Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP requests to the AWS EC2 service (ec2.amazonaws.com) that specifically attempt to enumerate Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) using the 'DescribeImages' API call. This activity could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance to understand the available virtual machine images within an AWS environment.
This rule detects when public or anonymous access is enabled for an Azure Storage Account. This configuration change can lead to potential data exposure, as it allows unauthenticated users to access blobs within the storage account. The rule specifically looks for 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE' or 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/BLOBSERVICES/WRITE' operations that successfully modify the storage account configuration to allow public access.
This rule detects when a cloud disk snapshot is created, specifically targeting AWS EC2 'CreateSnapshot' API calls. This activity can be indicative of data exfiltration attempts, where an attacker creates a snapshot of a compromised disk to move data out of the environment.
This rule detects when an AWS Organization Unit (OU) is modified, specifically when the 'MoveAccount' API call is made to 'organizations.amazonaws.com'. This activity could indicate an attempt to evade detection or alter the organizational structure for malicious purposes.
This rule detects attempts to modify an Azure Management Group, specifically when a PUT request is made to 'management.azure.com' with 'managementGroups' in the URI. This activity could indicate an attempt to evade defenses by altering management group configurations.
This rule detects suspicious GitHub workflow modifications or pushes originating from multiple distinct IP addresses within a short time frame (1 hour). It specifically looks for 'WorkflowCreated', 'WorkflowUpdated', or 'Push' actions on GitHub, and triggers if more than one such event and more than one distinct IP address are observed for a given account within an hour. This could indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized access to a GitHub account being used to manipulate CI/CD pipelines.
Identifies bursts or requests to high-value Microsoft Graph API discovery endpoints. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently perform automated burst reconnaissance against these endpoints post-compromise to map out roles, tenant relationships, mailbox settings, and contacts.
This rule detects attempts to grant consent to OAuth applications, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack. It specifically looks for successful operations related to consenting to applications, adding app role assignments to service principals, adding delegated permission grants, or adding OAuth2PermissionGrants within audit logs. The rule extracts details such as the target application, the user who consented, their initiating IP address, and the permissions granted.
This rule detects when an AWS IAM user policy is attached, specifically looking for the 'AttachUserPolicy' action on 'iam.amazonaws.com'. This could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or grant new permissions to a compromised account.
This rule detects when a credential (password) is added to an Azure Service Principal. This activity is identified by monitoring HTTP traffic for requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' containing 'addPassword' in the URI. This could indicate an attacker establishing persistence by adding new credentials to an existing service principal.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the GCP OS Login API endpoint 'oslogin.googleapis.com'. Such requests could indicate an attempt to execute commands on a Google Cloud instance using the OS Login feature, which is a common method for managing SSH access to instances.
This rule detects potential cloud API access using a stolen token by monitoring HTTP requests to AWS S3, Azure management, or Google APIs that contain an 'Authorization: Bearer' header. A threshold of 50 such requests within 10 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a possible brute-force or high-volume access attempt with a compromised token.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
This rule detects high-volume access to Azure Key Vault secrets, keys, or certificates within a one-hour window. It specifically looks for successful read operations on secrets, keys, and certificates, as well as modifications to access policies. A high volume (more than 10 accesses) from a single caller within an hour is flagged as potential credential harvesting.
This rule detects potential GitHub token theft or abuse activity by identifying GitHub tokens that are used from an unusually high number of distinct IP addresses or for an unusually high number of uses within a one-hour window. Specifically, it looks for tokens with more than 5 uses and more than 2 distinct IP addresses in an hour. This behavior could indicate that a compromised token is being used by an attacker from multiple locations or in an automated fashion.
This rule detects when an 'Agent ID Administrator' role adds an owner to a service principal in Azure Active Directory. This activity could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within the Azure environment by granting control over service principals to potentially unauthorized entities.
This rule detects the creation of new service principals or the assignment of new role assignments to existing service principals in Azure Active Directory. It specifically looks for assignments that grant high-privilege roles such as "Contributor", "Owner", or "Global Admin". The rule aggregates these changes by target and time, highlighting instances where multiple changes or distinct initiators are involved.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions in Microsoft Teams. This includes sideloaded apps, which can bypass Teams store vetting and be used for persistence, custom app creation outside of development teams, which may indicate C2 bots or data exfiltration, and the addition of bots with suspicious names. The rule also flags operations like AppShared and TabAdded as medium risk.
Detects sign-in or Microsoft Graph API activity using user-agent strings characteristic of ROADtools and similar Python-based identity-attack tooling. The rule generalizes beyond ROADtools to catch AzureHound, MicroBurst, MFASweep, GraphRunner, and similar identity attack frameworks by looking for scripting user-agents (python, requests, urllib, curl) which signal non-browser, non-app authentication that is inherently suspicious for Entra ID admin operations.
Identifies bursts or requests to high-value Microsoft Graph API discovery endpoints. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently perform automated burst reconnaissance against these endpoints post-compromise to map out roles, tenant relationships, mailbox settings, and contacts.
Detects the export of Microsoft Teams messages, transcripts, recordings, and chat retrieval activities, particularly when performed via the Graph API. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for specific operation names in SaaS audit logs from Microsoft Teams and flags user agents commonly associated with automation tools (e.g., python-requests, axios, go-http, curl, wget, powershell, httpx, aiohttp, node) which could indicate post-compromise attackers using stolen tokens to silently export chat history.
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