Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the attachment of a virtual disk (.vmdk) likely belonging to a Domain Controller to another virtual machine. This technique is used by threat actors like SCATTERED SPIDER to access the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) for offline credential dumping. This is often done on a newly created, attacker-controlled VM.
Detects a network connection to an external SMB or WebDAV server immediately following the launch of a .url file. This behavior is associated with CVE-2024-43451, where threat actors use malicious .url files to leak NTLM hashes.
Detects when an administrator or help desk agent resets a user's password or deactivates/resets their MFA factors. This activity, while often legitimate, is a key tactic used by social engineering groups like Muddled Libra (aka Scattered Spider) who are known to 'vishing' (voice-phishing) IT help desks to take over accounts.
Detects Remote Procedure Call (RPC) attempts targeting critical assets, such as Domain Controllers, where the call includes a UNC path pointing to an external IP address. This is a strong indicator of an authentication coercion attack (e.g., PetitPotam, DFSCoerce) where an attacker is attempting to force the critical asset to authenticate to a listener they control to capture credentials.
Detects Remote Procedure Call (RPC) authentication coercion attempts where a machine is forced to authenticate to an external IP address. Attackers use this technique to capture credentials by tricking a server into connecting to a listener they control. This rule identifies known vulnerable RPC interfaces and functions (including rare ones like MS-EVEN/ElfrOpenBELW) being used with a UNC path parameter that points to a public IP address.
Detects Remote Procedure Call (RPC) authentication coercion attempts where a machine is forced to authenticate to an external IP address. Attackers use this technique to capture credentials by tricking a server into connecting to a listener they control. This rule identifies known vulnerable RPC interfaces and functions (including rare ones like MS-EVEN/ElfrOpenBELW) being used with a UNC path parameter that points to a public IP address.
This rule detects a high number of failed authentication attempts followed by a successful authentication from the same source IP address and user. It specifically looks for events categorized as 'Insecure_Authentication' within the 'Authentication' datamodel. The rule aggregates authentication events by source IP, user, destination, application, caller user name, target user name, logon type, event code, signature, tag, action, authentication method, authentication service, vendor product, and user priority. It then filters for scenarios where there are more than 5 failures and more than 1 success for the same aggregated criteria.
Detects a potential ToddyCat APT technique where a single source remotely accesses sensitive browser or DPAPI credential files on multiple hosts via SMB. This behavior is consistent with the group's TomBerBil PowerShell script used for widespread credential harvesting.
The purpose of this query is to identify accounts that have logged in from multiple different countries within a short time window (last hour or last day).
This is typically used for security monitoring to detect suspicious or anomalous authentication behavior.
This is typically used for security monitoring to detect suspicious or anomalous authentication behavior.
Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep
Detects activity associated with the Hannibal Stealer, a .NET info-stealer known for targeting cryptocurrency wallets, VPN configurations, and browser data.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files within specific macOS directories associated with LoginWindow hooks and Authorization Plugins. These locations are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence or elevate privileges by injecting malicious code that executes during the login process. The rule specifically looks for file events in '/Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/', '/System/Library/CoreServices/SecurityAgentPlugins/', '/Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins.bundle', or any file activity within a 'loginwindow' path. It excludes activities initiated by legitimate installers and software updaters to reduce false positives. Additionally, it filters for files with low global prevalence, indicating potentially suspicious or custom binaries.
Detects potential execution of BQTLock ransomware by identifying characteristic command-line strings, credential staging files, and associated UAC bypass techniques.
Detects the collection and staging of sensitive user data, such as credentials from keychains, browser profiles, and cryptocurrency wallets, by compressing them into an archive. This behavior is a key component of the DigitStealer infostealer's data theft process.
Mimikatz payload has been executed on a system as one-liner likely to output to a file for collection
Query sign-ins with MFA success immediately following multiple failed sign-ins from different regions. Potential session hijack or AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle).
Error Code 0
Successful authentication
Normal successful login (validate carefully only when paired with suspicious failures)
Error Code 50053
Account locked or malicious IP
HIGH - Brute force attempts
Error Code 50074
MFA challenge not passed
HIGH - User failed MFA
Error Code 500121
MFA prompt timeout
MEDIUM - Possible MFA fatigue indicator
Error Code 50133
Session revoked or SSO artifact invalid
HIGH - Session hijacking indicator
Error Code 50076
MFA required but not provided
MEDIUM - Possible MFA bypass attempt
Error Code 0
Successful authentication
Normal successful login (validate carefully only when paired with suspicious failures)
Error Code 50053
Account locked or malicious IP
HIGH - Brute force attempts
Error Code 50074
MFA challenge not passed
HIGH - User failed MFA
Error Code 500121
MFA prompt timeout
MEDIUM - Possible MFA fatigue indicator
Error Code 50133
Session revoked or SSO artifact invalid
HIGH - Session hijacking indicator
Error Code 50076
MFA required but not provided
MEDIUM - Possible MFA bypass attempt
This rule is to identify when the registry key (SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\ WDigest\UseLogonCredential OR SYSTEM\ControlSet00*\Control\SecurityProviders\ WDigest\UseLogonCredential) is modified signaling a possible WDigest downgrade attack, which was recently seen and attributed to the SmokedHam tool from UNC2465 and its affiliates.
Detects phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments designed to harvest credentials and exfiltrate them via the Telegram Bot API. The detection looks for specific attachment filenames (e.g., RFQ, INQUIRY) or content patterns indicative of this threat.
Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to github.com's /login/device/code endpoint that contain a 'client_id=' in the request body. This pattern is indicative of a device code authentication flow, which could be leveraged in phishing attacks (device code phishing) to steal application access tokens.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to github.com's /login/device/code endpoint containing a 'client_id=' parameter in the request body. This pattern is indicative of a device code authentication flow, which could be leveraged in phishing attacks (device code phishing) to steal application access tokens or facilitate unauthorized access to GitHub accounts.
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