Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft Power Automate flows that integrate internal Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) with external communication or exfiltration targets (HTTP requests, external email addresses, or common external web services). This behavior is often indicative of automated data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, multi-channel probing of AI agent input surfaces. The rule identifies external actors sending instruction-injection style keywords across different communication channels (e.g., email, Teams, calendar) within a short window, which may indicate an attempt to identify and manipulate an organization's autonomous agents. Covers T1595.002
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, multi-channel probing of AI agent input surfaces. The rule identifies external actors sending instruction-injection style keywords across different communication channels (e.g., email, Teams, calendar) within a short window, which may indicate an attempt to identify and manipulate an organization's autonomous agents. Covers T1595.002
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, multi-channel probing of AI agent input surfaces. The rule identifies external actors sending instruction-injection style keywords across different communication channels (e.g., email, Teams, calendar) within a short window, which may indicate an attempt to identify and manipulate an organization's autonomous agents. Covers T1595.002
Detects an identity that performs a 'ListSecrets' operation followed by a high volume of 'GetSecretValue' or 'BatchGetSecretValue' requests within a short timeframe (15 minutes). This behavioral pattern is indicative of automated bulk exfiltration of secrets from AWS Secrets Manager, a common activity following an initial cloud environment compromise.
Detects anomalous mass consent grants to OAuth applications by users within the environment. This rule monitors for high-risk permissions such as Mail.Read and Files.ReadWrite.All, which are commonly used in consent phishing and application-based persistence campaigns to gain unauthorized access to mailbox and file resources.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks by identifying an initial legitimate sign-in followed by a second sign-in from a different IP address within a short timeframe (indicative of session token replay), immediately succeeded by high-risk post-compromise actions such as OAuth application consent or the creation of malicious mailbox rules.
Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
Detects high-volume, potentially programmatic search activity in Microsoft 365 SharePoint, characterized by iterative pagination requests using the 'indexdocid' parameter. This behavior may indicate an automated effort to crawl or systematically exfiltrate document metadata or content via the SharePoint search interface, often associated with post-exploitation discovery or unauthorized data collection.
Detects anomalous, high-volume email access patterns (more than 200 mail items accessed per hour) by specific Client or Azure AD App IDs, which may indicate automated data collection or exfiltration by an adversary using compromised or unauthorized applications.
Detects anomalous, high-volume email access patterns (more than 200 mail items accessed per hour) by specific Client or Azure AD App IDs, which may indicate automated data collection or exfiltration by an adversary using compromised or unauthorized applications.
Detects high-volume, potentially programmatic search activity in Microsoft 365 SharePoint, characterized by iterative pagination requests using the 'indexdocid' parameter. This behavior may indicate an automated effort to crawl or systematically exfiltrate document metadata or content via the SharePoint search interface, often associated with post-exploitation discovery or unauthorized data collection.
Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
Detects high-frequency, automated polling of Microsoft 365 mailbox data via the Microsoft Graph API, characteristic of malicious inbox scanning tools (e.g., Box Monitor). The rule correlates these persistent access patterns with subsequent searches for high-value financial keywords, identifying potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) reconnaissance.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to Microsoft Graph API resources (Mail or Files) following a device-code authentication event for the same user. It identifies scenarios where a previously unknown application client performs read operations within 24 hours of a device-code login, which is characteristic of 'ARToken' or 'EvilProxy' type device-code phishing and session proxy attacks.
Detects anomalous activity where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device registration event and the subsequent issuance of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) or x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential. This pattern is often indicative of OAuth device-authorization flow abuse, where an adversary attempts to register a malicious device to gain persistent access.
Detects high-frequency, automated access to mail items via Microsoft Graph API (mail.read/MailItemsAccessed), consistent with automated scanning or exfiltration tools like ARToken's Inbox Monitor. The rule identifies suspicious patterns of repetitive access to mailbox folders or messages that may indicate Business Email Compromise (BEC) or automated credential-based harvesting.
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