Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized execution of a Bun runtime executing an 'index.js' payload within a GitHub Actions workflow context, specifically targeting known compromised action paths (e.g., issues-helper, maintain-one-comment). The detection requires correlation with either sensitive environment/secret access or anomalous outbound network activity originating from the same process, indicating potential credential theft or C2 communication by a malicious CI/CD pipeline component.
Detects modifications to the WDigest 'UseLogonCredential' registry key. Enabling this setting (setting it to 1) forces the WDigest SSP to store plaintext credentials in memory, which facilitates easier credential harvesting by attackers using memory dumping techniques.
Detects non-browser and non-messaging processes accessing both browser credential stores (like 'Login Data' or 'Cookies') and messaging application session storage (Slack/Discord LevelDB) in a single session. This pattern is characteristic of credential-stealing malware, such as RevStealer, which targets both saved web browser credentials and application session tokens for exfiltration.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to open handles to Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge with elevated permissions, specifically accessing thread context (often associated with hardware breakpoints used for process injection or credential extraction techniques).
The following analytic detects an uncommon process requesting full access rights to winlogon.exe, which may indicate Rubeus exporting Kerberos tickets from memory.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for full-access rights, specifically the value 0x1f3fff.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for full-access rights, specifically the value 0x1f3fff.
Detects recovered scripts/payloads that harvest environment variables, API keys, bearer tokens, and Kubernetes secrets/configmaps into a variable named LOOT
Detects the execution of processes or creation of events attempting to mimic Windows Security credential prompts. This pattern is characteristic of the TukTuk C2 framework's 'Cred Prompt' feature, designed to harvest user credentials by presenting a fake authentication dialog.
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an unverified OAuth application requesting high-privilege scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All). This behavior is characteristic of consent phishing attacks aimed at obtaining persistent access to sensitive data and mailbox contents.
Detects a two-stage activity: first, the potential unauthorized reading or access of LLM provider API keys from files, environment variables, or command-line arguments; and second, the subsequent use of those same credentials to authenticate to LLM provider APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure, Bedrock) from a different, unrecognized source IP address, indicating potential credential theft and session hijacking.
Detects a two-stage activity: first, the potential unauthorized reading or access of LLM provider API keys from files, environment variables, or command-line arguments; and second, the subsequent use of those same credentials to authenticate to LLM provider APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Azure, Bedrock) from a different, unrecognized source IP address, indicating potential credential theft and session hijacking.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects anomalous activity from IDEs or AI coding assistant extension host processes (e.g., VS Code, Cursor, JetBrains). The rule alerts when these processes spawn children that access sensitive local credential files, perform network connections to non-standard/unexpected domains, or modify critical CI/CD build script configuration files, which is indicative of a supply chain compromise within the developer environment.
Detects access to sensitive Active Directory objects associated with replication (specifically the Domain, Domain Controller, and Schema objects) by non-computer accounts, which may indicate an attempt to perform unauthorized replication or credential harvesting (e.g., DCSync attacks).
Detects instances where AI-assisted development tools (such as Claude, Codex, Copilot, or Gemini) initiate command-line processes (e.g., shells, interpreters, or network utilities) with arguments indicative of credential access, reconnaissance, or sensitive file interactions.
Detects Node.js or ProfileQuickHost processes performing file operations (read, write, rename) on sensitive browser directories, such as 'Local Extension Settings' or wallet-related folders. This pattern is commonly observed in credential-stealing malware attempting to extract browser-stored secrets or cryptocurrency wallet data.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet utilizing the GH0ST RAT agent to locate, stage, and exfiltrate sensitive AI API keys. The detection monitors for file write operations within specific hidden directories ('/root/.hermes/loot/') and the use of malicious command-line patterns or process context associated with Hermes Agent or GH0ST malware to search for configuration files (e.g., .env) containing sensitive API credentials.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet utilizing the GH0ST RAT agent to locate, stage, and exfiltrate sensitive AI API keys. The detection monitors for file write operations within specific hidden directories ('/root/.hermes/loot/') and the use of malicious command-line patterns or process context associated with Hermes Agent or GH0ST malware to search for configuration files (e.g., .env) containing sensitive API credentials.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet utilizing the GH0ST RAT agent to locate, stage, and exfiltrate sensitive AI API keys. The detection monitors for file write operations within specific hidden directories ('/root/.hermes/loot/') and the use of malicious command-line patterns or process context associated with Hermes Agent or GH0ST malware to search for configuration files (e.g., .env) containing sensitive API credentials.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet utilizing the GH0ST RAT agent to locate, stage, and exfiltrate sensitive AI API keys. The detection monitors for file write operations within specific hidden directories ('/root/.hermes/loot/') and the use of malicious command-line patterns or process context associated with Hermes Agent or GH0ST malware to search for configuration files (e.g., .env) containing sensitive API credentials.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet utilizing the GH0ST RAT agent to locate, stage, and exfiltrate sensitive AI API keys. The detection monitors for file write operations within specific hidden directories ('/root/.hermes/loot/') and the use of malicious command-line patterns or process context associated with Hermes Agent or GH0ST malware to search for configuration files (e.g., .env) containing sensitive API credentials.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process creates a scheduled task named 'WindowsUpdate' followed by execution of 'netsh' commands to dump wireless profiles or clear keys within a 15-minute window. This behavioral pattern is often associated with credential-stealing malware attempting to establish persistence and harvest sensitive information.
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