Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when new credentials (certificates or secrets) are added to an existing application or service principal within Azure/Entra ID. This activity, if not part of expected workflows, could indicate a malicious actor establishing persistence or escalating privileges by adding their own credentials to an application.
This rule detects logon events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 (network logon) where the TargetUserName is 'ANONYMOUS LOGON' and the WorkstationName is '-' (indicating a local system or unknown workstation). Additionally, the source IP address must be a loopback address ('127.0.0.1' or '::1'). This specific combination of characteristics is indicative of a RottenPotato-like attack pattern, which exploits local NTLM relay vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
Detects activity when an AWS user's login profile (password) is modified by another user. This can indicate an attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission is changing passwords on behalf of other users to gain access to the AWS console.
This rule detects attempts to backdoor a domain object by granting DCSync rights to a regular user or machine account. This is achieved by modifying the 'ntSecurityDescriptor' attribute in Active Directory, specifically looking for GUIDs associated with DCSync extended rights. Such a modification allows the designated account to perform DCSync attacks, enabling the retrieval of password hashes for any user or computer in the domain.
Detects the creation or modification of a computer account or user account with a suspicious name pattern 'SAMTHEADMIN-X$' (where X is a number) which is known to be generated by a hacktool exploiting CVE-2021-42287 and CVE-2021-42278. This pattern is associated with the 'Sam the Admin' vulnerability exploitation.
This rule detects uncommon outbound network connections on TCP port 88, which is the default port for Kerberos. Such activity, especially from processes other than expected system services like LSASS or common applications like web browsers and Tomcat, can indicate potential lateral movement or initial privilege escalation attempts through Kerberos delegation. Attackers often leverage Kerberos for authentication in Windows environments to move between systems or elevate privileges, for example, using tools like Rubeus for Kerberoasting or other Kerberos-based attacks.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in activities that occur shortly after a network connection to an IP address associated with 'Lab539 Clickfix'. It correlates risky sign-in events from Azure Active Directory (AAD) with network connection logs from devices. Specifically, it looks for AAD sign-ins with a risk level of 30 or higher, from non-guest, non-compliant, and non-managed devices, where the IP address has not been seen for that user in the last 30 days. This is then joined with network connection events to IP addresses found in the 'Lab539 Clickfix' external data, ensuring the sign-in occurs after the network connection within a short timeframe. The 'Lab539 Clickfix' reference suggests a connection to a known threat or campaign, possibly related to phishing or credential compromise.
This rule detects the creation of AWS API keys for a user by a different user. This activity is indicative of a backdoored user account being used to establish persistence within an AWS environment. It can also help identify unusual flows of AWS key creation within an organization.
This rule detects anomalous user activity patterns, specifically focusing on suspicious changes to directories or other behaviors that Microsoft Entra ID Protection identifies as 'anomalousUserActivity'. This could indicate compromised accounts or insider threats.
Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags within PowerShell script block logs. This rule identifies various Kerberos-related attacks such as AS-REPRoasting, Kerberoasting, Pass-the-Ticket, Golden Ticket, and Silver Ticket attacks, as well as credential harvesting and dumping.
Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior, often associated with tools like Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module. This indicates an adversary is using stolen password hashes to authenticate to a system.
Detects modifications to Group Policy Object (GPO) attributes, specifically 'gPCMachineExtensionNames', that are indicative of adding privileges to user accounts or adding users as local administrators. This is identified by the presence of specific GUIDs ('827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A' or '803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B') within the 'AttributeValue' field of EventID 5136. These GUIDs are associated with Group Policy extensions that can be abused for privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information or command line parameters. Rubeus is a C# toolset designed for raw Kerberos interaction, often used for credential access, Kerberoasting, and pass-the-ticket attacks.
This rule identifies the suspicious use of the AWS Security Token Service (STS) API call `GetSessionToken`. This API call is used to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials for an IAM user or role. Attackers may use `GetSessionToken` to generate temporary tokens to move laterally within an AWS environment or escalate privileges by assuming roles with broader permissions. The rule specifically looks for `GetSessionToken` calls made by an `IAMUser`.
Detects the addition of a new root certificate authority to an Azure AD tenant. This action can be performed by an attacker to establish persistence and enable certificate-based authentication for unauthorized access, potentially bypassing traditional password-based authentication mechanisms. This is a critical security event as it can lead to privilege escalation and persistent access within the Azure AD environment.
This rule detects the installation of a new service that exhibits characteristics commonly associated with the Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike 'getsystem' command. Specifically, it looks for Event ID 4697 (A service was installed in the system) and then analyzes the 'ServiceFileName' for patterns indicative of these tools. It identifies two main techniques: one involving 'cmd.exe' or '%COMSPEC%' echoing data to a named pipe (e.g., `echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a`), and another involving 'rundll32.exe' loading a DLL with specific arguments (e.g., `rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn`). Additionally, it flags service installations where the 'ServiceFileName' starts with a specific network share path (`\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\`). These methods are typically used by adversaries to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects the loading of the WinDivert driver, which is a powerful user-mode package for Windows capable of capturing, sniffing, modifying, blocking, and re-injecting network traffic. This driver can be used by adversaries for network sniffing, credential access, and defense evasion techniques.
This rule detects failed attempts by a user or process to call the 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function. This function requires the 'SeTcbPrivilege' privilege, which is typically held by legitimate logon processes. A failure to call this function, especially when combined with the '0x8010000000000000' keyword indicating a failure, could suggest an attacker (e.g., using tools like Rubeus) is attempting to interact with the Local Security Authority (LSA) to gain unauthorized access to credentials or perform other malicious activities. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 4673 (A privileged service was called) where the service is 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess()' and the operation failed.
Detects the presence of a base64-encoded signature ("UWhRC....AAYBAAAA") in the command line, which corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. This pattern is a strong indicator of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-33073. The rule aims to identify attempts to add spoofed SPNs to DNS records or check for their presence using commands like `nslookup`.
Detects activity associated with the APT31 (ZIRCONIUM) threat group, specifically focusing on credential dumping using ldifde, lateral movement attempts involving copying tools like procdump64.exe, netsess.exe, and 7za.exe to remote shares, and archiving data. This rule is based on observations described in the Crowdstrike 2019 Global Threat Report.
Detects DNS queries containing specific base64-encoded patterns ("UWhRCA" and "BAAAA") that are indicative of Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing. This technique involves manipulating DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests, forcing victim systems to authenticate to attacker-controlled hosts. This is a strong indicator of a Kerberos coercion attack, potentially related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-33073, where a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure is used.
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