Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted tenant-wide administrative permissions within a Microsoft 365 environment. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' with the URI containing 'oauth2PermissionGrants'. This activity is indicative of a malicious OAuth app attempting to gain broad access to an organization's data and resources, often as a persistence mechanism.
This rule detects when a single user principal name (UPN) attempts five or more sign-ins from the same IP address within a one-hour window, and each sign-in is flagged with a 'RiskDetail' other than 'none' but still results in a 'Success' status. This could indicate an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or an account compromise where the attacker is repeatedly trying to access the account from a consistent location, possibly with different credentials or methods, until successful.
This rule detects multiple failed sign-in attempts using the 'Device Code' authentication flow from various IP addresses or locations for a single user. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) or gain unauthorized access through device code phishing or brute-force attacks against the device code flow. The rule specifically looks for more than 3 attempts from more than 2 distinct IP addresses or locations, targeting common Microsoft applications like Office, Teams, Azure Portal, or Graph.
This rule detects attempts to access or exfiltrate DPAPI (Data Protection API) credentials stored in the 'CREDHIST' folder. Specifically, it looks for file events within the `\Microsoft\Protect\CREDHIST` folder where the initiating process is either `dpapisnoop.exe` or `powershell.exe`. `dpapisnoop.exe` is a known tool for DPAPI credential extraction, and PowerShell can also be used for similar purposes.
Detects SID history manipulation for domain privilege escalation
This rule detects a Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) poisoning response from a rogue host. It specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 5355 (LLMNR) where the content contains the byte sequence '|80 00|' at a depth of 4 bytes. A threshold is applied to trigger an alert if 5 such responses are observed from the same source IP within 10 seconds, indicating potential malicious activity like credential harvesting.
Detects unauthorized access to the .npmrc file by unusual processes. Miasma targets this file to hijack NPM publishing rights and propagate supply chain attacks. The rule specifically looks for file access events on '.npmrc' where the initiating process is not a known legitimate NPM-related tool like 'npm', 'node', 'bun', or 'yarn'.
Detects successful or anomalous authentications utilizing the Microsoft device code flow. Kali365 and other phishing-as-a-service platforms actively abuse this flow to register attacker devices, bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gaining unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 environments.
Detects PowerShell accessing browser Local State files to steal credentials. This rule specifically looks for file access events where the file name is 'Local State' and the initiating process is 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe'.
Detects Python processes accessing sensitive credential paths, a common post-exploitation step for malicious ML models (e.g., CVE-2026-4372). The rule specifically looks for Python executables accessing paths commonly associated with cloud (AWS) or container (Kubernetes) credentials. It includes exclusions for known legitimate ML pipeline scripts to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks by looking for multiple successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM authentication for the same user from the same IP address. A count of 5 or more such events is considered suspicious.
This rule detects multiple attempts (3 or more within an hour) to access critical registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) with specific access masks (0x0001 - ReadData/ListDirectory or 0x0002 - WriteData/AddFile). This activity can be indicative of credential dumping attempts, particularly targeting the SAM hive to extract local user credentials.
This rule detects when a user successfully grants five or more OAuth2 permissions within a five-minute window, specifically looking for sensitive scopes such as 'Mail.Read', 'Calendar.Read', 'User.Read.All', or 'Directory.Read.All'. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain broad access to an organization's data through a compromised application or user account.
This rule detects multiple attempts (3 or more within an hour) to access critical registry hives (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) with specific access masks (0x0001 - ReadData/ListDirectory or 0x0002 - WriteData/AddFile). This activity can be indicative of credential dumping attempts, particularly targeting the SAM hive to extract local user credentials.
This rule detects the execution of processes with command-line arguments indicative of credential theft tools such as Mimikatz, lsadump, sekurlsa, vault, cachedump, or hashdump. It specifically looks for these keywords within Security Event ID 4688 (a process creation event) logs.
This rule detects attempts by package management processes (like npm or bun) to invoke the GitHub CLI (gh.exe) with commands that could be used to steal session tokens. This activity is suspicious as it suggests a potential supply-chain compromise targeting developer machines, where maintainers are high-value targets. The rule specifically looks for 'gh.exe' or 'gh' being executed with 'auth' and 'token' in the command line, initiated by 'node.exe', 'bun.exe', or 'npm.cmd'.
This rule detects attempts to copy the /etc/shadow file, which contains hashed user passwords, for offline password cracking. It specifically looks for the string "cat /etc/shadow" in TCP traffic destined for the home network on any port, indicating a potential exfiltration attempt or preparation for credential access. The rule is designed to alert on established connections where this specific command is observed.
This rule detects attempts to dump LSA secrets by accessing the 'SECURITY\Policy\Secrets' registry key remotely over SMB (port 445). This activity is indicative of credential access attempts, specifically targeting cached credentials or other sensitive information stored in the Local Security Authority (LSA). The rule looks for the specific string 'SECURITY\Policy\Secrets' within TCP traffic destined for port 445, suggesting an attempt to read this registry path.
This rule detects HTTP traffic containing the string "KerberosRequestorSecurityToken" in the file data, indicating a potential Kerberos exploit for credential theft delivery. The detection is focused on traffic flowing from the server to the client.
This rule detects the creation of a new service account key within Google Cloud Platform (GCP) via the 'iam.googleapis.com' API. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests to URIs containing 'serviceAccounts' and 'keys'. This activity can be indicative of privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new key for an existing service account to gain persistent access or elevate their privileges.
Detects unauthorized domain controller replication that may indicate DCSync or rogue DC
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