Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of Granular Delegated Administrative Privileges (GDAP) relationships, or the assignment of highly privileged (Tier 0) roles, when performed by an application identified as a partner provider or via delegated administration. This rule monitors for potential abuse of trusted partner relationships to escalate privileges or establish persistence within a tenant.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to audit and logging configurations across AWS, Azure, and GCP. The rule identifies actions such as stopping, deleting, or updating logging trails, diagnostic settings, or logging sinks, which may indicate an adversary attempting to impair visibility into their activities (Anti-Forensics).
Detects the creation of high-cost, resource-intensive compute instances (such as GPU-enabled or large-scale VMs) within cloud regions that have not been previously utilized by the account, subscription, or project. This behavior is often indicative of unauthorized resource hijacking, such as crypto-mining or large-scale data processing by threat actors.
Detects the creation or modification of serverless functions (AWS Lambda, Azure Function Apps, GCP Cloud Functions) that exhibit high-risk configurations. These include functions assigned overly permissive IAM roles, configured for public or unauthenticated invocation, or tied to event triggers commonly abused for persistence in cloud environments.
Detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell environment or session. Attackers often abuse CloudShell as a managed, agentless environment within the provider's infrastructure to stage tools, perform reconnaissance using the AWS CLI, and exfiltrate data while bypassing standard endpoint-based detection.
Detects unauthorized attempts to modify or delete AWS CloudTrail logs stored in S3, or changes to the S3 bucket lifecycle configuration that would shorten the log retention period. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to clear their tracks or hinder audit capabilities.
Detects instances where a principal utilizes the iam:PassRole permission to assign a role with higher privileges to a newly created or updated compute resource (Lambda or EC2), potentially allowing the principal to assume the identity and elevated permissions of the passed role.
Detects unauthorized modifications or deletions of cloud logging sinks in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) or diagnostic settings in Azure, which may indicate an attacker attempting to disable audit logs to cover their tracks or evade detection.
Detects unauthorized or risky configuration changes in Google Cloud Storage or Azure Storage accounts that grant public access (e.g., allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers or public blob access) specifically on storage resources identified as production or sensitive (PII/financial data).
Detects instances where an administrative user grants 'AllPrincipals' OAuth consent to a multi-tenant application that is unverified or lacks a trusted publisher. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a global admin into granting broad permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to a malicious application, bypassing per-user consent restrictions.
Detects the addition of a Service Principal to an Azure AD group that has the 'isAssignableToRole' property set to true. This behavior is a known privilege escalation technique where the service principal inherits the privileged roles assigned to that group, bypassing standard direct role-assignment monitoring.
This rule detects when new credentials (secrets or certificates) are added to an Azure Active Directory Service Principal. It flags this activity as suspicious if it occurs outside of typical business hours or if it exhibits signs of 'rapid re-keying', where multiple credentials are added to the same service principal within a 24-hour window. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence maintenance or credential rotation to support unauthorized access.
This rule detects scenarios where an external user is invited to an Azure AD tenant and subsequently granted a highly privileged role (such as Global Administrator or User Administrator) within a short window of time (1 hour). This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment or privilege escalation by an adversary using guest accounts.
Detects modifications to federated domain authentication, identity provider trusts, or federation settings in cloud environments (e.g., Entra ID, Okta). Unauthorized changes to these configurations can be used to establish persistence, enable SAML token forgery, or bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for service principals (non-interactive accounts) where the same application authenticates from multiple distinct countries within a 24-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of compromised service principal credentials, such as client secrets or certificates, from distributed attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects potential abuse of Azure Cloud Shell backing storage (acsCloudShell) to stage or persist malicious scripts following an Azure AD session compromise. Adversaries may use this storage to blend in with legitimate engineering operations while maintaining persistent access to their tooling.
Detects modifications to Google Cloud Storage bucket IAM policies that grant access to 'allUsers' or 'allAuthenticatedUsers'. This activity indicates a potential misconfiguration or an attempt by an attacker to stage or exfiltrate data by making bucket contents publicly accessible.
Detects instances where an IAM user or role attempts to assume a role in a different AWS account (Cross-Account) without providing a valid ExternalID. This often indicates unauthorized attempts to access or abuse cross-account trust relationships, which is a common technique for lateral movement or privilege escalation in cloud environments.
This rule detects scenarios where a user account grants high-privilege permissions (e.g., mail access or file modification) to an OAuth application within a short time frame (2 hours) following a sign-in event flagged as risky by Entra ID (Azure AD). This pattern is indicative of an adversary abusing OAuth consent flows as a persistence and credential-access mechanism following account compromise.
This rule detects potentially malicious bulk mailbox exfiltration operations (such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ComplianceSearch, or Search-Mailbox) performed by an account within 24 hours of experiencing a high or medium-risk sign-in event, suggesting post-compromise data harvesting.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a single session identifier is used to access three or more distinct SaaS applications within a one-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of a stolen session cookie or OAuth token (Pass-the-Cookie) across multiple SSO-integrated platforms.
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