Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the abuse of the Windows built-in utility 'certutil.exe' to download files from remote locations using the 'urlcache', 'verify', or 'verifyctl' arguments. Attackers often leverage this LOLBIN to download malicious payloads as it is a trusted system binary.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies or modifying Windows Boot Configuration Data, a technique commonly employed by LockBit and other ransomware families prior to file encryption.
Detects msiexec.exe spawned from explorer.exe, consistent with a user double-clicking a malicious .lnk shortcut, where the command line triggers the installation of an MSI package hosted on a remote HTTP/HTTPS server. This behavior is a known initial access technique used by FIN7 to deliver malicious payloads.
Detects command-line indicators associated with destructive disk-wiping activity, specifically targeting disk structure corruption to render systems unbootable. This rule monitors for unauthorized use of the Windows 'diskpart' utility, direct raw physical drive access, and specific file system utility commands (fsutil) frequently observed in wipers attributed to APT44 (Sandworm).
Detects configuration changes to AAA/TACACS+ settings or the creation of local administrative accounts on network devices executed over SSH or Telnet sessions. This behavior is associated with malicious activity by groups such as Salt Typhoon, involving the compromise of telecommunications infrastructure.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects anomalous process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, taskkill.exe) initiated by the process 'ReportDump.exe'. This activity is indicative of the SectopRAT payload performing remote shell, file management, or process control tasks initiated via a C2 channel.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
Detects a sequence of events where a suspected sideloaded process (e.g., masquerading as common tools like curl or vim) is followed within 30 minutes by the registration of a new Windows service, a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis threat group.
Detects host enumeration activities (listing processes, user information, and directory contents) performed by known legitimate binaries (e.g., poedit.exe, curl.exe, vim.exe) shortly after they have executed a suspicious sideloading event. This pattern is characteristic of the NeedyMantis actor performing initial discovery before C2 beaconing.
Detects the execution of taskkill.exe to terminate known security software processes, when the command is initiated from sqlservr.exe or via a command shell child process of sqlservr.exe. This activity is a common post-exploitation step after abusing xp_cmdshell to neutralize defenses before deploying further payloads.
Detects instances where a Python process spawns a command-line shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash) within 15 seconds of starting, while executing common reconnaissance or utility commands. This behavior is indicative of malicious code executing at import-time, a technique often associated with supply chain compromises in Python packages.
This rule detects potential persistence via Python environment variable manipulation (PYTHONPATH) followed by suspicious network activity from a child process of python.exe. It specifically looks for the modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable using PowerShell on Windows or shell configuration files on Unix-like systems, followed by a python.exe-initiated network connection (like curl) to external domains, which may indicate the execution of a malicious sitecustomize.py hook.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of 'sqlcmd.exe' when spawned by web application pools (w3wp.exe) or general command shell (cmd.exe) processes that do not appear to be related to authorized database administration or IIS appcmd activity.
Detects the use of 'findstr' or PowerShell to query sensitive configuration files (such as web.config or applicationHost.config) for credential-related keywords like 'connectionString', 'AccountKey', or 'machineKey'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to harvest credentials or sensitive configuration data stored in cleartext on the filesystem.
Detects the Microsoft IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning common command-line shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) and executing discovery-related commands. This is highly indicative of potential web shell activity where an adversary uses an existing web application vulnerability to gain remote code execution.
Detects reconnaissance activity on IIS servers where the worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns appcmd.exe or PowerShell to list websites, virtual directories, or application pools. This pattern is indicative of an attacker performing post-exploitation discovery after establishing a web shell.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects suspicious child processes such as shell interpreters, download utilities, and base64-decoded commands spawned from core Citrix NetScaler processes (nsppe, httpd, aoacli, nscli). This pattern is often indicative of post-exploitation command execution following an exploitation of remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities.
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