Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a single user generates an excessive number of 'Permission Denied' events within a one-hour timeframe in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Specifically, it looks for more than 5 'BLOCK' actions with a severity of 'ERROR' and a status code of '7' (which typically indicates 'Permission Denied' in GCP API errors) from a single user. Additionally, it requires these events to span across more than one target application and more than one product event type, which helps to reduce false positives by indicating broader activity rather than a single, isolated error.
This rule detects when a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Identity and Access Management (IAM) Organization Policy is either updated or deleted. Such actions can indicate an attempt to modify security controls, potentially to facilitate persistence or privilege escalation within the GCP environment. Monitoring these changes is crucial for maintaining the security posture of an organization's cloud resources.
Detects when a user deletes multiple secrets or secret versions from Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Secret Manager within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate an attempt to destroy critical data or disrupt services.
This rule detects when an AWS Config Service is modified, stopped, or deleted. Specifically, it looks for CloudTrail events indicating actions such as stopping or deleting a configuration recorder, deleting a delivery channel, or putting (creating/updating) a delivery channel or configuration recorder. These actions can be indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses by disabling or modifying cloud logging capabilities.
This rule detects when a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Compute Engine image's access policy is modified to include 'allAuthenticatedUsers'. This action effectively makes the image publicly accessible to any authenticated Google user, which could lead to unauthorized access or data exfiltration if sensitive data is present in the image.
This rule detects when an AWS account attempts to leave an AWS organization or is removed from an AWS organization. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to evade detection or disrupt cloud infrastructure by isolating an account from central management and security policies.
This rule detects when a single user disables or destroys 10 or more Google Cloud KMS (Key Management Service) crypto key versions within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to destroy data encrypted by these keys, leading to data unavailability or integrity issues. The rule specifically looks for 'DestroyCryptoKeyVersion' events or 'UpdateCryptoKeyVersion' events where the key version state is changed to 'DISABLED'.
Detects when the AWS managed policy 'AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantine' is attached to an IAM user, role, or group. This policy is typically applied by AWS when credentials for an IAM entity are suspected of being compromised or publicly exposed, indicating a potential security incident.
This rule detects successful AWS API calls originating from an IP address identified as a Tor exit node. It leverages a GCTI Feed for Tor exit node IP listings and also calculates a risk score based on the geographical location of the originating IP, specifically increasing the score for connections from Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Syria.
Detects when an IAM user attempts to update or modify the code of an AWS Lambda function. This activity can be indicative of an attacker trying to introduce malicious code, backdoor existing functions, or alter their behavior for persistence, privilege escalation, or other malicious purposes.
Detects when an AWS IAM user creates an AWS Access Key for programmatic calls. This action can be used by adversaries to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an AWS environment.
This rule detects when a single user downloads results from multiple BigQuery tables within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of data exfiltration attempts, where an attacker or insider is trying to extract a large amount of data from an organization's data warehouse.
This rule detects when a single user disables multiple Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Service APIs within a short period (1 hour). Specifically, it triggers if a user performs more than 5 'DisableService' actions on 'serviceusage.googleapis.com' within an hour. This activity could indicate an attempt to disrupt cloud services or evade detection by disabling security-related APIs.
This rule detects an excessive number of 'AccessDenied' events within a one-hour timeframe originating from a single AWS IAM user. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to discover cloud infrastructure and resources by making numerous API calls that they do not have permissions for. The rule specifically looks for more than 5 'AccessDenied' events, involving more than one target application and more than one product event type, from the same user within an hour.
This rule detects modifications to the user data script of an EC2 instance in AWS. User data scripts are executed when an EC2 instance is launched and can be used to perform initial setup, install software, or run other commands. An adversary modifying this script could achieve persistence or privilege escalation by injecting malicious commands that run upon the next instance boot.
This rule detects when AWS CloudTrail logging configurations are modified, stopped, or deleted. Specifically, it looks for API calls such as 'UpdateTrail', 'StopLogging', 'DeleteTrail', or 'PutEventSelectors' that indicate an attempt to tamper with CloudTrail's ability to record events. Such actions could be performed by an adversary to evade detection by hiding their activities.
This rule detects an excessive number of successful AWS API calls related to discovery activities (e.g., Describe*, List*, Get*) originating from a single IAM user within a 5-minute timeframe. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to map out the cloud environment after gaining initial access.
Detects when an AWS CloudWatch log group is deleted. This activity can be an indicator of an adversary attempting to impair defenses by removing or modifying logging capabilities to hide their actions.
This rule detects when an AWS IAM Access Analyzer is deleted. Deleting an Access Analyzer can be a defense evasion technique, as it removes a critical security monitoring tool that helps identify unintended external access to resources. An adversary might delete it to obscure their activities or prevent detection of misconfigurations they introduce.
Detects when principals are exempted from GCP Cloud Audit logs at either the project or organization level. This action can significantly impair an organization's ability to monitor security events and maintain compliance, as audit logs are crucial for detecting malicious activity and ensuring accountability. The rule specifically looks for 'SetIamPolicy' events targeting 'cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com' where audit log exemptions are added for 'allServices'.
This rule detects when free Google email addresses (gmail.com, googlemail.com, or googlegroups.com) are added to an IAM policy in Google Cloud Platform. This activity is suspicious as it could indicate an attempt by an attacker to establish persistence or escalate privileges by granting access to an external, potentially untraceable, account.
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