Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11,847 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
5,637
1,822
1,261
860
754
Contributors
3,246
2,040
1,233
910
828
Categories
20,460
11,847
5,879
5,158
4,866
Platforms
9,745
2,545
1,173
276
100
Products / Services
3,075
2,985
2,353
1,065
955
MITRE Techniques
6,780
3,901
2,671
2,015
1,829
CVEs
21
19
18
14
14
IDS Classtypes
75
31
26
19
19
IDS Protocols
102
68
10
5
3
This rule detects the execution of common Windows administration utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe, bcdedit.exe) being used to delete Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration data to disable automatic recovery. These actions are frequently performed by ransomware to prevent data restoration.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
Detects the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell (WMI/CIM objects). This activity is commonly used by ransomware to prevent local data recovery by destroying shadow copy backups before encryption.
Detects usage of the 'gem' command (install, build, push, publish) that includes naming patterns or specific command strings associated with the GemStuffer supply chain compromise campaign. This targets attempts to introduce malicious dependencies into the environment using RubyGems.
Detects the use of 'terraform init' where the command line arguments reference known typosquatted HashiCorp registry domains. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack attempting to pull malicious providers or modules from an adversary-controlled source.
Detects Node.js processes executing suspicious command lines that involve fetching and executing remote JavaScript code. This behavior is indicative of a loader or downloader script commonly used to pull and evaluate malicious payloads at runtime, specifically referencing indicators associated with 'GHAPPIER'.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using native 'wevtutil.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets. The rule monitors for common log-clearing commands and triggers an alert when multiple such events occur on a single host within a 15-minute window, which is indicative of bulk log-wiping often performed by ransomware or during post-exploitation defense evasion.
Detects the use of PsExec to remotely execute binaries on target hosts, a technique observed in The Gentlemen ransomware lateral movement phase when domain controller access is unavailable. The rule identifies psexec.exe process creation with common flags (-s, -d, -c) while filtering out common administrative parent processes.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a PowerShell command. The command typically utilizes Invoke-RestMethod to fetch a remote payload and Invoke-Expression to execute it in memory, bypassing execution policies. This behavior is commonly associated with campaigns like SmartApeSG and DeepLoad.
Detects malicious AI assistant links delivered via spearphishing emails that contain pre-populated prompt injection query parameters. The rule correlates the clicking of a high-signal URL (containing parameters like prompt, system, or lengthy search queries with malicious keywords) originating from an email with a subsequent active session to the same AI service within 5 minutes, confirming potential weaponized AI assistant session manipulation. Covers T1566.002, T1204.001
Detects rapid, multi-category reconnaissance activity initiated by AI-agent binaries (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). The rule identifies sessions that perform four or more distinct discovery operations—spanning account, network service, system information, and network configuration discovery—within a short time window, indicating potentially malicious autonomous exploration by an AI agent. Covers T1046, T1087, T1083, T1016
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects anomalous multi-agent chaining where one AI-enabled agent instance initiates a connection to an AI API and subsequently hands off information to a second, distinct agent instance, which then performs an suspicious downstream action such as spawning a shell or initiating an unauthorized external network connection. This behavior is intended to identify potential abuse of AI-coding assistant tools for automated execution chains.
Detects the execution of zsh with potentially suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., usage of curl, pipes, or osascript) occurring within a 15-minute window of network activity connecting to iCloud CalDAV servers. This behavior pattern may indicate unauthorized data access or exfiltration via legitimate cloud services.
Detects modifications to the .zshrc configuration file followed by shell commands interacting with the file, or the execution of commands that source the .repair-run script within a shell environment. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary modifies startup scripts to maintain access or execute malicious code upon shell initialization.
Detects instances where a Node.js process spawns another Node.js process to execute a JavaScript file located within the node_modules directory. This pattern is commonly observed when malware or malicious scripts attempt to execute payloads from within project dependencies, potentially hiding malicious activity within seemingly legitimate library paths.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the '/sta' command line argument followed by a CLSID. This behavior leverages the IShellRunDll COM interface to execute registered objects, bypassing the standard requirement of providing a DLL path and exported function name. This method is often used by adversaries to execute malicious code while blending in with legitimate system processes.
Detects instances where a Terraform process or its associated provider plugins spawn a Go toolchain process (go.exe) to execute a local package. This pattern is associated with malicious Terraform providers that use this technique to bootstrap second-stage payloads such as the Graphalgo RAT.
Page 61 of 565