Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of known Kerberoasting tools or commands, specifically identifying the use of Rubeus, GetUserSPNs, or processes containing strings related to Kerberoasting, which indicates attempts to extract Kerberos service tickets for offline brute-force attacks.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious processes attempting to access the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe). This activity often indicates attempts to dump process memory to harvest sensitive credentials, a common technique used by attackers to facilitate lateral movement.
Detects unauthorized processes reading, copying, or renaming Kerberos ticket cache files (ccache) located in common temporary directories. This behavior is often associated with credential theft and potential Pass the Ticket attacks where adversaries attempt to extract session credentials to perform lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility ntdsutil.exe with arguments 'ac i ntds' or 'ifm', which are commonly used to perform an 'Install from Media' (IFM) operation. This technique is frequently abused by adversaries to create a snapshot of the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and the SYSTEM registry hive, facilitating offline credential dumping.
Detects cross-process memory access attempts targeting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe). The rule filters out known Microsoft-signed system processes and common Windows binaries to identify potential unauthorized credential dumping activity.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility ntdsutil.exe with arguments 'ac i ntds' or 'ifm', which are commonly used to perform an 'Install from Media' (IFM) operation. This technique is frequently abused by adversaries to create a snapshot of the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and the SYSTEM registry hive, facilitating offline credential dumping.
This rule detects successful additions or updates to service principal credentials or application certificates/secrets within Azure AD. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has compromised an account with sufficient permissions to manipulate application identities.
Detects access to sensitive Domain DNS objects in Active Directory, specifically targeting properties associated with domain controller replication metadata or sensitive object attributes. This activity is often used for reconnaissance or to facilitate further attacks against domain infrastructure.
Detects Python accessing AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Kubernetes, Docker, Terraform, or Vault credential stores. This rule specifically looks for Python processes executing commands that contain keywords associated with cloud CLI credential files or configuration paths.
This rule detects Node.js or Bun processes interacting with sensitive configuration, credential, or authentication files, or executing processes with specific, suspicious command-line markers associated with malicious behavior (e.g., Miasma). This is often indicative of credential theft or discovery activities by an attacker leveraging script interpreters.
This rule detects Node.js or Bun processes interacting with sensitive configuration, credential, or authentication files, or executing processes with specific, suspicious command-line markers associated with malicious behavior (e.g., Miasma). This is often indicative of credential theft or discovery activities by an attacker leveraging script interpreters.
Detects Active Directory object access events (Event ID 4662) associated with domain controller replication rights (Replication-Get-Changes or Replication-Get-Changes-All). This behavior is often associated with credential dumping techniques like DCSync, where an attacker impersonates a domain controller to request replication of sensitive data, such as password hashes, from another domain controller.
Detects Active Directory object access events (Event ID 4662) associated with domain controller replication rights (Replication-Get-Changes or Replication-Get-Changes-All). This behavior is often associated with credential dumping techniques like DCSync, where an attacker impersonates a domain controller to request replication of sensitive data, such as password hashes, from another domain controller.
Detects execution of the login-information extractor SharpGetUserLoginIPRP with embedded user, password, host, and day-range parameters. This tool is known to collect domain logon data.
This rule detects EvilTokens device code OAuth phishing by identifying rapid, repeated POST requests to the /common/oauth2/token endpoint with a device_code grant and authorization_pending responses, followed by a successful token issuance and sign-in without an MFA claim. This pattern is consistent with EvilTokens session harvesting.
Detects Vidar Stealer's technique of bypassing Chrome's Application-Bound Encryption by spawning a suspended Chrome instance with specific command-line flags for APC-based CryptUnprotectMemory injection, combined with accessing Chrome credential files (Login Data, Cookies, Local State) for cookie and password theft. This rule correlates process creation events of Chrome with suspicious command-line arguments and file access events to Chrome's credential stores by the same initiating process within a short time frame.
Detects attempts to leverage PowerShell to register a loose-file AppX package from a UNC path. This technique can be used to trigger NTLM coercion via InstallService.exe or achieve SYSTEM DLL load, often associated with the 'UNCanny' coercion method. The rule looks for PowerShell command lines containing 'Add-AppxPackage', '-Register', and a UNC path (\\) along with 'AppxManifest.xml'. Additional suspicious indicators like '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', 'DiscCoerceProbe', 'poc.ps1', 'Invoke-InstallServiceCoerce.ps1', or '-AttackerHost' increase the suspicious score.
This rule detects when an unusual process (not Outlook, MSOIA, OLK, or MicrosoftEdgeUpdate) queries registry keys associated with Microsoft Outlook profiles or the Windows Messaging Subsystem profiles. This activity could indicate an attempt to discover or access Outlook configuration, potentially for credential harvesting or data exfiltration.
Detects suspicious process activity involving common macOS command-line tools (osascript, sh, bash, zsh, cp) attempting to access sensitive browser data (Chrome, Edge login data, cookies, web data) or macOS keychain files. This rule specifically excludes activity initiated by the browsers themselves to reduce false positives.
Detects activity associated with Operation Poisson credential theft, specifically the use of VBScript (sys.vbs) to launch a Python keylogger (pynput or keyboard library) or the installation of keylogger dependencies via pip. It also includes a hash match for a known artifact (KeyL.zip).
Detects when a process, not identified as a standard web browser, queries specific Internet Explorer or Internet Settings registry keys from suspicious file paths (AppData\Roaming, AppData\Local\Temp, Temp). This behavior could indicate an attempt by malware or an attacker to gather browser-related information or modify settings.
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