Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` on the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate authentication certificates, which can be used to impersonate users or decrypt sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
The following analytic detects the execution of the SubInAcl utility. SubInAcl is a legacy Windows Resource Kit tool from the Windows 2003 era, used to manipulate security descriptors of securable objects. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving "SubInAcl.exe" binary. This activity can be significant because the utility should be rarely found on modern Windows machines, which mean any execution could potentially be considered suspicious. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to blind defenses by tampering with EventLog ACLs or modifying the access to a previously denied resource.
The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL script
via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data,
focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT
switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control
bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary
code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool,
posing a severe threat to the environment.
via a URL. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data,
focusing on command-line executions that include HTTP/HTTPS URLs and the /FORMAT
switch. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control
bypass, allowing adversaries to execute JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
If confirmed malicious, this technique can enable attackers to execute arbitrary
code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence using a trusted Windows tool,
posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of an XSL script using the WMIC process, which is often indicative of malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving WMIC and XSL files. This behavior is significant as it has been associated with the FIN7 group, known for using this technique to execute malicious scripts. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and further malicious actions within the environment.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
Detects the OIC-lure Mustang Panda PlugX infection chain with tightened false-positive controls: requires the console-resize artifact (mode.com with digit,digit args) that precedes the download, requires PowerShell to be parented directly by explorer.exe (filtering out legitimate scheduled-task/management-agent automation that also chains curl+tar), requires curl to combine -L with -k/-s (insecure/silent) flags, narrows all correlation windows to 2 minutes, and excludes shell/utility processes from the final execution match.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
The following analytic identifies a Windows command interpreter process being executed where it's process name does not match it's original file name attribute.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
Detects the ClickFix/fake-CAPTCHA initial access pattern where users are socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a browser-spawned shell. The rule matches on process creation events involving mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe initiated by explorer.exe or common shell-related processes, filtering out known administrative and deployment software.
The following analytic detects the execution of a DCRat "forkbomb" payload, which spawns multiple cmd.exe processes that launch notepad.exe instances in quick succession. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on the rapid creation of cmd.exe and notepad.exe processes within a 30-second window. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential DCRat infection, a known Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with destructive capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to system instability, resource exhaustion, and potential disruption of services.
The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n".
Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n".
Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
Detects the spawning of shells, interpreters, or system reconnaissance binaries by primary Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway processes (httpd, nsppe, aslearning). This behavior is strongly indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as remote command execution, often following the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-88771.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint) spawning common LOLBins or command-line interpreters. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious macros or exploitation attempts delivering secondary payloads.
Detects ClickFix-style attacks where a user is tricked into copying and pasting malicious, often obfuscated, commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt. The detection identifies suspicious parent processes (like explorer.exe) spawning shell interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe) with inline encoded payloads or remote content retrieval patterns. It correlates these process executions with recent entries in the Windows RunMRU registry key to identify commands triggered via the Run dialog.
Detects instances where the Windchill Java/Tomcat application server process spawns command-line interfaces such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash.exe. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation behavior associated with CVE-2026-12569, where an attacker exploits a deserialization vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands, often for the purpose of dropping web shells.
Detects a potential web shell deployment by identifying a web server process creating or modifying a file in common web directory locations, followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by the execution of that same file.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
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