Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
173 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
93
25
23
19
11
Contributors
98
20
18
9
5
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,872
5,155
4,866
Platforms
134
60
56
24
6
Products / Services
94
57
57
24
12
MITRE Techniques
103
56
55
31
30
IDS Classtypes
1
1
IDS Protocols
3
Detects high-frequency authentication failures in Entra ID (Azure AD) originating from External Authentication Method (EAM) providers. The rule identifies instances where the external identity token fails signature or key-ID validation (AADSTS50012/AADSTS70002), which may indicate configuration issues with the external IdP or attempts to forge authentication tokens.
Detects high-frequency authentication failures in Entra ID (Azure AD) originating from External Authentication Method (EAM) providers. The rule identifies instances where the external identity token fails signature or key-ID validation (AADSTS50012/AADSTS70002), which may indicate configuration issues with the external IdP or attempts to forge authentication tokens.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule identifies instances where a user successfully authenticates using a phone app OTP MFA method that was registered between 1 and 30 days prior. The rule specifically flags logins associated with potentially automated or non-browser user agents, or logins flagged with risk, suggesting potential account takeover or persistence mechanisms involving MFA re-registration.
Detects suspicious Entra ID device registration and Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance occurring shortly after an OAuth Device Code sign-in. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-style post-compromise persistence, where an attacker leverages a stolen device code to register a rogue device and establish a persistent session.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user successfully completes an OAuth device-code grant, followed by a subsequent login event using the same user context but originating from a different source IP address. This pattern is indicative of device-code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, then uses the resulting session or token from their own infrastructure.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user successfully completes an OAuth device-code grant, followed by a subsequent login event using the same user context but originating from a different source IP address. This pattern is indicative of device-code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, then uses the resulting session or token from their own infrastructure.
Detects anomalous device registration behavior where a user account registers multiple unique devices within a very short timeframe (less than 90 seconds). This behavior is characteristic of device code phishing attacks, where an adversary uses automated scripts to rapidly register devices after obtaining authorization codes from victims.
This rule detects successful device-code authorization logins to Azure AD that originate from a country or region not previously associated with the user. It evaluates the user's historical sign-in locations to establish a baseline and flags deviations, which may indicate account compromise via device-code phishing or MFA bypass attempts.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving guest users (external identities) or service principals in Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID). It baselines typical behavior—including IP addresses, countries, and sign-in frequency—over a 14-day period and alerts when activity in the last 24 hours deviates significantly. This includes sign-ins from new IP addresses or countries, sudden spikes in sign-in volume, after-hours access, or failed authentication attempts, which may indicate account takeover or misuse of third-party vendor access.
This rule detects administrative changes to domain federation settings or domain authentication configurations within an Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID) environment. These modifications can be used to establish persistence or facilitate identity-based attacks, such as domain-wide impersonation, by altering how identities are authenticated.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
This rule detects potential session token replay attacks in Azure Active Directory by correlating interactive or single-factor sign-in events using 'python-requests' user agents (common in automated tooling) with subsequent 'Register device' and 'Register security info' (Windows Hello for Business) activity within a 48-hour window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to register a device to a compromised account to maintain persistence or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
Page 6 of 9