Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a successful Okta login that occurs after multiple failed MFA push notifications within a 15-minute window. It correlates 'system.push.send_factor_verify_push' events (representing MFA push attempts) with a subsequent 'user.authentication.auth_via_mfa' event (representing a successful MFA authentication and login). The rule specifically looks for more than 4 MFA push attempts followed by a successful login, indicating a potential MFA brute-force or push fatigue attack.
This rule detects failed authentication attempts in Okta where the security result indicates a "FastPass declined phishing attempt." This specifically targets real-time Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing proxy attacks against users enrolled in Okta FastPass, which is designed to prevent such attacks by checking the origin of the authentication request.
Detects when a high number of failed authentication attempts occur for unknown users on AWS, indicating a potential brute-force or credential stuffing attack against the AWS console.
This rule identifies when an encryption key file is accessed (downloaded, viewed, or copied) by an anonymous user in Google Drive. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive encryption keys before moving laterally or compromising data.
Detects when the AWS managed policy 'AWSCompromisedKeyQuarantine' is attached to an IAM user, role, or group. This policy is typically applied by AWS when credentials for an IAM entity are suspected of being compromised or publicly exposed, indicating a potential security incident.
This rule detects a successful login to the AWS console after multiple failed login attempts for the same user within a 15-minute window. It specifically looks for at least three failed authentication attempts followed by one successful authentication. The rule also calculates a risk score based on potential country mismatches between failed and successful attempts, and successful logins from unauthorized geographies (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria).
Detects when an AWS IAM user creates an AWS Access Key for programmatic calls. This action can be used by adversaries to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an AWS environment.
This rule detects an unusual number of failed authentication attempts from the same IP address targeting valid users within an AWS environment. It specifically looks for 'ConsoleLogin' events from AWS CloudTrail where the security result indicates a 'BLOCK' action due to 'Failed authentication'. The rule triggers if there are more than 5 distinct target users experiencing failed logins from the same IP within a 5-minute window. Additionally, it calculates a risk score based on whether the source IP's country of origin is associated with known high-risk geographies (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria).
Detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an AWS user. This can be an indicator of an attacker attempting to maintain persistence or bypass existing MFA controls by registering their own MFA device.
This rule detects suspected brute force attacks against Okta accounts. It triggers when Okta ThreatInsight identifies multiple login failures from the same IP address across one or more Okta organizations. The rule also increases the risk score if the IP address is marked as suspicious by Okta ThreatInsight or if the login attempts originate from specific high-risk countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria).
Detects a successful attempt to retrieve the encrypted Administrator password for a Windows EC2 instance using the GetPasswordData API call in AWS CloudTrail. This action indicates an adversary is attempting to gain access to credentials for a Windows virtual machine.
Detects AWS IAM activities originating from an EC2 instance that could be used to retain access or escalate privileges. This includes actions like creating users, attaching policies, creating/updating login profiles, creating access keys, creating groups, and creating roles.
This rule detects a specific privilege escalation scenario in AWS where a user creates a new access key for another user and then immediately uses that newly created access key from the same IP address to perform further actions. This behavior indicates an attempt to escalate privileges by leveraging a newly generated credential.
This rule detects when AWS API Gateway keys are accessed with the 'includeValue' or 'includeValues' parameter set to 'true'. This indicates an attempt to retrieve the actual API key values, which could be a credential access attempt. The rule specifically looks for 'GetApiKey' and 'GetApiKeys' events in AWS CloudTrail logs where the request explicitly asks for the key's value.
This rule detects suspicious Okta login attempts where a stolen web session cookie might be reused. It specifically looks for a single user (identified by `userid`) attempting to log in from multiple distinct IP addresses AND from multiple distinct browsers or operating systems within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass authentication mechanisms by replaying a stolen session cookie from a different device or location.
This rule detects multiple login failures from the same IP address targeting unknown users, as identified by Okta's ThreatInsight. It specifically looks for Okta events categorized as 'USER_UNCATEGORIZED' and 'security.threat.detected' with a summary indicating 'Login failures with high unknown users count'. The rule also incorporates risk scoring based on whether the IP address is deemed suspicious by Okta ThreatInsight and if the login attempts originate from certain high-risk countries.
This rule detects the usage of a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) service account key from more than two distinct countries within a one-hour period. It leverages GeoIP enrichment data from Chronicle to identify the geographical origin of the IP addresses making the API calls. This behavior can indicate a compromised service account key being used by an attacker from multiple locations, potentially to evade detection or perform malicious activities across different regions.
Detects a successful attempt to retrieve service API Keys within Google Cloud Platform. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials for further malicious actions.
This rule detects brute force activity targeting Amazon EC2 or Amazon RDS instances, as reported by AWS GuardDuty. It specifically looks for GuardDuty findings where the product event type contains 'BruteForce' and filters out sample findings.
This rule detects access to the 'wceaux.dll' file, which is associated with the Windows Credential Editor (WCE) tool. This activity is indicative of an attempt to perform pass-the-hash remote command execution, often used for credential dumping and lateral movement. The rule specifically looks for Security Event IDs 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) or 4663 (An attempt was made to access an object) where the accessed object's name ends with '\wceaux.dll'.
This rule detects the creation of a new API token within the Okta identity platform. API tokens can be used for programmatic access to Okta and, if compromised, can lead to unauthorized access, persistence, or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for 'system.api_token.create' events with a successful 'ALLOW' action.
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