Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11,842 detections
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Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line cloud synchronization and file transfer utilities (such as rclone, rsync, and MEGAcmd) when invoked with flags or patterns indicative of data staging or exfiltration, such as copy, sync, or targeting remote cloud storage locations.
Detects instances of potential lateral movement using PsExec or WMI following an alert related to credential compromise, infostealers, or session hijacking, where the same user account is involved in both events.
Detects activity indicative of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, where users are tricked into manually executing obfuscated commands (often from fake CAPTCHA or error prompts) via the Windows Run dialog or command-line interfaces. The rule correlates suspicious process execution (e.g., mshta, powershell, certutil, curl) originating from explorer.exe with the detection of common encoded/obfuscated command line patterns, or interactions with the Windows RunMRU registry key, which logs commands typed into the Run dialog.
Detects the GitHub Actions runner executing the Bun runtime to run a hidden index.js payload, specifically associated with the compromised 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' actions. The rule filters for process execution context tied to GitHub runner internals and validates that the Bun execution follows the pattern observed in these supply chain attacks.
Detects the creation of specific decoy scheduled tasks ('Internet Quality Test Connection', 'Network Configuration Manager', 'System Health Monitor') identified as part of the Star Blizzard actor's CosmicPulse delivery mechanism. The rule monitors for the creation of these tasks via schtasks.exe or system events, specifically when the task configuration references execution via rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, control.exe, or remote/UNC-based payloads.
Detects coordinated activity characteristic of NotPetya-like lateral movement. It identifies a local account authenticating across multiple hosts (credential reuse), followed by the creation of a transient Windows service (typically for remote command execution) and the invocation of rundll32.exe to execute a DLL export by ordinal on the same device.
Detects anomalous child process execution (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe) by the Microsoft Exchange IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) or the creation of .aspx files in Exchange web directories. This behavior is highly indicative of post-exploitation activity, such as web shell deployment, frequently observed in attacks targeting vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyLogon.
This rule detects potential unauthorized account creation by correlating suspicious administrative activity on network edge devices (VPNs, firewalls) with subsequent local administrator account creation on an internal host within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware affiliates exploiting internet-facing infrastructure to gain initial access and escalate privileges.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the command line contains suspicious patterns such as execution of common scripting engines (PowerShell, wscript, cscript), use of common staging directories (temp, appdata, programdata), or naming conventions that mimic legitimate Windows system tasks.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the command line contains suspicious patterns such as execution of common scripting engines (PowerShell, wscript, cscript), use of common staging directories (temp, appdata, programdata), or naming conventions that mimic legitimate Windows system tasks.
Detects the execution of known Windows 'Living-off-the-Land' binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe) when they originate from web browsers or office productivity applications, or when they are executed with command-line arguments indicative of network resource loading, remote scripting, or code execution bypasses.
Detects the abuse of built-in Windows binaries 'regsvr32.exe' and 'msbuild.exe' for proxy execution. Specifically, it flags 'regsvr32.exe' loading remote scriptlets via HTTP and 'msbuild.exe' processing project files containing inline tasks, which are common techniques used to execute arbitrary malicious code while bypassing security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell process creation patterns often associated with malicious activity. The rule identifies PowerShell execution invoked by common parent processes (like Office applications or scripting engines) or using highly suspicious command-line arguments such as encoded commands, hidden windows, or common download and execution patterns (e.g., IEX, WebClient).
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into pasting malicious payloads into the Windows Run dialog. The rule monitors for common scripting interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe) spawned by explorer.exe or mstsc.exe with suspicious command-line patterns indicative of payload delivery, such as obfuscated strings, hidden windows, or short-URL downloads.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (via Event ID 4698 or schtasks.exe) involving suspicious action paths, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBins, or tasks configured to run as SYSTEM by non-administrator users, which is a common persistence mechanism for malware.
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