Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
This rule detects the installation of common AI agent and orchestration frameworks (e.g., LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI) using command-line package managers (pip, npm, conda) that point to non-standard or unverified package indexes. This behavior is a common indicator of a potential software supply-chain compromise, where an adversary attempts to inject malicious code by forcing the installation of packages from an attacker-controlled source.
Detects command-line operations indicative of bulk data export, dumping, or unauthorized scanning against vector databases (e.g., Pinecone, Chroma, Milvus, Qdrant) and caching backends (e.g., Redis). Such activities may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate training data, embeddings, or context stored within an AI agent's memory backend.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities involving the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks or the use of system binaries (rundll32.exe and control.exe) to execute commands, often associated with lateral movement or persistence. It looks for schtasks.exe commands creating tasks with specific deceptive names, and rundll32.exe or control.exe executing from remote network paths or suspicious command line arguments.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities involving the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks or the use of system binaries (rundll32.exe and control.exe) to execute commands, often associated with lateral movement or persistence. It looks for schtasks.exe commands creating tasks with specific deceptive names, and rundll32.exe or control.exe executing from remote network paths or suspicious command line arguments.
Detects a specific multi-stage infection chain associated with Star Blizzard. The sequence begins with a command shell launched under conhost.exe executing SSH with PermitLocalCommand enabled, followed by the execution of a control panel (.cpl) file via control.exe within a two-hour window.
Detects the execution of potentially malicious processes originating from common mail client attachment cache directories, the use of suspicious double extensions in file names, or common command-line interpreters being spawned by Microsoft Office applications, which are high-confidence indicators of phishing or malicious document exploitation.
Detects the execution of command shells or common post-exploitation utilities as child processes of network appliance management services (e.g., VPN gateways, firewalls, web servers). This pattern indicates potential exploitation of public-facing infrastructure where an attacker achieves code execution through the management daemon or its web components.
Detects a suspicious sequence of reconnaissance activities associated with ShinyHunters campaigns targeting PeopleSoft environments. The pattern involves reading '/etc/hosts' using standard utilities ('cat', 'grep', 'awk') followed by rapid network discovery or probing attempts using 'curl', 'wget', 'nmap', or 'nc' from the same host within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of the GigaWiper malware or the use of common system commands associated with destructive data activities, such as recursive file removal, disk formatting, or secure data overwriting, often used by threat actors for extortion.
Detects the installation or first execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, specifically AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect, shortly after an identity change or MFA reset event, indicative of social engineering vishing-to-remote-access techniques often employed by threat actors such as Scattered Spider (UNC3944).
Detects processes attempting to enumerate Active Directory objects (users, groups, trusts) while simultaneously establishing a network connection to Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) on port 9389. This behavior is characteristic of tools like SharpADWS, which performs AD enumeration via the ADWS protocol rather than traditional LDAP, potentially bypassing legacy detection mechanisms.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender exclusion paths by adding root drive letters or temporary directory paths. This behavior is indicative of defense evasion techniques often employed by ransomware families, such as Nova or Gentlemen, to prevent the scanning of files immediately prior to encryption.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
This rule detects when common web server processes or service accounts spawn unexpected interpreter, shell, or reconnaissance tools, which is a common indicator of post-exploitation activity following a successful Remote Code Execution (RCE) attempt.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects anomalous, rapid enumeration of system, network, process, and software configuration settings by AI coding assistant processes (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). This behavior often signifies an AI agent being coerced or configured to perform environment discovery or credential gathering, indicating potential compromise or abuse of the LLM-integrated development environment.
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