Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
Detects modifications to federated domain authentication, identity provider trusts, or federation settings in cloud environments (e.g., Entra ID, Okta). Unauthorized changes to these configurations can be used to establish persistence, enable SAML token forgery, or bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for service principals (non-interactive accounts) where the same application authenticates from multiple distinct countries within a 24-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of compromised service principal credentials, such as client secrets or certificates, from distributed attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for service principals (non-interactive accounts) where the same application authenticates from multiple distinct countries within a 24-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of compromised service principal credentials, such as client secrets or certificates, from distributed attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects a potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) persistence chain where a user grants an OAuth application mailbox read/write permissions, followed immediately by the creation of an inbox rule (forwarding, moving, or deleting) targeting messages containing keywords like 'invoice', 'wire', or 'payment'.
Detects a potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) persistence chain where a user grants an OAuth application mailbox read/write permissions, followed immediately by the creation of an inbox rule (forwarding, moving, or deleting) targeting messages containing keywords like 'invoice', 'wire', or 'payment'.
This rule detects instances where a user successfully activates a privileged role via Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in a cloud environment, despite the activation policy requiring approval. It flags cases where the 'Add member to role completed' event indicates that approval is required, but the 'approvalStatus' is absent, suggesting an attempt to bypass the formal approval workflow.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects administrative actions in Azure that disable or modify diagnostic settings, which stops the flow of logs to services like Azure Sentinel/Log Analytics, or deletes policy assignments. Such actions are often performed by adversaries to blind security operations monitoring prior to lateral movement or further malicious activity.
This rule detects administrative actions in GCP that involve modifying or deleting Cloud Logging sinks, or disabling specific services, with a specific focus on disabling the logging service itself. Adversaries may perform these actions to tamper with audit trails and evade detection of malicious activities.
Detects 'ec2:RunInstances' API calls occurring in AWS regions that are not part of the organization's approved allow-list. This behavior can be indicative of malicious infrastructure staging, such as deploying assets for unauthorized cryptomining or establishing pivot points in regions that are infrequently monitored.
Detects 'ec2:RunInstances' API calls occurring in AWS regions that are not part of the organization's approved allow-list. This behavior can be indicative of malicious infrastructure staging, such as deploying assets for unauthorized cryptomining or establishing pivot points in regions that are infrequently monitored.
This rule detects modifications to AWS IAM policies (PutUserPolicy, PutRolePolicy, PutGroupPolicy, AttachUserPolicy, AttachRolePolicy, or CreatePolicyVersion) that result in a policy granting administrative '*' access to both Actions and Resources. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation after initial IAM credential compromise.
Detects a privilege escalation sequence where a principal uses 'PassRole' to attach an IAM role to a newly created compute resource (Lambda, EC2, or CloudFormation stack), followed shortly by that compute resource performing privileged API calls. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to gain unauthorized elevated permissions by executing actions from an over-privileged service identity.
Detects a privilege escalation sequence where a principal uses 'PassRole' to attach an IAM role to a newly created compute resource (Lambda, EC2, or CloudFormation stack), followed shortly by that compute resource performing privileged API calls. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to gain unauthorized elevated permissions by executing actions from an over-privileged service identity.
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