Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
KQL Query
KQL Query
SPL Query from file: Enumeration of GCP Infrastructure
This detection leverages Azure Graph activity logs to identify when Graph APIs have been used to identify 10 or more service principals. This type of behavior is associated with tools such as Azure enumeration tools like AzureHound or ROADtools.
This detection identifies the presence of the default AzureHound user-agent string within Microsoft Graph Activity logs and NonInteractive SignIn Logs. AzureHound is a tool used for gathering information about Azure Active Directory environments, often employed by security professionals for legitimate auditing purposes. However, it can also be leveraged by malicious actors to perform reconnaissance activities, mapping out the Azure AD infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and targets for further exploitation. Detecting its usage can help in identifying unauthorized access attempts and preemptively mitigating potential security threats to your Azure environment.
The following analytic identifies anomalous GetObject API activity in AWS, indicating potential data exfiltration attempts. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs and uses the `anomalydetection` command to detect unusual patterns in the frequency of GetObject API calls by analyzing fields such as "count," "user_type," and "user_arn" within a 10-minute window. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized data access or exfiltration from S3 buckets. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exfiltrate sensitive data, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.
This detection identifies when an Azure Service Principal elevates privileges by adding itself to a new app role assignment. This activity is indicative of privilege escalation within an Azure Active Directory environment, where a service principal grants itself additional permissions.
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
This query looks for possible Teams phishing activity.
'This query looks for diagnostic settings that are removed from a resource.
This could indicate an attacker or malicious internal trying to evade detection before malicious act is performed.
If the diagnostic settings are being deleted as part of a parent resource deletion, the event is ignores.'
This could indicate an attacker or malicious internal trying to evade detection before malicious act is performed.
If the diagnostic settings are being deleted as part of a parent resource deletion, the event is ignores.'
'Identifies when Azure Run command is used to execute a PowerShell script on a VM that is unique.
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
'This query look for users starting an Azure CloudShell session and summarizes the Azure Activity from that
user account during that timeframe (by default 1 hour). This can be used to help identify abuse of the CloudShell
to modify Azure resources.'
user account during that timeframe (by default 1 hour). This can be used to help identify abuse of the CloudShell
to modify Azure resources.'
'This script identifies rare domain accounts accessing cloud resources by examining logs. You can lower the domainLimit value to see domains with fewer access attempts. For example, set domainLimit = 2 to see domains with 2 or fewer access attempts.'
'Identifies when a new user is granted access and starts creating resources in Azure. This can help you identify rogue or malicious user behavior.'
"This query searches for any action type with high frequency that involves adding, modifying, or removing something in cloud app policies. It sees where the properties are modified such that the old value and new value are different for every property except for minor property changes such as Display Name."
Use this query to review OAuth applications whose behaviour has changed as compared to a prior baseline period. The following query returns OAuth Applications accessing user mail via Graph that did not do so in the preceding week.
This query will find applications that have been granted Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions in which the corresponding user recently consented to. It can help identify applications that have been abused to gain access to user email.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
"This query searches for any files in Cloud App Events that have trigger a security alert."
This query will find when federation trust settings are changed for a domain or when the domain is changed from managed to federated authentication. Results will relate to when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added.
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
This detection identifies when a new packaged application has been added, updated, or deleted within Microsoft Intune. This functionality, while legitimate for software deployment, can be abused by adversaries to deploy malicious payloads to Intune-managed devices.
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