Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
361 detections
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Detects rapid mass-cloning or downloading of private GitHub repositories shortly after an OAuth token authorization, originating from IP addresses or countries not previously associated with the user account. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized bulk data extraction using compromised credentials, consistent with threat actor activity (e.g., TeamPCP/UNC6780).
Detects anomalous high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft 365 (SharePoint or OneDrive) by a single user within a 15-minute window, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft 365 (SharePoint or OneDrive) by a single user within a 15-minute window, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects instances where a service principal or entity identified as an AI agent, bot, or assistant accesses files in SharePoint or OneDrive that are likely to contain sensitive credentials, secrets, or configuration files (e.g., .pem, .pfx, .env, id_rsa).
This rule detects potentially malicious mailbox access patterns in Microsoft 365. It identifies instances where the 'MailItemsAccessed' action is performed using the Outlook ClientAppId, but in conjunction with an uncommon APIId and a suspicious user agent ('Client=REST' combined with specific Firefox versions). This pattern is indicative of automated session hijacking or unauthorized access via third-party tools rather than legitimate browser-based Outlook access.
Detects anomalous access to email items containing financial keywords (e.g., payroll, invoice, banking) via 'MailItemsAccessed' events, characteristic of potential data collection following an AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) account takeover. The rule identifies accounts accessing multiple financial emails without performing traditional BEC indicators such as creating inbox rules, modifying mailbox forwarding, or sending outbound phishing emails, which helps isolate silent exfiltration attempts.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
This rule monitors cloud audit logs for high-frequency file access operations originating from a Python-based HTTP client (python-httpx). This behavior is characteristic of automated collection or exfiltration scripts utilizing cloud APIs to download or access large quantities of files.
Detects high-volume access to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to messages, mail folders, and attachments by a single user account within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated, unauthorized email and attachment scraping, often associated with remote email collection attempts.
This rule detects anomalous behavior where an identity performs multi-category discovery (e.g., users, groups, directory roles, applications) via Microsoft Graph API within a single session, followed by intensive collection of content (files, attachments, or messages). This sequence is indicative of an adversary performing reconnaissance to map an environment before moving to data exfiltration or theft.
Detects unauthorized access and data retrieval attempts from a MinIO object storage instance using default administration credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin). The rule monitors both command-line execution of MinIO client (mc) operations and network connections to MinIO service ports (9000/9001) that involve the use of the default credential pair.
Detects unauthorized access and data retrieval attempts from a MinIO object storage instance using default administration credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin). The rule monitors both command-line execution of MinIO client (mc) operations and network connections to MinIO service ports (9000/9001) that involve the use of the default credential pair.
Detects high-volume cloud storage access or download activity originating from the python-httpx library within a short window (2 hours). This behavior is often indicative of automated data scraping, exfiltration, or bulk content synchronization.
Detects high-volume, sustained or burst-like access, download, or deletion activity by a single user across SharePoint, OneDrive, or Exchange services. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging, exfiltration, or bulk malicious activity by a compromised account or insider.
This rule monitors cloud and identity logs to detect a single user identity exhibiting multiple stages of suspicious activity (authentication, reconnaissance, and exfiltration) within a 24-hour period while utilizing distinct, non-overlapping source IP addresses for each stage. This behavior is indicative of an account compromise where different stages of the attack chain originate from different infrastructure.
Detects an anomalous burst of git clone, fetch, or download events performed by a single GitHub user account against a large number of private repositories within a short timeframe (15-minute window). This pattern often indicates unauthorized bulk collection or exfiltration of sensitive source code by an actor using a valid account.
Detects an anomalous burst of git clone, fetch, or download events performed by a single GitHub user account against a large number of private repositories within a short timeframe (15-minute window). This pattern often indicates unauthorized bulk collection or exfiltration of sensitive source code by an actor using a valid account.
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