Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized processes attempting to modify, create, or rename sensitive browser files (Login Data or Cookies) belonging to Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge. The rule filters out known browser processes and looks for suspicious initiating processes characterized by unsigned code or execution from common staging areas like Temp folders.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to modify, create, or rename sensitive browser files (Login Data or Cookies) belonging to Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge. The rule filters out known browser processes and looks for suspicious initiating processes characterized by unsigned code or execution from common staging areas like Temp folders.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to modify, create, or rename sensitive browser files (Login Data or Cookies) belonging to Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge. The rule filters out known browser processes and looks for suspicious initiating processes characterized by unsigned code or execution from common staging areas like Temp folders.
Detects signs of the TrustSink technique where an Entra sign-in process, while at the MFA stage, is intercepted by redirecting the user to a rogue External Authentication Method (EAM) provider. This unauthorized provider typically uses look-alike domains or tunneling services to host phishing pages that harvest plaintext credentials and return forged MFA tokens to Entra.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency password submission patterns from a single IP address within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing proxy (e.g., NovaCookies) testing multiple credentials before proceeding to MFA.
Detects evidence of potential credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule monitors for two distinct behaviors: the use of MemProcFS with device memory access flags targeting a RAW file, and the creation of files containing 'lsass.exe', 'minidump', and 'readme.txt' in their paths or filenames, which is characteristic of certain post-exploitation toolkits that harvest LSASS memory.
Detects evidence of potential credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The rule monitors for two distinct behaviors: the use of MemProcFS with device memory access flags targeting a RAW file, and the creation of files containing 'lsass.exe', 'minidump', and 'readme.txt' in their paths or filenames, which is characteristic of certain post-exploitation toolkits that harvest LSASS memory.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks targeting Microsoft 365 authentication flows. It identifies suspicious proxy traffic that contains authentication-related URIs or session-related cookies (such as ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT or refresh tokens) originating from hosts other than recognized Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of an attacker using a reverse proxy, such as Evilginx2, to intercept user credentials and session cookies in real-time.
Detects a sequence of events starting with a user signing in via the OAuth device code flow, followed immediately by mailbox item enumeration and sending of email. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who use device code phishing to steal tokens, subsequently using those tokens to access mailboxes and send malicious emails from the compromised account.
Detects the issuance of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) to Microsoft Graph occurring in close temporal proximity to a device code authentication flow. This pattern is indicative of device-code phishing attacks, where an adversary intercepts a device code to obtain long-lived, session-persistent access to a tenant.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious actions indicative of credential theft, including LSASS memory access for dumping, followed by the acquisition of browser or cryptocurrency wallet files, and the subsequent staging of data in temporary directories, all correlated by the same process and device within a 15-minute window.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious actions indicative of credential theft, including LSASS memory access for dumping, followed by the acquisition of browser or cryptocurrency wallet files, and the subsequent staging of data in temporary directories, all correlated by the same process and device within a 15-minute window.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious actions indicative of credential theft, including LSASS memory access for dumping, followed by the acquisition of browser or cryptocurrency wallet files, and the subsequent staging of data in temporary directories, all correlated by the same process and device within a 15-minute window.
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