Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects inbound phishing emails that leverage urgent security themes (e.g., passkey, SSO, or MFA updates) to lure users into clicking links. It correlates these emails with subsequent URL clicks and suspicious sign-in activity, such as MFA failures, which are indicative of an attempt to compromise credentials or bypass MFA.
Detects the use of the device code authentication protocol in Azure Sign-in logs, which is a common vector used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks to hijack OAuth tokens.
Detects the removal of the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute from a file followed by the execution of the macOS 'security' utility to dump or retrieve passwords from the Keychain within a 5-minute window. This sequence is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Gatekeeper-related restrictions on a potentially malicious tool, followed by unauthorized access to sensitive credentials stored in the Keychain.
This rule detects the execution of Mimikatz or the use of its common command-line arguments, which are indicative of credential dumping and post-exploitation activities. It monitors process creation events for the 'mimikatz.exe' binary or command-line patterns associated with credential theft techniques such as dumping LSASS memory, extracting passwords, or Kerberos ticket manipulation.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a C# toolkit used for interacting with the Kerberos protocol. The rule specifically monitors command-line arguments and process names associated with common Kerberos exploitation tasks such as Kerberoasting, Golden/Silver Ticket forging, and ticket manipulation.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to perform Active Directory replication requests (DCSync) by monitoring for specific Event IDs (4662), activity types (DsGetNCChanges, DRSUAPI), and known Directory Replication Service (DRS) UUIDs. It specifically flags requests originating from non-Domain Controller assets or workstations, which is a common indicator of credential dumping via tools like Mimikatz.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a widely used offensive security tool for Kerberos manipulation, including ticket requests, pass-the-ticket, and credential dumping.
This rule detects potential credential dumping activities by monitoring for the execution of Mimikatz or command-line arguments associated with credential extraction (e.g., 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords'). Additionally, it monitors for suspicious process access attempts to 'lsass.exe' with specific high-privileged access masks often used by credential dumping tools to read process memory.
This rule detects potential credential stuffing attempts against a Fortinet FortiGate SSL VPN portal. It triggers when an external source performs multiple HTTP POST requests to the /remote/login endpoint within a short period, accompanied by the FortiGate-specific header, which is indicative of automated brute-force or credential stuffing activity associated with the 'FortiBleed' campaign pattern.
This rule detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a known C# toolkit for raw Kerberos interaction. The rule specifically alerts on command-line arguments associated with common Kerberos attacks such as Kerberoasting, requesting TGT/TGS tickets, and performing Pass-the-Ticket operations.
Detects evidence of potential credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule monitors for two distinct behaviors: the use of MemProcFS with device memory access flags targeting a RAW file, and the creation of files containing 'lsass.exe', 'minidump', and 'readme.txt' in their paths or filenames, which is characteristic of certain post-exploitation toolkits that harvest LSASS memory.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities associated with credential dumping and inhibiting system recovery. The rule tracks when a user account executes multiple commands related to volume shadow copies (vssadmin, rmdir, mklink) or attempts to copy sensitive registry files (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY) within a 15-minute window on the same device.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files named '.passphrase' or '.txid' within user directories. These file names are indicative of potential sensitive credential or wallet-related data storage, which may be targeted by adversaries for credential theft or unauthorized access.
This rule detects repeated attempts to use the 'dscl' utility on macOS with the 'authonly' flag within a short timeframe, which is a known indicator of credential validation loops often used by backdoors like Bazinga. The detection also looks for correlations with suspicious 'osascript' system preference prompts and the creation of '.passphrase' files to identify potential automated credential theft activity.
This rule detects potential quishing (QR code phishing) attempts by identifying emails with one or more image attachments and minimal URL content, followed by a risky user authentication event within a 3-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to harvest credentials via a malicious QR code that redirects the user to a phishing site.
Detects instances where an Entra ID application or service principal has new secrets or certificates added by a user who is not a registered owner of that application. This behavior is a common technique for establishing stealthy persistence in a cloud environment.
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (TGS-REQ) using RC4 encryption (etype 0x17) and specific ticket options (0x40810000), which are commonly associated with Kerberoasting attacks. This rule filters out service accounts (ending in $) to reduce noise, as these legitimate account types frequently request tickets.
Detects a single account requesting an abnormally large number of Kerberos service tickets (Event ID 4769) using weak RC4 encryption (0x17) within a short window. This pattern is characteristic of Kerberoasting attacks, where an adversary requests service tickets for offline password cracking.
Detects the creation or abuse of Volume Shadow Copies specifically to access the NTDS.dit file or the SYSTEM registry hive, a common technique for offline Active Directory credential dumping.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4624 (Logon). The rule specifically targets logon type 9 (NewCredentials) combined with specific process/package names indicative of tools like Mimikatz, or anomalous NTLM network logons (logon type 3) that are not anonymous.
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