Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11,847 detections
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Detects the abuse of Windows signed binaries (LOLBins) rundll32.exe and regsvr32.exe for proxy execution. Rundll32.exe activity is monitored for the use of javascript: pseudo-protocol or comsvcs.dll for MiniDump operations, while regsvr32.exe activity is monitored for Squiblydoo-style remote scriptlet execution via /i:http and other suspicious flag combinations.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments often used by adversaries for obfuscation, evasion, or in-memory code execution, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, and downloading external content.
This rule detects the creation of services or execution of processes associated with remote management tools like PsExec or PAExec. It looks for common service names (PSEXESVC, PAExec), suspicious executable paths in temporary directories (e.g., \Temp\, \AppData\Local\Temp\), or command-line patterns indicating remote execution via ADMIN$ shares. These indicators are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote command execution.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that either trigger on user logon or startup and point to common writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData), or tasks created with a remote system argument, which is frequently used by adversaries for persistence or lateral movement.
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for potentially malicious purposes. Specifically, it flags certutil.exe being used for decoding or cached URL operations, and bitsadmin.exe being used to initiate file transfers from remote URLs or network paths. These tools are commonly abused by attackers for file staging, ingress tool transfer, and deobfuscation of malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, including service creation, local account modification, or security tool tampering, executed as SYSTEM shortly after activity associated with the ADSelfService Plus GINA logon-screen vulnerability (CVE-2026-74849).
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain involving the execution of a script (likely config.cmd) via curl, followed by the modification of the Active Setup StubPath registry key for persistence, and subsequent execution of a Python script (config.py) from a non-standard location in AppData\Local\Microsoft\.
Detects suspicious PowerShell process execution initiated by Windows Explorer, specifically involving WebDAV-related commands or network share mounting indicators. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers attempting to download and execute remote payloads from WebDAV shares to bypass security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe (typically initiated through the Windows Run dialog) where the command line references a WebDAV UNC path (containing DavWWWRoot). This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks, where users are coerced into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog that trigger remote script execution.
Detects execution of package management commands (pip, npm, conda) that attempt to pull packages from registries other than the approved internal repositories. This behavior is indicative of potential AI supply-chain compromise, including malicious packages or namesquatting targeted at machine-learning or LLM-related development workflows.
Detects instances where machine learning runtime processes (e.g., Python, torch-model-loader) load serialized model files (e.g., .pkl, .joblib, .pth) and subsequently spawn suspicious child processes like command shells, scripting engines, or download utilities. This behavior is indicative of arbitrary code execution via unsafe deserialization of a malicious model artifact.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or MSHTA from explorer.exe with command line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as hidden windows, Base64 encoding, or command execution (IEX/Invoke-Expression). This behavior is common in fileless malware delivery and script-based initial access.
This rule detects the execution of the Cloudflare 'cloudflared' utility from non-standard directory locations. Cloudflared is often abused by threat actors to establish reverse tunnels (e.g., TryCloudflare) to gain unauthorized, persistent, and encrypted external access to a compromised host, effectively bypassing standard perimeter network security controls.
Detects the use of common administrative tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic, bcdedit, etc.) to perform actions that inhibit system recovery. This includes deleting Volume Shadow Copies, deleting backup catalogs, disabling system recovery boot policies, and stopping backup-related services, which are common behaviors used by ransomware to prevent data restoration.
Detects suspicious activity on VMware ESXi hosts involving the termination or unregistration of virtual machines via 'esxcli' or 'vim-cmd', correlated with high volumes of file modification or creation events (.vmdk or .vmx files) within a short window. This pattern often indicates attempts to disrupt virtual machines or inhibit system recovery by adversaries.
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
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