Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the addition of new credentials (secrets or certificates) to an existing service principal or application within a cloud environment. This behavior is often associated with persistence or privilege escalation tactics in cloud identity platforms. The rule flags activity from potentially non-automated accounts and can correlate with recent administrative role assignments.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects the reuse of the same user's refresh token from two different countries within a 15-minute window. This behavior is a strong indicator of token theft or session hijacking, commonly associated with AiTM phishing, infostealer malware, or session cookie extraction, where an adversary uses stolen credentials from a remote location.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects high-risk activities related to SAML token-signing certificates, including certificate export from Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and unauthorized configuration changes to enterprise application certificate management. These activities are potential precursors to Golden SAML attacks, where an adversary attempts to forge authentication tokens.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects impossible travel sign-in events where a user authenticates from geographically distant locations within a short time window. The rule specifically flags the second, suspicious event as having occurred via a non-interactive session or single-factor authentication, suggesting the use of a replayed or stale session token to bypass MFA.
Detects impossible travel sign-in events where a user authenticates from geographically distant locations within a short time window. The rule specifically flags the second, suspicious event as having occurred via a non-interactive session or single-factor authentication, suggesting the use of a replayed or stale session token to bypass MFA.
Detects the reactivation of a service principal by correlating the addition of new credentials followed by a successful login event for the same principal within a 7-day window. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence maintenance or account hijacking, especially when legacy or deprecated accounts are targeted.
Detects modifications to application secrets or certificates in Azure that are performed by a user who is not the registered owner of the application, or when a new credential is added to an application that already has credentials configured, potentially indicating persistent access establishment.
Detects impossible travel sign-in events where a user authenticates from geographically distant locations within a short time window. The rule specifically flags the second, suspicious event as having occurred via a non-interactive session or single-factor authentication, suggesting the use of a replayed or stale session token to bypass MFA.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain where a device shows signs of credential theft (accessing browser credential stores or cookies) followed closely by a successful cloud authentication from that same user using a device identifier not previously observed in the last 30 days.
Detects a user account adding a new client secret or certificate to an Azure AD application/service principal, followed by a sign-in event from that same service principal originating from an IP address not observed in the prior 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential persistent access creation by an adversary using newly generated credentials.
This rule detects non-browser processes that simultaneously access a web browser's 'Local State' file and the Windows DPAPI master key storage directory. This behavior is a common precursor to credential dumping, as adversaries must decrypt browser-protected secrets (passwords and cookies) using DPAPI keys stored in the user's profile.
Detects instances where a risky Azure AD sign-in (e.g., token replay or confirmed compromise) is closely followed (within 24 hours) by sensitive application or service principal credential modifications by the same user account. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence establishment via account manipulation.
Detects a potential post-compromise lateral movement sequence where a host, previously identified as accessing sensitive browser credential files by an unauthorized process, subsequently initiates RDP or WinRM connections to other internal hosts using an account not previously observed performing interactive logons on that source host.
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