applications. This can help identify potentially unauthorized or unusual access to cloud resources via less common applications, which might indicate credential compromise or an attempt to bypass standard access controls. The rule specifically excludes certain known benign Microsoft application IDs and allows for filtering out ADFS synchronization traffic.
Continual logins to Azure AD PowerShell app are not a security best practice, if this is observed, additional investigation is needed
This rule detects O365 login activity to apps other than a defined list of first party MS Cloud Apps. Note that Azure Active Directory PowerShell and custom Azure apps are not in this list by default
This rule detects Azure AD login activity to apps other than a defined list of first party MS Cloud Apps. Note that Azure Active Directory PowerShell and custom Azure apps are not in this list by default
Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programmatic access to Entra ID (Azure AD) should generally be through apps, so reviewing these activities is needed.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving an initial successful authentication to Office 365, followed by a non-interactive sign-in to Azure Activity (Entra ID) from the same user and IP address, but with different session IDs, applications, and user agents. This pattern is indicative of token theft and reuse, potentially using tools like GraphRunner, where an adversary uses a stolen token to perform non-interactive actions. The rule specifically looks for a mismatch in session ID, application, and user agent between the initial interactive login and the subsequent non-interactive login, while the user and IP remain consistent. The user agent strings are specifically chosen to align with those used by the GraphRunner tool.
This rule detects successful user logins to the "Azure Active Directory PowerShell" application within Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). While legitimate administrative tasks may involve this application, the rule's description highlights that programmatic access to Azure AD should generally occur through other applications. Therefore, direct logins to this specific PowerShell application could indicate suspicious activity, such as an attacker using compromised credentials to gain access to user information or perform administrative actions. The rule focuses on successful login events and groups them by user over a 5-minute window, which can help identify clustered or repeated login attempts by a single user.
Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programatic access to Azure AD should generally be through other apps
Detects authentication to O365 followed by a non-interactive sign-ins that aligns to suspicious activity.
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