Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) accessing enterprise applications outside of the expected first-party subset. This could indicate an attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) or gain unauthorized access to resources.
Detects successful user authentications originating from IP addresses associated with known EvilToken infrastructure hosted on Railway.com. This indicates potential compromise of user accounts via phishing or other credential access techniques, where the adversary is using their infrastructure to authenticate.
Detects attempts to add credentials or secrets to a service principal to establish persistence independent of user accounts. This rule specifically looks for 'Add service principal credentials' or 'Update application - Certificates and secrets management' operations in Azure AuditLogs.
Detects the exchange of FOCI refresh tokens across the Microsoft app family, a tactic utilized by Tycoon 2FA. This KQL query identifies successful sign-ins where a single user's session (CorrelationId) interacts with more than 3 distinct applications within a 5-minute window, indicating potential token abuse.
Detects anomalous access to Privileged Access Management (PAM) platforms (e.g., CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea, HashiCorp Vault, Thycotic, ARCON PAM). The rule identifies successful sign-ins occurring outside typical business hours (7 AM to 7 PM) that also exhibit either a high volume of sign-ins (more than 5 per hour per user/app) or access from multiple new IP addresses (more than 2 unique IPs per hour per user/app). This behavior is indicative of potential abuse of privileged accounts, possibly by threat actors like Silk Typhoon (HAFNIUM).
Detects device code authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker targeting Microsoft Graph, which is a known indicator of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks or device code phishing.
Detects extraction of Azure Storage account keys (ListKeys) used to facilitate programmatic, static-auth data exfiltration.
This rule detects when the 'Groups.xml' file within the SYSVOL folder is read. This file can contain sensitive credential information, such as passwords for service accounts, if Group Policy Preferences (GPP) were used to deploy them. Attackers often target this file to extract credentials for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting attempts by identifying a high volume of short-duration HTTP requests to common login, sign-in, verify, account, or authentication URI stems. It specifically looks for requests originating from user agents commonly associated with bots or scripting tools (e.g., 'bot', 'curl', 'python', 'powershell') and successful HTTP status codes (200). The 'short' session duration is inferred from small response sizes (less than 5000 bytes), suggesting automated access rather than human interaction.
Detects a component combining spooler token access and CreateProcessAsUser, often indicative of the Sprysocks malware. The rule specifically looks for the presence of 'spoolsv.exe' along with API calls 'OpenProcessToken', 'DuplicateTokenEx', and 'CreateProcessAsUser', which are used to elevate privileges or impersonate other users by duplicating a token from the print spooler service and then launching a new process with that token.
Detects Python creating an archive containing browser, wallet, developer, cloud, and authentication data from multiple collection roots. This activity is associated with the InvisibleFerret malware.
Detects attempts by non-browser processes to access sensitive Chromium-based browser data files such as Login Data, Cookies, History, Web Data, and Local State. This rule focuses on file creation events and excludes legitimate browser processes from the principal. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
SYSTEM-Context PST or OST Collection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects suspicious access to Outlook data files (.pst or .ost) by processes running in the SYSTEM context, excluding legitimate Outlook-related processes. It focuses on identifying non-standard applications or scripts attempting to collect mailbox data, potentially indicating data exfiltration or unauthorized access. The rule leverages causality fields for enhanced investigation.
Detects curl commands transmitting harvested GitHub tokens (ghp_ prefix) in the request body, representing the final exfiltration stage of gh-token-monitor.
Detects PHP runtime processes anomalously accessing the .env file, bypassing normal application routing to directly scrape database credentials.
Detects instances where an unsigned or non-trusted process attempts to access the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Accessing LSASS memory is a common technique used by threat actors to harvest credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
Detects instances where non-browser processes attempt to open a handle to common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox). This behavior is indicative of unauthorized memory access or process injection techniques often used to harvest session cookies or other sensitive data stored in browser memory space.
Detects network connection attempts to the cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint (169.254.169.254) initiated by processes that are not known cloud management agents or system utilities, which may indicate unauthorized credential or IAM role token theft.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting activity associated with the Hannibal Stealer. It looks for non-standard processes (processes other than the browsers themselves) that access sensitive browser credential stores (like 'Login Data', 'cookies.sqlite', or 'key4.db') and correlate these file access events with the loading of 'bcrypt.dll' or 'CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess.dll', which are often used for decryption or browser automation/sub-processes during credential theft.
This rule detects when non-FileZilla processes attempt to read or access sensitive FileZilla configuration files, specifically 'recentservers.xml' or 'sitemanager.xml', which are known to store plain-text credentials for site connections. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting.
Detects the forceful termination of web browsers using taskkill.exe with the /F (force) and /IM (image name) flags. This behavior is a common precursor for information stealers attempting to unlock browser databases for credential harvesting.
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