Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of a malicious PowerShell command chain initiated by explorer.exe, consistent with the PlugX malware infection sequence. The detection monitors for specific command-line arguments, including the use of curl for file downloads, tar for extraction, and the launching of associated malicious executables like 'GRrte.exe' following the execution of a shortcut file named 'OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk'.
Detects anomalous behavioral patterns where an AI agent process (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Aider) performs multi-category discovery of its own runtime environment, plugins, and host configuration. The rule identifies agents that trigger processes spanning at least three distinct discovery categories (Network, File/Plugin, Software, or System) within a short timeframe, indicating potential reconnaissance of agent-authorized capabilities and tools rather than standard host exploration. Covers T1082, T1518, T1083, T1016
Detects the execution of shell interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, Bash, Zsh) with suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or network download requests, when initiated by common user-facing applications like web browsers or Windows Explorer.
Detects the creation or modification of a file within the /etc/cron.d/ directory, followed shortly by a Bash process invocation using /dev/tcp redirection. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to achieve persistence via cron and establish reverse shells, bypassing potential limitations of default system shells that do not support /dev/tcp syntax.
Detects Sauron Loader stage-2 payload execution: a randomly-named file dropped in %TEMP% and executed within 5 minutes by a native launcher (rundll32/regsvr32/msiexec/cmd/powershell/wscript). Scoped to devices that already show the confirmed rnpkeys.exe side-load from ProgramData\keyroll, turning a very noisy fleet-wide 'temp file executed by native binary' heuristic (matches countless legitimate installers/updaters) into a targeted next-stage check on hosts with corroborated Sauron Loader activity. Also fixes an unused/dead variable and an ambiguous post-join column reference.
This rule detects the execution of common Node.js package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm) attempting to install specific dependencies that match known patterns of malicious or typosquatted packages often used in supply chain attacks. The detection focuses on suspicious package names that mimic common data structure library naming conventions.
Detects instances where the Node.js process (node.exe) is executed with a command-line argument referencing 'sharedLoad.min.js'. This is often used in web-based applications or potentially malicious obfuscated scripts, but may flag legitimate JavaScript automation tasks.
This rule detects scenarios where an AI agent executes shell commands or system-level tools immediately after receiving a prompt injection attack from an untrusted source. It correlates agent audit logs—specifically identifying tool calls flagged for prompt injection—with actual endpoint process creation events. It flags process execution as 'High' severity if the command line matches common malicious patterns like encoded commands, IEX, or attempts to access credential material (e.g., lsass, mimikatz).
Detects execution of remote payloads by piping the output of network utilities like curl or wget directly into a shell interpreter (bash, sh, zsh). This pattern is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts directly from a remote server without saving a file to disk.
Detects the creation of a new local account that is immediately followed by (or associated with) execution from a process identified as an AI development or agent-based tool (e.g., Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Ollama). The rule correlates process creation events with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created) and optionally checks for subsequent addition to the local Administrators group. This logic aims to surface potential unauthorized credential creation triggered by automated AI coding assistants or LLM-driven workflows.
Detects the use of PowerShell processes that employ command-line encoding (e.g., -enc, -EncodedCommand) in conjunction with download-related cmdlets (e.g., DownloadString, IEX, Invoke-WebRequest), or instances of PowerShell spawned as a child process of another PowerShell process. This pattern is indicative of a loader or stage-one script fetching additional malicious payloads.
This rule detects instances where mshta.exe acts as a parent process to initiate powershell.exe. It specifically looks for command line arguments that employ obfuscation techniques, such as character casing variations (e.g., 'POWERsHeLl'), while simultaneously excluding standard casing, combined with flags typical of non-interactive execution (e.g., -NonInteractive or /w h /c). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and execute scripts hidden from user view.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of USSD codes by the corporate MDM agent to modify call-forwarding settings. This activity is indicative of a compromise where an attacker uses an MDM-controlled device to intercept calls or divert communications.
Detects the use of native Windows administration utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery configurations. The rule specifically monitors for patterns where these commands are executed across multiple hosts or in rapid succession by the same account, behavior frequently observed during the precursor stages of ransomware deployment, such as the ShinyHunters ShinySp1d3r campaign.
Detects the execution of TruffleHog, an automated secret-scanning CLI tool, often utilized by threat actors to harvest sensitive credentials from local filesystems, repositories, environment variables, or CI/CD configuration files following unauthorized access.
Detects the use of the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute a file deletion command following a forced delay using the 'choice' command. This technique is often used by adversaries to facilitate file deletion by introducing a pause, possibly to bypass file locks or to time execution during an intrusion.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
Detects the execution of the SIDEEYE backdoor (Ple64.exe) when it is spawned by web-based processes such as Java (WebLogic) or shell interpreters (cmd.exe/powershell.exe) invoked by web-based parents. This behavior is indicative of a web shell exploitation attempt.
Detects execution of shell commands (cmd, powershell) by processes associated with AvisLoader (e.g., 78324.exe, VLCAssistant.exe, auto.exe), followed by the creation or modification of files in suspicious user-writable directories (e.g., appdata, temp) within a 10-minute window, suggesting potential C2 activity and secondary payload staging.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) to modify Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths, processes, or extensions). This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by excluding malicious files or processes from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.
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