Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects reconnaissance and persistence behaviors associated with the Akira ransomware attack chain, specifically the execution of the Cloudflare Tunnel daemon for remote access or the creation/modification of local user accounts via standard Windows tools.
This rule detects the use of 'mshta.exe' to execute HTML (.html, .htm) or MHTML (.mhtml, .mht) files. This behavior is often associated with bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections, as attackers may use container formats to deliver files that do not properly inherit MotW markings when extracted, allowing them to be opened by 'mshta.exe' without restrictive security policies.
FileFix (mr.d0x, June 2025) tricks victims into pasting a clipboard payload into the File Explorer address bar; explorer.exe directly spawns the hidden shell command with no legitimate GUI file-open lineage.
FileFix execution via the Explorer address bar writes to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths, a forensic artifact distinct from the Run dialog's RunMRU key, immediately before the malicious child process spawns.
The FileFix StealC campaign's final-stage loader is written in Go and performs VM/sandbox checks plus string encryption before executing the infostealer.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
This rule detects scenarios where a node-based package manager (npm or npx) executes an 'install' command, which is immediately followed by the spawning of unexpected child processes such as interpreters (python, powershell, cmd, wscript, cscript, mshta) or network tools (curl). This behavior is characteristic of malicious npm packages used in supply chain attacks to deliver secondary payloads like BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, or similar threats.
Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects the GitHub Actions runner executing the Bun runtime to run a hidden index.js payload, specifically associated with the compromised 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' actions. The rule filters for process execution context tied to GitHub runner internals and validates that the Bun execution follows the pattern observed in these supply chain attacks.
Detects the execution of LNK files masquerading as PDF files through the use of double extensions (e.g., .pdf.lnk). The rule monitors for processes spawned by explorer.exe that contain '.pdf.lnk' in the command line and trigger child processes like PowerShell, CMD, WScript, or MSHTA, which are common indicators of malicious intent.
Detects instances where the Claude Desktop application spawns a terminal or shell process that immediately executes commands associated with downloading remote payloads or accessing sensitive cryptocurrency wallet artifacts. This behavior is indicative of potential AI prompt injection where an AI assistant is coerced into executing malicious commands without user authorization.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe initiated by a Windows script host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) in close temporal proximity to a suspicious PowerShell command. The PowerShell command includes flags common in obfuscated or downloader scripts such as '-NoProfile' combined with file manipulation or sleep cmdlets, which may indicate a multi-stage infection or payload delivery chain.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects automated reconnaissance using WMI or PowerShell to perform broad queries for system environment, security products, network adapters, software, and hardware attributes. The detection focuses on clusters of distinct WMI reconnaissance categories occurring within a 15-minute window, which is often indicative of pre-C2 profiling by adversaries.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
This rule detects potential backdoor deployment or persistence mechanisms in AI coding assistants like Claude Code and Cursor. It identifies when specific configuration or hook files (e.g., settings.json, hooks.js) are modified, followed within a two-hour window by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., powershell.exe, curl.exe, python) initiated by the coding assistant's CLI tool.
Detects the execution of processes named 'nohup' with arguments suggesting renderer masquerading ('--type=renderer') containing suspicious terms like 'SystemUpdate' or 'iSync', originating from Cursor IDE helper processes or the terminal shell. This behavior is indicative of a backdoor or malicious process attempting to hide in plain sight by masquerading as legitimate IDE rendering components.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell where the task binary path resides in suspicious directories frequently used by adversaries for staging, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or Public folders.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and coercion tools (such as PetitPotam, EfsPotato, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, or Coercer) when attempting to coerce a local authentication or credential relay using the local loopback address. These tools leverage various RPC-based techniques to force the local machine to authenticate to an attacker-controlled source, facilitating NTLM relay attacks.
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