Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling an active policy, removing users or groups from enforcement scopes, or removing MFA requirements. Such actions are typical of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or evade authentication controls.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects the creation of a new application secret or credential in a cloud environment followed by an immediate authentication attempt using that credential from an IP address that has not been observed performing successful authentication within the specified lookback window. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized persistence or the use of compromised credentials by an adversary.
Detects malicious attempts to delete or modify the access control settings of centralized cloud audit log storage, such as S3 buckets, Azure Log Analytics workspaces, or GCP log buckets. These actions aim to impair visibility into an adversary's activities, a common step in anti-forensics and data destruction workflows.
Detects chained AWS STS AssumeRole/AssumeRoleWithSAML/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events where a principal assumes a role in a different account and then quickly performs another role assumption from that new context. This pattern, often referred to as 'role chaining' or 'role laundering', is frequently used to obfuscate identity tracking and facilitate lateral movement across AWS account boundaries.
Detects the use of iam:PassRole to attach a potentially highly privileged IAM role (e.g., Administrator, PowerUser, FullAccess) to newly created or modified compute or serverless resources (EC2 instances, Lambda functions, Launch Templates, or Auto Scaling Groups). This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges by granting a managed resource excessive permissions that the attacker can subsequently abuse.
Detects the creation of programmatic API credentials or service principal keys by highly privileged cloud identities across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Specifically monitors AWS Root, Azure AD Global/Company Administrators, and GCP Organization Owners, whose roles generally do not require long-term API access.
This rule detects the assignment of sensitive Microsoft Graph API application roles to a service principal, which can be an indicator of an adversary establishing a directory-wide backdoor in an Azure/Entra ID environment. This technique is often used to escalate privileges following an initial compromise of a low-privilege application registration.
Detects instances where a non-administrative user grants OAuth application permissions for high-risk Microsoft Graph delegated scopes. This activity is a common indicator of 'consent phishing' campaigns, where an attacker tricks a user into authorizing a malicious application, granting persistent access to the user's data and resources via API tokens, even after password resets.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
Detects instances where an administrator has granted tenant-wide consent to an OAuth application requesting highly privileged Microsoft Graph permissions. This activity is a significant indicator of potential persistence or privilege escalation, as it allows the application to perform sensitive operations across the organization without requiring individual user interaction.
Detects when a service principal is added as an owner to an application or another service principal. This activity indicates a potential privilege escalation or persistence attempt, where a compromised application gains administrative control over other identities or resources within the Azure environment.
Detects instances where an Entra ID (Azure AD) application is registered and subsequently granted consent by the same user within 30 minutes, specifically when the activity occurs outside of typical business hours (7 AM - 7 PM) or from disparate IP addresses. This behavior pattern is indicative of potential malicious OAuth application registration and subsequent token-granting by an attacker to maintain persistent access to an environment.
Detects instances where a user grants OAuth consent or assigns roles to an application that lacks a verified publisher and requests broad permissions across multiple sensitive categories (e.g., Mail, Files, and Directory). This behavior is characteristic of consent-phishing campaigns designed to harvest data from cloud environments.
This rule detects when a new password credential (client secret) is added to an existing Azure AD Service Principal or application. This activity is a common method for adversaries to establish persistence in a cloud environment that survives password resets or MFA enforcement on the original administrative account.
Detects anomalous cross-account AssumeRole activities, including chained role assumptions, which are often used by cloud-native intrusion sets to launder access, evade single-account logging detection, and move laterally across AWS environments. The rule identifies AssumeRole events targeting non-allowlisted accounts or sequences where credentials are immediately used to perform further cross-account assumptions.
Detects modifications to EBS or RDS snapshot permissions that grant access to the public 'all' group or an external AWS account ID. This activity is a common method for exfiltrating sensitive data via unauthorized cross-account sharing, bypassing standard VPC egress monitoring and DLP controls.
Detects unauthorized attempts to stop, delete, or reduce the scope of AWS CloudTrail logging. Attackers frequently perform these actions to blind defenders before conducting large-scale resource abuse or ransomware activities. This rule monitors for StopLogging, DeleteTrail, and configuration changes (UpdateTrail, PutTrail) that weaken log integrity such as disabling multi-region tracking, global service events, or log file validation.
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM access key by a user for an account other than their own. This is a common persistence technique where an attacker, having obtained sufficient permissions, creates a new credential set for an existing, potentially dormant user account to maintain long-term access while blending in with legitimate activity.
Detects anomalous, large-scale provisioning of GPU-intensive cloud instances (such as p3, p4, g4dn, g5, and trn1 families) in AWS. This activity is indicative of cloud cryptojacking campaigns where adversaries hijack resources to rapidly spin up compute clusters for cryptomining, potentially incurring significant financial damage within a short period.
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