Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments that suggest programmatically capturing or redirecting console output using ScriptBlock techniques (Create, Console, In, ReadToEnd). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated script execution, in-memory payloads, or attempts to bypass logging by capturing output via .NET streams.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns suspicious child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe, which are correlated with inbound network connections on ports 135 (RPC/DCOM) or 445 (SMB). This behavior is characteristic of lateral movement techniques used by tools like Impacket's wmiexec.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects execution of regsvr32.exe with command-line arguments that include a remote URL ('/i:http...') combined with silent, unregistered, and notification-free execution flags ('/s', '/u', '/n'). This behavior is characteristic of the 'Squiblydoo' technique, where attackers use Regsvr32 to execute arbitrary scriptlets from remote servers to bypass application whitelisting.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries regsvr32.exe and rundll32.exe for proxy execution, defense evasion, and credential access. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns including Squiblydoo (regsvr32 with remote scriptlets), rundll32 executing JavaScript via mshtml.dll, rundll32 performing LSASS credential dumping via comsvcs.dll, and the loading of DLLs from untrusted user-writable locations like Temp or Downloads folders.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility where the task execution path points to common script interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32) or is located in common user-writable directories (Users, Temp, AppData). Additionally, it flags tasks configured to execute under the 'SYSTEM' account, which is a common technique used to achieve persistence with elevated privileges.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or powershell_ise.exe by the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe). This pattern is frequently used for fileless lateral movement, as threat actors leverage WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to execute remote commands which manifests as wmiprvse.exe launching a shell on the target host.
Detects the creation or connection of named pipes that match known default and common malleable C2 profile patterns used by the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework. These named pipes are frequently utilized by Cobalt Strike beacons for inter-process communication, SMB/TCP beacon functionality, and staging during post-exploitation activities.
Detects the execution of known Windows system binaries (rundll32, regsvr32, mshta, msiexec) with command-line arguments indicative of proxy execution or script-based attacks. The rule identifies patterns commonly associated with downloading or executing remote payloads, including the use of URLs, JavaScript, VBScript, or specific DLL exports designed to execute code indirectly or from a remote source.
Detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as using common temporary directories, executing PowerShell with encoded commands, running tasks as SYSTEM, or using tasks that attempt to hide by using unusual naming conventions. These techniques are often used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution in a stealthy manner.
Detects the abuse of common Windows LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) like regsvr32, mshta, certutil, and rundll32 to proxy the execution of remote scripts, DLLs, or malicious payloads, a technique often used to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line flags (EncodedCommand, NoProfile, WindowStyle Hidden, ExecutionPolicy Bypass) combined with either potential Base64-encoded payloads or network-based download cradles (e.g., Invoke-Expression, WebClient).
Detects the execution of known living-off-the-land binaries or network utilities initiated by or involving processes related to the Semantic Kernel framework (e.g., SKAgent, kernel.run). This pattern is often indicative of automated execution, potentially associated with agent-based activity or malicious orchestration leveraging AI framework components.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin to download files to suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) or to register persistent command execution via the /SetNotifyCmdLine parameter. This detection correlates process execution events with BITS Client operational log events to confirm the completion or status of the BITS job.
Detects the execution of Rubeus, a common security tool used for Kerberos-based attacks including Golden/Silver Ticket forgery, AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, and ticket harvesting. The rule monitors command-line indicators associated with known Rubeus arguments.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
Detects invisible/non-printing Unicode codepoints (zero-width chars, bidi overrides, variation selectors, Unicode tag characters, and Private Use Area icon-font codepoints) embedded in process command lines - covering both classic command/script obfuscation and the emerging use of hidden codepoints to smuggle AI prompt-injection payloads into content later processed by AI copilots/agents. Tightened to require 2+ high-confidence codepoint hits (or 1 from a known scripting host/LOLBin), and gates Private-Use-Area-only matches (a common legitimate icon-font false-positive source) to scripting hosts with 5+ hits, maps to T1027.018.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects the misuse of the legitimate odbcconf.exe utility via the /A switch combined with the REGSVR action. Attackers leverage this behavior to execute malicious DLLs, often utilizing response files or executing from non-standard directories to bypass application control policies.
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