Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a correlation between high-risk or anomaly-flagged sign-ins and subsequent changes to B2B guest invitation or tenant collaboration policies by the same user account within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary who has successfully hijacked a session (e.g., via AiTM or token replay) and is attempting to establish persistence or pivot by inviting external accounts or modifying B2B security settings.
Detects instances where a user grants OAuth consent to a non-verified application requesting high-privilege scopes related to mail access (Mail.Read, Mail.Send) and persistence (offline_access, full_access_as_app), which is a common indicator of consent phishing attacks.
Detects high-risk sign-in events in Azure AD that exhibit indicators of token replay, impossible travel, or anomalous sessions, while simultaneously leveraging certificate-based authentication or valid Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT). This combination often indicates an adversary is using stolen session material or PRTs to establish persistent, MFA-exempt access to the environment.
Detects successful sign-in events using the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (device code flow). This technique is frequently abused in AiTM/consent-phishing campaigns where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, effectively obtaining a fully authenticated session token. The rule identifies successful device-code authentications, which should be correlated with source IP discrepancies or unusual volume per tenant to identify malicious activity.
Detects high-volume, automated attempts to validate AWS credentials (access keys) from a single source IP address within a short time window. This pattern, characterized by a large number of distinct access keys being tested against identity-confirming API calls (e.g., GetCallerIdentity, AssumeRole) with a mix of success and failure, is indicative of automated credential harvesting or reconnaissance campaigns.
Detects instances where end users grant high-risk delegated permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to applications via OAuth consent flows outside of standard administrator approval processes. This behavior is indicative of device-code phishing or consent phishing campaigns designed to gain unauthorized access to user data.
Detects instances where an existing, non-interactive SSO session token is reused from a suspicious network location, such as an anonymizing proxy, VPN, or VPS, or triggered by an impossible travel risk event. The rule specifically looks for token usage that lacks a fresh interactive Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, a common indicator of session token hijacking or 'replay' attacks frequently used in cloud account takeover campaigns.
Detects high-volume account existence checks targeting the Microsoft Teams API. The rule identifies anomalous authentication attempts characterized by the use of outdated Electron/Chrome user-agent strings associated with the TeamFiltration tool, specifically targeting the Microsoft Teams API AppId (1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264).
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates via the OAuth Device Code flow using an unmanaged or non-compliant device, followed closely by high-privileged Azure/Graph API administrative actions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a device-code phishing attack aimed at bypassing MFA controls, including FIDO2/passkeys, by compromising an active session.
This rule detects a multi-stage Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack involving executive impersonation via look-alike domains, followed by the creation of suspicious inbox rules (forwarding/deletion) by the victim, and concurrent external communication (Teams/Zoom meeting invites) from a newly created account. It correlates these activities to identify sophisticated payment fraud campaigns.
Detects attempts to tamper with, disable, or delete audit logging configurations in AWS CloudTrail and Azure Monitor. Monitoring these activities is critical to ensure that audit logs remain intact for security investigations.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates to a cloud service (Azure AD) from an unrecognized ASN, device, or country without performing MFA, followed shortly by high-risk actions such as mailbox rule creation, mass file downloads, or OAuth application registration. This pattern is indicative of session cookie theft or OAuth token replay used to bypass MFA.
Detects package publishing or version creation events on npm or PyPI that originate from non-CI/CD service accounts, suggesting the use of stolen registry authentication tokens by unauthorized entities to push malicious package versions.
Detects high-volume account existence checks targeting the Microsoft Teams API. The rule identifies anomalous authentication attempts characterized by the use of outdated Electron/Chrome user-agent strings associated with the TeamFiltration tool, specifically targeting the Microsoft Teams API AppId (1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264).
Detects the transmission of sensitive credential-like patterns (such as API keys, private keys, and connection strings) to known external AI coding assistant and IDE plugin endpoints. This rule monitors cloud application events originating from developer workstations or CI/CD runners where such sensitive information may be inadvertently or maliciously sent to third-party AI services.
This rule detects potential CI/CD security compromises in GitHub by monitoring for modifications to workflow permissions that grant 'write-all' access, access to sensitive workflow secrets via 'pull_request_target' from forked repositories, and the registration of new self-hosted runners. These actions are common indicators of supply chain attacks aimed at poisoning pipeline execution or exfiltrating build secrets.
Detects high-velocity administrative activity performed by a single user account in Azure Active Directory, specifically focusing on account provisioning and role membership changes. The rule flags patterns such as password resets, enabling/disabling accounts, adding new users, and privilege escalation (e.g., granting Global Administrator roles), which are indicative of malicious post-compromise activity.
Detects high-volume, rapid enumeration of core Microsoft Graph directory endpoints (users, groups, applications, and servicePrincipals) by a single identity or session. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance tools such as AADInternals, ROADtools, or TokenTactic being used to map out a cloud environment's directory structure.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID service principal (app-only) sign-in events where an application accesses a resource or tenant that has not been observed in the previous 30 days. This is often an indicator of cross-tenant impersonation abuse or credential misuse, particularly related to Actor Tokens.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID service principal (app-only) sign-in events where an application accesses a resource or tenant that has not been observed in the previous 30 days. This is often an indicator of cross-tenant impersonation abuse or credential misuse, particularly related to Actor Tokens.
Detects instances where a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is assigned to a user account, followed by a sign-in from an unmanaged or non-compliant device within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential help-desk impersonation (vishing) attacks where an adversary obtains a TAP to bypass standard authentication controls.
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