Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

11,847 detections

Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
101
Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning command-line interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker, having gained remote code execution via techniques like insecure deserialization, executes commands or deploys in-memory webshells within the context of the IIS worker process.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects potential malicious PowerShell activity involving suspicious file paths in 'C:\Users\Public\' and the use of 'UPLOAD' command strings, which may indicate the staging and execution of payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
004
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain beginning with common end-user applications (browsers, Office apps, explorer.exe) spawning known LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries), which in turn execute secondary LOLBins with suspicious command-line indicators. This pattern often signifies post-exploitation activity such as secondary payload delivery, fileless malware execution, or proxy execution of malicious scripts/commands, consistent with ClickFix or BYOVD-related ingress techniques.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects potential 'ClickFix' phishing activity where a user is tricked into executing malicious commands in a Windows shell. The rule looks for browser or file explorer processes acting as the parent process to command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) executing suspicious command-line arguments often used to fetch or run malicious scripts from the internet.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is instructed to use the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to execute a malicious one-liner. This activity is characterized by explorer.exe spawning common command/script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) containing typical download-and-execute strings (cradles), which bypasses browser-based download security controls.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects mshta.exe or rundll32.exe spawned as a direct child of explorer.exe with a remote HTTP/HTTPS URL or javascript: URI as an argument. This pattern is indicative of ClickFix-style phishing campaigns where users are socially engineered into running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog or clipboard, leading to execution of remote malicious payloads proxied through trusted system binaries.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData) when launched by common LOLBins or shell-like parents, which is indicative of the CastleLoader 'ClickFix' phishing chain where attackers deploy a portable Python runtime to execute malicious payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the use of forfiles.exe to execute command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries as a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binary and Script) technique to achieve indirect command execution and bypass security controls.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the use of pcalua.exe to launch executables or scripts located in potentially transient or user-writable directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute payloads while bypassing security controls or masquerading as legitimate system processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects malicious prompt injection attempts within an LLM conversation session. The rule monitors for ingested content containing common instruction-override keywords (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'system prompt override'), followed immediately by the agent process executing unauthorized actions such as process launch, network connections, or file creation within the same session/user context.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
102
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects interactive or user-triggered execution of PowerShell carrying indicators of payload downloading, inline evaluation, or Base64 encoding. Because explorer.exe is the parent process, it typically signifies a payload delivered via email/web that a user opened directly such as an .lnk shortcut.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Hunters
1 month ago
104
This rule detects interactive or user-triggered execution of PowerShell carrying indicators of payload downloading, inline evaluation, or Base64 encoding. Because explorer.exe is the parent process, it typically signifies a payload delivered via email/web that a user opened directly such as an .lnk shortcut.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
304
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
003
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
203
Detects rapid, multi-category reconnaissance activity initiated by AI-agent binaries (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). The rule identifies sessions that perform four or more distinct discovery operations—spanning account, network service, system information, and network configuration discovery—within a short time window, indicating potentially malicious autonomous exploration by an AI agent. Covers T1046, T1087, T1083, T1016
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
103
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
003
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