Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule looks for exposed pairs of credentials used for GitHub cloud identity federation in logs or artifacts. Leaked pairs let attackers mint tokens as your pipeline. Rotate federation settings and audit recent workflow runs.
This rule detects the use of a forged SAML token for identity federation bypass. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests (flow:to_server,established; http.client_body;) containing the string "SAMLResponse" (content:"SAMLResponse"; nocase;) and a long base64-encoded string (pcre:"/[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{500,}={0,2}/";) within the client body. The presence of a large base64 string in conjunction with "SAMLResponse" suggests a potentially malicious SAML assertion being submitted.
Detects modification of hybrid identity federation configuration for authentication bypass
This rule detects attempts to modify hybrid identity federation settings by monitoring HTTP POST requests to graph.microsoft.com with a URI containing 'federationConfiguration'. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence or gain unauthorized access by manipulating identity federation.
Identifies when suspicious SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could gain backdoor access via SAML.
Identifies when an user or application modified the federation settings on the domain.
Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.
Detects modifications to Azure AD federation settings or domain authentication methods. Such changes can be indicative of a Golden SAML attack, where an attacker establishes a new federation trust to forge SAML tokens and gain unauthorized access.
Detects when a new federation identity provider (SAML or OpenID Connect) is created or updated in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). This could indicate an attempt to establish new trust relationships for federated access.
This query identifies rare or newly observed application sign-ins by comparing activity in the last 24 hours against a 30‑day historical baseline.
It highlights applications that are never used or seldom used in the tenant, helping detect anomalous or suspicious application activity that may indicate OAuth abuse, automation tools, or compromised accounts.
It highlights applications that are never used or seldom used in the tenant, helping detect anomalous or suspicious application activity that may indicate OAuth abuse, automation tools, or compromised accounts.
This rule identifies when a user or application modifies the federation settings on a domain within Azure Active Directory. Such modifications can impact how users authenticate and can be leveraged by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion by altering trust relationships.
This rule identifies suspicious activity related to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) in AWS. Specifically, it looks for two events: `AssumeRoleWithSAML` from the `sts.amazonaws.com` service and `UpdateSAMLProvider` from the `iam.amazonaws.com` service. An adversary could leverage these actions to gain unauthorized access, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within an AWS environment by manipulating SAML providers or assuming roles via SAML.
Detects changes to the AWS Identity Center (formerly AWS SSO) identity provider configuration. Such changes, including associating, disassociating, enabling, or disabling an external identity provider, could be used by an attacker to establish persistent access or escalate privileges through user impersonation.
This analytic identifies the modification of the SourceAnchor (ImmutableId) attribute for an Azure Active Directory user. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Update user" operation and changes to the SourceAnchor attribute. This activity is significant as it is a step in setting up an Azure AD identity federation backdoor, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, leading to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
This analytic detects the addition of a new federated domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. It identifies successful "Set domain authentication" operations in Azure AD AuditLogs. This activity is significant as it may indicate the use of the Azure AD identity federation backdoor technique, allowing an adversary to establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could impersonate any user, bypassing password and MFA requirements, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure AD environment.
Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain within Microsoft 365 audit logs. This activity can be a legitimate administrative action but also indicates potential federated credential abuse or the establishment of a backdoor via federated identities.
Purpose: Hunts for risky OAuth applications in Microsoft 365 with overly permissive Microsoft Graph permissions.
Key Actions:
Finds enabled OAuth apps and retrieves their latest state (arg_max).
Expands permissions and flags sensitive ones (e.g., Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, User.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All).
Notes publisher verification, origin, and last modification date.
Marks risky apps via HasRiskyPermissions flag.
Use Cases: Detects malicious consent grant phishing, overprivileged third-party apps, and integrations that could enable data theft or long-term access.
Key Actions:
Finds enabled OAuth apps and retrieves their latest state (arg_max).
Expands permissions and flags sensitive ones (e.g., Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, User.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All).
Notes publisher verification, origin, and last modification date.
Marks risky apps via HasRiskyPermissions flag.
Use Cases: Detects malicious consent grant phishing, overprivileged third-party apps, and integrations that could enable data theft or long-term access.
KQL Query from file: EntraFalcon Detection
This query will find when federation trust settings are changed for a domain or when the domain is changed from managed to federated authentication. Results will relate to when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added.
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `UpdateSAMLProvider` event, analyzing fields such as `sAMLProviderArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity` details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.
The following analytic detects updates to the SAML provider in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify the `UpdateSAMLProvider` event, analyzing fields such as `sAMLProviderArn`, `sourceIPAddress`, and `userIdentity` details. Monitoring updates to the SAML provider is crucial as it may indicate a perimeter compromise of federated credentials or unauthorized backdoor access set by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate identity federation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to cloud resources and sensitive data.
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