Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
Detects GitHub repository actions (git.clone, oauth_authorization.create, repo.download_zip) from actor IPs not seen for that user in the prior 30 days, requiring either 3+ actions or activity across 2+ distinct repositories from the new IP within the same day. Aggregating to burst/multi-repo behavior (rather than alerting on a single new-IP event) filters out one-off false positives from travel, VPNs, or dynamic IP reassignment while still surfacing sustained anomalous access patterns consistent with account compromise or bulk exfiltration.
Detects GitHub repository actions (git.clone, oauth_authorization.create, repo.download_zip) from actor IPs not seen for that user in the prior 30 days, requiring either 3+ actions or activity across 2+ distinct repositories from the new IP within the same day. Aggregating to burst/multi-repo behavior (rather than alerting on a single new-IP event) filters out one-off false positives from travel, VPNs, or dynamic IP reassignment while still surfacing sustained anomalous access patterns consistent with account compromise or bulk exfiltration.
Detects GitHub repository actions (git.clone, oauth_authorization.create, repo.download_zip) from actor IPs not seen for that user in the prior 30 days, requiring either 3+ actions or activity across 2+ distinct repositories from the new IP within the same day. Aggregating to burst/multi-repo behavior (rather than alerting on a single new-IP event) filters out one-off false positives from travel, VPNs, or dynamic IP reassignment while still surfacing sustained anomalous access patterns consistent with account compromise or bulk exfiltration.
This rule detects potential cloud service enumeration activity originating from a specific, potentially malicious IP address (23.234.84.102). It flags instances where this source IP performs specific API calls ('GetCallerIdentity' and 'ListTopics') without expected user-agent strings typical of legitimate AWS service traffic.
This rule detects potential cloud service enumeration activity originating from a specific, potentially malicious IP address (23.234.84.102). It flags instances where this source IP performs specific API calls ('GetCallerIdentity' and 'ListTopics') without expected user-agent strings typical of legitimate AWS service traffic.
This rule detects potential cloud service enumeration activity originating from a specific, potentially malicious IP address (23.234.84.102). It flags instances where this source IP performs specific API calls ('GetCallerIdentity' and 'ListTopics') without expected user-agent strings typical of legitimate AWS service traffic.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
Detects instances where a removed GitHub organization member performed bulk repository access (cloning or downloading) shortly before their removal, potentially indicating exploitation of retained access by a departed employee or an adversary using a valid account before deprovisioning. The rule identifies activity occurring more than 24 hours prior to removal involving multiple repositories or multiple access actions.
Detects the creation and immediate deletion of a GitHub OAuth token that is used to clone or fetch a large volume of private repositories within a short lifespan. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a temporary, ephemeral token to perform rapid data exfiltration or mass reconnaissance on source code repositories.
Detects the creation and immediate deletion of a GitHub OAuth token that is used to clone or fetch a large volume of private repositories within a short lifespan. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a temporary, ephemeral token to perform rapid data exfiltration or mass reconnaissance on source code repositories.
Detects the creation and immediate deletion of a GitHub OAuth token that is used to clone or fetch a large volume of private repositories within a short lifespan. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a temporary, ephemeral token to perform rapid data exfiltration or mass reconnaissance on source code repositories.
Detects the creation and immediate deletion of a GitHub OAuth token that is used to clone or fetch a large volume of private repositories within a short lifespan. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a temporary, ephemeral token to perform rapid data exfiltration or mass reconnaissance on source code repositories.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
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