Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of new AWS IAM access keys where the actor initiating the request is distinct from the target user associated with the key. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistent access to a compromised account by creating additional, long-lived credentials.
Detects suspicious modifications to AWS Organization structure, specifically the moving of accounts out of protected organizational units (e.g., security, quarantine, guardrail), accounts leaving the organization, or the detachment of policies, which may indicate an attempt to evade security controls or organizational guardrails.
This rule detects the creation of new, potentially long-lived service account keys for GCP service accounts that possess highly privileged roles, such as Project Owner, Project Editor, or broad custom roles. The creation of such keys for privileged accounts can be a technique used by adversaries to establish persistent, stealthy access within a GCP environment.
This rule detects modifications to AWS EC2 Snapshot or AMI (Image) attributes that result in the resource becoming publicly accessible ('all') or shared with an unapproved AWS account ID. Such activities are often precursors to data exfiltration or unauthorized access to sensitive disk images.
Detects a potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) persistence chain where a user grants an OAuth application mailbox read/write permissions, followed immediately by the creation of an inbox rule (forwarding, moving, or deleting) targeting messages containing keywords like 'invoice', 'wire', or 'payment'.
This rule detects instances where a user successfully activates a privileged role via Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in a cloud environment, despite the activation policy requiring approval. It flags cases where the 'Add member to role completed' event indicates that approval is required, but the 'approvalStatus' is absent, suggesting an attempt to bypass the formal approval workflow.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects potential abuse of Azure Cloud Shell backing storage (acsCloudShell) to stage or persist malicious scripts following an Azure AD session compromise. Adversaries may use this storage to blend in with legitimate engineering operations while maintaining persistent access to their tooling.
Detects administrative actions in Azure that disable or modify diagnostic settings, which stops the flow of logs to services like Azure Sentinel/Log Analytics, or deletes policy assignments. Such actions are often performed by adversaries to blind security operations monitoring prior to lateral movement or further malicious activity.
This rule detects modifications to AWS CloudTrail configurations that reduce logging visibility, such as stopping the logging service, deleting a trail, or updating a trail to include restrictive event selectors (e.g., non-multi-region, read-only events, or excluding management events). These actions are indicative of an attacker attempting to evade detection by limiting the audit trail available to security analysts.
Detects 'ec2:RunInstances' API calls occurring in AWS regions that are not part of the organization's approved allow-list. This behavior can be indicative of malicious infrastructure staging, such as deploying assets for unauthorized cryptomining or establishing pivot points in regions that are infrequently monitored.
Detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell session followed by file transfer operations (PutFile or GetFile). This behavior may indicate an attacker using CloudShell to stage, exfiltrate, or move tools within the cloud environment, potentially bypassing endpoint detection by operating within the cloud service infrastructure.
This rule detects modifications to AWS IAM policies (PutUserPolicy, PutRolePolicy, PutGroupPolicy, AttachUserPolicy, AttachRolePolicy, or CreatePolicyVersion) that result in a policy granting administrative '*' access to both Actions and Resources. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation after initial IAM credential compromise.
Detects a privilege escalation sequence where a principal uses 'PassRole' to attach an IAM role to a newly created compute resource (Lambda, EC2, or CloudFormation stack), followed shortly by that compute resource performing privileged API calls. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to gain unauthorized elevated permissions by executing actions from an over-privileged service identity.
Detects the creation of GCP compute instances that are attached to service accounts with broad 'cloud-platform' scope permissions. This activity is monitored to ensure that only authorized automation service accounts (e.g., IaC pipelines) are performing these actions, as creating instances with highly privileged service accounts can be a technique used to escalate privileges or establish persistence.
Detects modifications to application secrets or certificates in Azure that are performed by a user who is not the registered owner of the application, or when a new credential is added to an application that already has credentials configured, potentially indicating persistent access establishment.
Detects modifications to Google Cloud Storage bucket IAM policies that grant access to 'allUsers' or 'allAuthenticatedUsers'. This activity indicates a potential misconfiguration or an attempt by an attacker to stage or exfiltrate data by making bucket contents publicly accessible.
Detects the modification of an Azure Storage account configuration to enable public access (allowBlobPublicAccess: true). This activity is often associated with attackers attempting to facilitate anonymous data exfiltration by enabling public access to blobs and subsequently reading them.
Detects the creation of new AWS IAM access keys where the actor initiating the request is distinct from the target user associated with the key. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistent access to a compromised account by creating additional, long-lived credentials.
Detects suspicious modifications to AWS Organization structure, specifically the moving of accounts out of protected organizational units (e.g., security, quarantine, guardrail), accounts leaving the organization, or the detachment of policies, which may indicate an attempt to evade security controls or organizational guardrails.
This rule detects the creation of new, potentially long-lived service account keys for GCP service accounts that possess highly privileged roles, such as Project Owner, Project Editor, or broad custom roles. The creation of such keys for privileged accounts can be a technique used by adversaries to establish persistent, stealthy access within a GCP environment.
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