Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) launched directly from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox). The rule specifically flags common obfuscation techniques such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or attempts to download and execute code (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) while excluding explicit file-based script executions.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and further identifies suspicious command-line arguments often associated with post-exploitation activity like discovery, credential gathering, or file manipulation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns involving cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned by services.exe, or involving redirection to temporary files, which are consistent with Impacket-based remote service execution commonly associated with NeedyMantis malware deployment.
This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the `--dump-dom` argument.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
Detects the FileFix execution chain, where victims are socially engineered into pasting a malicious path into the Windows Explorer address bar. This action results in explorer.exe launching suspicious command-line tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe) with suspicious flags or unusually long, potentially obfuscated arguments characteristic of a 'ClickFix' style attack.
This rule detects potential post-exploitation activity where a web server process spawns a command shell, executes system discovery commands, and immediately initiates an outbound network connection. This behavior is indicative of a web-based exploit leading to interactive command execution and subsequent C2 communication.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
Detects the execution of the Windows finger.exe utility with a command-line argument containing an '@' symbol, which indicates a request to a remote host. This technique is often abused by adversaries for reconnaissance or to retrieve remote stagers or other payloads, as the finger protocol is rarely used in modern enterprise environments.
Detects instances where the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) is used to execute 'dotnet --list-runtimes' with output redirected to sensitive locations (e.g., NUL, temp folders, or text/log files). This pattern is often observed during post-exploitation activities by RMM agents or unauthorized processes attempting to profile the .NET environment while hiding their command output.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects the use of common command-line utilities (net, powershell, cmd) to perform user account creation or local group membership modification, which are behaviors often associated with adversary persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of discovery or credential access utilities (e.g., whoami, net, reg, ldapsearch) spawned by Java-based server processes like java.exe or tomcat.exe. This activity is often indicative of an attacker leveraging a vulnerable web application to perform reconnaissance or credential harvesting on the host system.
This rule detects potential command injection attacks targeting the Zimbra 'swatchdog' service, specifically involving the abuse of SNMP trap notifications (CVE-2026-73570). The attack works by injecting malicious shell metacharacters into the 'zimbra-MIB::zmServiceName' argument, which is processed by a Perl-invoked 'swatchdog' script. The rule monitors process execution events for shell commands spawned by the swatchdog utility that contain suspicious shell operators and the targeted MIB parameter.
Detects the execution of common enumeration tools and commands often associated with ransomware-precursor behavior. This includes the use of AdFind, dsquery, net.exe, and nltest for domain account, group, and trust discovery, as well as the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound collection activities.
Detects the use of PsExec or SC.exe to create services on multiple remote endpoints within a short time window. This pattern is characteristic of adversary-driven mass deployment of ransomware or other malicious payloads where remote execution via Windows service control is used to move laterally across a network.
Detects the execution of known Active Directory reconnaissance tools, specifically AdFind and SharpHound/BloodHound. These tools are commonly used by adversaries to enumerate domain objects, users, computers, groups, and trusts, which are essential precursors to further lateral movement and privilege escalation within a domain environment.
Detects the installation of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) feature via dism.exe or wsl.exe, or the execution of wsl.exe for non-standard administrative tasks. This activity is often a precursor to running Linux-based tools or malware on a Windows host.
Detects the execution of reconnaissance commands designed to enumerate Active Directory domain trust relationships. Attackers, including those associated with ransomware operations like INC Ransom, use these tools to map organizational structures and identify pathways for lateral movement and cross-domain propagation.
Detects two distinct suspicious patterns: first, the deletion of executable files residing in common user-writable temporary directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) using command-line tools like 'del' or 'erase', which is often indicative of anti-forensic activity after malware execution. Second, it monitors for network traffic involving HTTP POST requests or specific SOAP headers related to 'tempuri.org', which are commonly associated with default .NET WCF service scaffolding and may be used by adversaries for C2 communication or exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) and remote access tools (e.g., ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera, Splashtop, NinjaOne, Action1) when the command line includes silent install or installation flags. The detection correlates this activity with recent (within 72 hours) identity-related alerts (e.g., impossible travel, anomalous sign-in, credential compromise) for the same user, suggesting a potential high-risk scenario where an adversary is establishing remote access following a credential compromise.
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