Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of remote commands on cloud virtual machines (Azure RunCommand or AWS SSM SendCommand) during defined off-hours (18:00 to 06:00). This rule identifies potentially unauthorized administrative or management activity occurring outside of standard business hours across cloud environments.
Detects suspicious OAuth application or service principal registration, or permission consent, performed by users who are not part of designated IT administrator groups. This rule flags high-privilege permission grants (e.g., Mail.Read, Directory.ReadWrite.All) or application consent events, which are common methods for establishing long-term persistence in cloud environments.
Detects processes attempting to query the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) that are not recognized as legitimate cloud agent software (such as AWS, Azure, or Google cloud agents). This behavior is often indicative of SSRF or unauthorized discovery attempts by an adversary on a compromised cloud instance.
Detects processes attempting to query the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) that are not recognized as legitimate cloud agent software (such as AWS, Azure, or Google cloud agents). This behavior is often indicative of SSRF or unauthorized discovery attempts by an adversary on a compromised cloud instance.
This rule detects potential automated credential stuffing attempts followed by successful authentication and subsequent access to sensitive/privileged APIs within Azure/Entra ID environments. It correlates multiple failed login attempts for service-oriented account names (e.g., svc, api, bot) with a successful login from the same user shortly thereafter, followed by privileged API operations (e.g., KeyVault secret access, user management) within a short time window.
This rule detects attempts to modify or delete Conditional Access Policies within Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID) by monitoring network events targeting 'graph.microsoft.com' with 'conditionalAccessPolicies' in the AdditionalFields, specifically looking for 'PATCH' or 'DELETE' operations. Such activities could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls or maintain persistence.
Detects the successful removal of Azure Resource Management locks. Attackers may attempt to delete these locks to modify, move, or delete protected resources that would otherwise be restricted, often as a precursor to data destruction or infrastructure tampering.
Detects the successful removal of Azure Resource Management locks. Attackers may attempt to delete these locks to modify, move, or delete protected resources that would otherwise be restricted, often as a precursor to data destruction or infrastructure tampering.
This rule monitors for unauthorized deletion or modification of Microsoft Sentinel alert rules and automation rules. Such actions are indicative of an attacker attempting to impair security monitoring, silence alerts, or disable automated responses to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects the invitation of an external user to the Azure AD tenant. This activity often results in the creation of a guest account with the '#EXT#' suffix in the User Principal Name (UPN). Monitoring this event is critical for identifying potential unauthorized external access or social engineering attempts aimed at gaining persistence within the environment.
Detects installation or update of a VM extension whose settings invoke scripts, remote support tooling, or command execution outside standard configuration management. This could indicate an adversary establishing persistence or remote access.
This rule detects successful configuration modifications to diagnostic settings or storage services where the destination resource is identified as being outside of the organization's trusted subscriptions or expected storage naming conventions. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate logs or data to an attacker-controlled storage account.
Detects when a single user initiates a high volume (5 or more) of external guest user invitations within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of reconnaissance or attempts to establish persistence by an compromised account by inviting external identities into the tenant.
Detects successful OAuth application consent events where the requested permissions include sensitive scopes such as Mail, Files, or User profile access. This is a common indicator of OAuth application-based phishing or persistence attempts, often referred to as 'Illicit Consent Grant' attacks.
This rule detects when sensitive administrative roles are assigned directly to users in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) without utilizing the Privileged Identity Management (PIM) service. Direct assignment of these roles bypasses the security controls and JIT (Just-In-Time) access workflows enforced by PIM, potentially indicating unauthorized privilege escalation or a misconfiguration.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity within Azure Automation by monitoring for the creation or modification of runbooks and jobs, combined with the presence of suspicious command-line or script patterns in job stream output, such as credential harvesting (e.g., Get-AutomationPSCredential) or execution of web-based payloads (e.g., IEX, Invoke-WebRequest).
Detects instances where a guest user is invited to the organization using an email address from potentially malicious TLDs (e.g., .ru, .cn, .ir, .kp) or a domain structure that is represented as an IP address. These patterns are often associated with phishing, reconnaissance, or adversary attempts to gain a foothold in an environment by inviting external identities.
Detects any modification (add, update, or delete) to Entra ID cross-tenant access settings. Adversaries may manipulate these trust configurations to weaken inbound security restrictions, establish unauthorized access between tenants, or facilitate cross-tenant impersonation.
Detects modifications or publication of Azure Automation runbooks by users or service principals other than known, pre-approved automation service principals. This activity may indicate an unauthorized user or compromised service principal attempting to inject malicious code into automation workflows.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency account enumeration activity in cloud audit logs, specifically targeting user, group, device, and service principal listing operations. This behavior is indicative of potential reconnaissance or discovery efforts by an attacker who has compromised a user account.
This rule detects potential Conditional Access bypass attempts where a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) is exchanged for an Azure Active Directory (AAD) Graph token. The detection specifically looks for successful sign-ins to 'Windows Azure Active Directory' or 'Microsoft Graph' resources from devices marked as 'compliant' but with 'Unknown' ownership or no prior device registration history in Audit Logs. This could indicate an adversary using a compromised PRT on an unregistered or untrusted device to gain access to resources that should be protected by Conditional Access policies.
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