Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11,839 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,629
1,822
1,261
860
754
Contributors
3,246
2,040
1,233
910
828
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
Platforms
9,739
2,542
1,172
276
100
Products / Services
3,075
2,979
2,352
1,065
955
MITRE Techniques
6,777
3,901
2,671
2,014
1,827
CVEs
21
19
18
14
14
IDS Classtypes
75
31
26
19
19
IDS Protocols
102
68
10
5
3
Detects attempts to disable security services (Windows Defender, EDR agents), modify audit policies via auditpol, or stop/clear the Windows Event Log service. This behavior is a common precursor to post-compromise activity intended to blind defenders and conceal malicious actions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects instances of rundll32.exe being used with suspicious command line arguments, such as referencing JavaScript, loading Control Panel applets (.cpl) via shell32.dll from non-standard locations, or executing DLLs directly from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Downloads, ProgramData). These patterns are common techniques used by adversaries to proxy execution and evade detection.
Detects the execution of the Microsoft HTML Application host (mshta.exe) when it is used to launch scripts from remote URLs (http/https/ftp) or when it spawns common command-line shells and scripting engines, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land techniques used to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage obfuscation or evasion techniques such as Base64 encoded commands, hidden window styles, in-memory script downloads via IEX, and common string obfuscation methods like backtick insertion, character concatenation, and casting. These techniques are frequently used by adversaries to bypass command-line monitoring and execute malicious payloads.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe to perform remote file downloads or decode remote content. Adversaries often use these dual-use tools to bypass network security controls by masquerading as standard system processes for staging second-stage payloads.
Detects instances where the WMI service (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common command-line or system tools such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe. This behavior is often indicative of lateral movement or remote command execution via WMI.
Detects common suspicious PowerShell command-line patterns often used for malicious purposes, including base64-encoded command execution, hidden-window execution with common evasion flags, and the use of download/execution cmdlets for in-memory payload delivery.
Detects the creation of suspicious services that are preceded by an administrative SMB share (ADMIN$) connection and a network logon event (Type 3) from the same source. This pattern is commonly used by lateral movement tools (like PsExec) to execute payloads remotely by installing a service, accessing the administrative share to drop the binary, and executing the service.
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin, and bcdedit) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware operations to inhibit data restoration.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that execute common script interpreters (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe, cscript.exe) from user-writable or temporary directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData, Users\Public). This activity often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts.
This rule detects the invocation of rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, or mshta.exe with arguments pointing to remote resources (UNC, WebDAV, or HTTP(S) URLs). This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute remote scriptlets (e.g., .sct, .hta, .dll) for living-off-the-land bypasses or initial staging of malicious payloads, such as the Squiblytwo or Squiblydoo techniques.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' that involves suspicious command-line patterns, specifically tasks pointing to potentially volatile directories (temp, appdata, programdata) or tasks executing PowerShell/CMD with common obfuscation/execution arguments such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or base64 decoding.
Detects the execution of PowerShell processes using suspicious command-line flags, encoding, or built-in .NET network download methods (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, DownloadString). The rule excludes signed PowerShell binaries and common system management tools like SCCM or monitoring agents to reduce false positives.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender settings (e.g., disabling real-time monitoring, adding exclusions, or stopping services) using the Set-MpPreference cmdlet or service control commands. This technique is frequently utilized by ransomware actors, such as the ALPHV/BlackCat group, to neutralize security protections prior to executing malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of Grixba, a reconnaissance and inventory tool used by Play ransomware operators. The tool is designed to enumerate domain accounts, security software, backup solutions, and remote systems to facilitate reconnaissance prior to deploying encryption.
Page 40 of 564