Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MATCHBOIL campaign, identifying instances where a registry run key and a scheduled task pointing to an application data (%LOCALAPPDATA%) path are created by the same process within a short window, or where known specific scheduled task names and run value names are observed.
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks on remote hosts by monitoring for the NetrJobAdd function call (opnum 0) against the ATSVC RPC interface (UUID: 1FF70682-0A51-30E8-076D-740BE8CEE98B). This interface is associated with the legacy Windows AT scheduler, which is frequently abused by offensive security tools like Impacket's atexec for remote command execution and lateral movement.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
Detects the execution of MATCHBOIL malware variants (PlannerAssistantManager.exe or RegularExpressionExplorer.exe) using specific command-line arguments (-auto, -plans, -renew) which trigger C&C logic.
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
Detects potential remote shell behavior where a process named libgcrypt establishes an outbound connection on TCP port 9999 and spawns a shell (such as sh, bash, dash, zsh, or ash) within a short time window.
This detection identifies potential abuse of SSH "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" by monitoring for suspicious process execution patterns.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
The following analytic detects the execution of programs initiated by forfiles.exe. This command is typically used to run commands on multiple files, often within batch scripts. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where forfiles.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be exploited to bypass command line execution protections, making it a potential vector for malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows error recovery boot configurations using bcdedit.exe with flags such as "recoveryenabled" and "no". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables recovery options to prevent system restoration, making it crucial for SOC analysts to investigate. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder recovery efforts, allowing ransomware to cause extensive damage and complicate remediation.
The following analytic detects the execution of curl commands with insecure flags within the Cisco Isovalent environment. It identifies this activity by monitoring process execution logs for curl commands that use the -k or --insecure flags. This behavior is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to bypass SSL/TLS verification, potentially exposing the Kubernetes infrastructure to man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to data interception, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can be used to execute malicious scripts embedded within CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the abuse of Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code, specifically detecting the loading of "scrobj.dll" by Regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line executions. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe is a trusted, signed Microsoft binary, often used in "Squiblydoo" attacks to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and persistent access.
The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
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